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This thesis proposes a reconceptualisation of SCIence education. 
Compulsory science education should be seen in the broad context of 
general education, and science education should share the social goal of 
enhancing democratic society. The reproduction and transformation of 
social institutions is affected by the way people live their lives, arid 
people's daily decisions and actions are shaped by their world-view. By 
developing citizens with a science-compatible world view, and with the 
ability to think rationally and critically, science education can contribute to 
social change . 
The way science is portrayed to learners will influence their world-view. 
Science cannot be characterised by a simple, fixed method, nor is it just an 
alternative way of viewing the world. Science is best presented as a way of 
thinking, and as a conscious search for the truth. Citizens' critical attitudes 
and sense of justified skepticism will be suppressed if science education 
reinforces a positivist view of science. Alternatively, post-modernist 
teaching pushes skepticism to a level where it will destroy people's belief 
in 'meta narratives' such as the democratic project. 
Learning science involves gaining a measured commitment to a theoretical 
position, and also involves knowing when to change this commitment~ In 
the classroom, teachers may make moderate use of the authority of science, 
providing they are inducting children into science and not indoctrinating 
them. There is a fine line between induction and indoctrination, and science 
education outcomes depend on teachers' decisions made in a very complex 
environment. Teachers often face legitimate but conflicting educational 
demands, and this creates a 'dilemma' for which educational theory alone is 
unable to provide solutions. A model is presented in which there is 
considerable scope for teacher autonomy, and for teaching decisions to be 
based on craft skills and local knowledge. However, 'developmental 
research' does offer a mechanism for advancing pedagogical knowledge and 
teacher wisdom. 
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The thesis concludes that, despite criticism of the present New Zealand 
science curriculum, and despite primary teachers' lack of expert scientific 
knowledge, there is potential for progress. However, progress is contingent 
upon the provision of clear goals for science education and, particularly for 
primary school teachers, the provision of appropriate support. 
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CHAPTER 1 PUTTING THE THESIS IN CONTEXT 
1.1: A Personal Note 
Work on this thesis was started shortly after I took over the SCIence education 
department at Christchurch College of Education. At that time I was heavily involved in 
the development of pre-service courses for both primary and secondary students, and this 
seemed a natural source for the thesis topic. In order to narrow the scope, the initial topic 
was set as a report on the development and evaluation of a pre-service training 
programme for primary science teaching. 
I had written most courses from scratch but soon became aware that much of this had 
been done from a gut feeling rather than from an articulated theoretical base. Clearly, I 
needed to lmow what good science in the primary classroom was if I was to prepare 
students to go and teach it, and this became the new focus. Previously I had travelled to 
the other colleges and spent time in their science departments. Many of the ideas and 
courses matched my own - to help students who knew little science to gain confidence in 
teaching the subject; to teach students some basic science content within a very short 
contact time (and without putting them in a failure sitution); to persuade students to give 
children a science programme that was hands-on; and for us to give students the skills to 
teach in a manner that took into account the children's existing knowledge (and that 
treated children's views with respect). Largely, these views and aims corresponded with 
the 'constructivist' view of teaching and learning; a view that was later scrutinised by 
Michael Matthews (1995) and others. While Matthews' interpretation of constructivists' 
aims and methods, and his manner of conducting the debate, could be viewed as extreme, I 
came to share enough of his concerns to reject constructivism as the foundation on which 
to build science education. Constructivism provides some alternative teaching techniques 
but it is not the answer to all our prayers. 
While constructivism offered answers in the form of ways to teach science, I suspected 
that the question of what was good science in the primary school had not been seriously 
asked. However, one of the things I learned from the debate over constructivism - which 
is, at heart, heavily philosophical - was that the answer to what constitutes good primary 
science would come from asking the question, what is good science? Unfortunately, even 
a cursory reading of the literature of philosophy of science is sufficient to see that there is 
no clear answer to this question. Is science a omnipotent method of finding out the true 
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nature of the universe? Or is science a cynical way of raising the mystique of scientists' 
particular (but by no means priviledged) notions of the way the world works, and of 
advancing the selfish cause of scientists? Fortunately there are alternatives to such 
simplistic (positivist) and excessively skeptical (post-modernist) views of science. One 
alternative view lies in the broad band of 'realist' science, perhaps best described as the 
science of scientists, rather than the science of philosophers or sociologists [which is not 
to deny that there are philosophers and sociologists who hold realist views of science]. 
The bolder versions of the realism hold that science is about finding the truth, and in 
Chapter 8 I will explain why I favour this view as the underpinning for science education. 
While thinking of the processes of education occuring in the classroom, it struck to me 
that I did not really know what the purpose of education was. This was particularly so 
for universal and compulsory schooling which is a relatively recent phenomenon [and 
even today a requirement that is only thoroughly established in the industrially advanced 
nations]. Clearly, education has a function of socialisation, but this only raised further 
questions about the nature of society, about the relationship between individuals and 
social institutions and, in particular, about the nature of capitalism. 
At one stage in its evolution, this thesis was cynically entitled 'Science Education and the 
Meaning of Life'. It seemed at the time that such was the question that I would 
eventually face in my quest for a theoretical foundation on which to base science 
education. I did manage to avoid delving into the meaning of life, but work on this thesis 
has led me to question the nature of modern science, the place of science education within 
general education, the role of general education in society, the nature of our social 
institutions and the mechanisms for social change. The thesis topic finally evolved as 
finding a coherent rationale for compulsory science education. In terms of the New 
Zealand situation, this refers to science for Years 1-10 (Level 1-6 in the curriculum 
document). Of particular interest are Years 1-8 because these are where the foundations· 
for science learning are established, and because this is where teachers are least likely to I 
have specialist science knowledge. The result is a coherent justification for teaching 
science to all children, and a theoretical model for guiding and evaluating science teaching. 
Without wanting to sound presumptuous; this thesis is a re-conceptualisation of science 
education. 
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1.2 The Main Ideas 
The view that there are no new ideas in the world is not difficult to accept in the field of 
human affairs. Scientific knowledge advanced spectacularly once deference to Aristotle 
and other philosophers of old was replaced by critical examination of the behaviour of the 
world. Yet many of the current questions about important aspects of human existance are 
just those that have been asked for centuries. Scientific theories about the nature of matter 
move to deeper and more complex understandings, but different theories about how best 
to teach seem to be periodically recycled as political and other social climatic factors 
change. For example, in the early 1980's Peter Fensham launched a science education 
reform movement based on 'Science for All' (Fensham, 1985). However, this was 
predated by an English report of 1918 from a committee that was specially appointed to: 
describe the sort of science teaching which is suitable to form an essential 
part of a liberal education, and to report on the scope and nature of 
"Science for All" in Public Schools 
quoted in Westaway (1929), p90. 
One of the aims of such a science course was 'humanizing the work as much as possible 
by using daily-life phenomena, practical applications, machines, agricultural processes, 
&c.', and within the aims, 'complete freedom should be left to the teacher in accordance 
with his (sic) interest and opportunities'. This latter idea of freedom for the teacher also 
features in this thesis. 
However, within these limitations on originality, this thesis does bring some ideas newly 
to bear on science education. First, the justification for teaching of science is given in 
terms of social goals. Science Literacy and Science-Technology-Society movements 
promote science for social decision-making and for coping with a technological world, but 
my justification for science teaching goes beyond these. I see science education acting as 
an agent for social change by teaching skills and attitudes that will help citizens promote a 
more democratic society. 
The second contribution of this thesis is the call for science educators to consciously 
reject postmodernist views of science, and to project a view of science as 'the search for 
truth about our material universe'. They must do this without returning to earlier, 
positivist views, and this will require the adoption of a moderate realism (I will explain in 
Chapter 8 why I believe that the weaker form of realism, semantic realism, is inadequate). 
Within the modest realist tradition, teachers should develop in students scientific 
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thinking and a science-compatible world view. With such a view citizens would not 
accept social conditions as a given, nor would they mistakenly expect social problems to 
be absorbed and solved as part of science. Rather, citizens with a science-compatible 
world view would be capable of taking scientific skills out into the world and using them 
to openly scrutinise their social world. 
The third contribution of this thesis lies in drawing a distinction between holding 
scientific ideas at various levels of sophistication, and holding manifestly unscientific and 
incorrect ideas. For teachers whose own science lmowledge is at a rudimentary level, such 
a distinction should relieve the concern about children being right or wrong, and at the 
same time prevent teachers from falling into an 'anything goes' type of relativism. 
As a fourth contribution, the notion of a 'dilemma' is introduced in its original Marxian 
sense of a natural dialectical phenomenon. Applied to the classroom situation, the idea of 
a dilemma means that teachers should not see conflicting demands as an aberration 
requiring resolution but rather as a continuing inevitability to be dealt with on a case by 
case basis. 
This need for flexibility in classroom decision-making leads to an original model of 
teaching as the fifth contribution. This model specifies outcomes compatible with our 
rationale for science education, but also gives teachers the autonomy to apply their 'local 
knowledge'. As a consequence of this need for local knowledge, any research effort, or 
curriculum advice to teachers, will need to avoid being prescriptive. In Chapter 10, I 
explore briefly an appropriate research model, and I offer a critical evaluation of our 
current science curriculum document (Ministry of Education, 1993). 
The main arguments establishing the rationale and goals for science education appear in 
Longbottom & Butler (1999). 
1.3 The Raw Materials of Science Education 
The primary concern of this thesis is with establishing a rationale for teaching science. 
However, the larger goal of improving primary school practice makes it prudent to 
examine some of the factors influencing classroom conditions. At Christchurch College of 
Education, a typical 100-level, primary -science, pre-service class has 36 students, mainly 
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female, with an average age in the mid twenties. The ages range from mid forties to late 
teens and most students have had some post-school experience. Few, if any, will have 
tertiary science qualifications, and three or four might have taken chemistry or physics at 
senior high school (these numbers might rise to double figures if biology is included). 
Some students will be unable to remember whether they did science at form five or not, 
and even those who studied a science at senior level are unlikely to claim a high level of 
understanding. Despite this seemingly depressing lack of qualifications, the majority of 
students express both a willingness to have a go at teaching science and a determination to 
do better for their pupils than was done for them. 
For teachers in schools, science can still be one of the neglected curriculum areas. We 
routinely ask students about science lessons they have seen on practicum and, at most, 
two or three report having observed their associate teaching science. Frequently, there is 
no-one who saw science being taught. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that, where 
science is taught, topics tend to be those that are covered by library research, discusions 
on the mat or other non-experimental activities. None of this is surprising given the 
curriculum strengths of teachers and the deluge of curriculum changes faced by teachers 
over the last five or so years. Most secondary teachers are being asked to deal with 
perhaps two new curricula, their primary school colleagues have six new curricula 
(English, Mathematics, Science, Social Studies, Technology and Health) with more to 
come. 
The openness of the present science curriculum presents opportunities for teachers but 
also produces problems, especially for those who do not have a subject strength in this 
area. Two support publications, 'Developing Science Programmes' and 'Investigating in 
Science' were produced shortly after the release of the curriculum document (Ministry of 
Education, 1995a, 1995b). However, conversations with primary teachers suggest that 
they have not found these resources particularly. useful. Perhaps, in part, because the 
books attempt too much by covering from junior primary to senior high school. 
Commercial support materials, for example the Sunshine Series (Biddulf & Biddulf, 1992) 
and the Science Alive packs (Hanifin & Smythe, 1995) are well presented. Unfortunately, 
some teachers are easily enticed away from a practical/experimental base for their science 
teaching by the excellence of the print material (although activity cards are part of the 
Science Alive packs). In contrast, the three most recent Ministry publications, the 
Material World' and 'Making Better Sense of the Physical World' and 'Making Better 
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Sense of Planet Earth and Beyond' (Ministry of Education, 1998, 1999a, 1999b) are 
aimed at primary teachers and do seem to contain the level of support needed in content 
knowledge and in practical investigations. This is important progress because any reform 
needs to take into account the reality that primary science will be taught by teachers 
without expert knowledge. 
Direct help for teachers comes from the Advisory Services across the country and, in 
addition, potentially valuable support comes in the form of Ministry-contract, teacher 
development programmes. From my own experience, and from comments of those 
involved in other programmes as both providers and participants, there is a level of 
frustration at the limited amount of follow-up with resulting reduction in long term 
effectiveness. Even amongst the positive teacher evaluations reported by Gilmore (1994), 
the need for on-going support was emphasised. Bell (1993) identifies a number of 
personal factors essential for effective teacher change and, although Matthews (1995) 
objects to some of these as peripheral to science teaching, we should reflect that education 
is about people. The content of science comes from the investigation of an objective 
universe but the process of science, and certainly the teaching of science, involves the 
interactions of human beings. 
Kimai ki ahau 
He aha te mea nui 0 te Ao. 
Maku e ki atu, 
he tangata, he tangata, he tangata. 
[It is asked of me, 
what is the thing that is of greatest importance in the world. 
I shall respond, 
It is people, it is people, it is people.] 
In the final analysis it is people who are are the key to the process of education and it is 
people who are the target of the outcomes of education. What also is true is that for the 
process of rational change we do need people, but people who are informed, people with 
a purpose, people who are enlightened. 
In his book 'The Demon Haunted World' (Sagan, 1996) Carl Sagan gently explodes many 
of today's myths and legends - alien abduction and healing crystals for example - that 
seem to be so eagerly embraced by the public. Clearly a more rational population would 
result if we could eliminate such non-science. However, in the introduction, Sagan tells the 
story of how he disillusioned a taxi driver about many pseudo-scientific beliefs, and of 
9 
how he later felt saddened about this because the driver had held these beliefs 'not just as 
some errant doctrine but a precious facet of his inner life'. Equally clearly then, the simple 
elimination of a person's beliefs can be detrimental. Science educators need to replace 
pseudo-scientific beliefs by something creative, something imaginative, something to 
intrigue the non-specialist. The science of scientists can defend us against Sagan's demon 
haunted world, it can be a candle in the dark, but why stop at the defensive? Science 
educators must help produce a rational and critically-minded population by building a 
belief in the rational rather than simply disabusing people of the irrational. Such an 
empowered population could then enhance the level of democracy and raise the quality of 
human existence to the point where it becomes possible to eliminate the demons 
altogether. 
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CHAPTER 2 A RATIONALE FOR SCIENCE TEACHING 
In this thesis I raise three major questions: 
Why should we teach science? 
What should we teach in science? 
How should we teach science? 
If there is to be successful reform of science education, then there needs to be clear 
answers to these questions, and this has not always been the case in previous reforms. 
The answers to what and to how we should teach are strongly dependent on the reasons 
we have for teaching science. 
2.1 A Question of Why Teach Science 
Before leading into the main argument, I need to consider briefly other critiques of science 
education. Calls for reform are not new. While science courses have long been included in 
the general education of most children, the effectiveness of traditional courses has come 
under increasing criticism over the last couple of decades. Demands have been made for 
courses that would more appropriately fill the role of 'Science for All', (Fensham, 1985) 
and there have been a plethora of reviews and reform proposals. Reforms include 
demands that the content of science courses should be made more interesting and relevant \ 
to children's lives, or that ways of teaching science should be more sensitive to the way 
children learn, to the children's gender, or to their cultural background. Such reforms do 
not generally address the deeper question that we raise, and I will show (in Chapter 5) 
that some are in danger of encouraging anti-scientific views. 
Other proposals, based on the science-technology-society relationship (STS) and on 
notions of scientific literacy, structure science education around the empowerment of 
citizens to contribute to decision-making on scientific matters that affect their lives 
(American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1989). Reforms of this type have 
admirable but over-ambitious goals that ask too much of science and science education 
(Shamos, 1988; Millar, 1996). For example, if we broaden the goals of science education 
to include an understanding of 'economic, religious, political and scientific issues' 
(Ramsey, 1993), or if we entertain the notion that if science is enthusiastically pursued 
we will be able to solve all problems (American Association for the Advancement of 
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Science, 1989), then we set unattainable goals. By setting expectations that will be 
unfulfilled, we risk public disenchantment with science and with science education, and 
we open the way for the acceptance of irrational and unscientific notions. So, why should 
we teach science? 
"What do I teach in my science lesson today and how should I teach it?" is a question 
asked regularly by all science teachers, even if only of themselves as they do their lesson 
planning. However, behind the question of whether a class should do mirrors or magnets 
lies the more fundamental issue of why we teach science in the first place. To ask "why 
choose this or that topic?" is to ask what is the educational point of including a particular 
topic in a teaching programme. This in turn relates directly to the deeper question asked 
by Millar (1996); 'why [do we] want to teach science to all our young people'? [Italics in 
the original.] Such a question is not often articulated by teachers and only spasmodically 
are answers to the question attempted by curriculum writers and science education 
researchers. 
Until the question of why teach science is answered, at least partially, we cannot help 
teachers make decisions about which science to teach and how it should be taught, nor can 
we help them defend their decisions against criticism from those who are anti-science. In 
answering the fundamental question of why we should teach science I have been led to 
consider the place of science education within general education, and the place of general 
education within society. I assume that one of the roles of compulsory, universal 
education is to function as an agent for socialisation and that, in a rational society, 
socialisation involves not only maintaining social institutions but also involves trying to 
ensure that institutions work to improve the lot of ordinary people. Thus a major goal of 
education is, or should be, to improve the quality of human existence. My further 
assumption is that an essential factor in the improvement of society as a whole is the 
promotion of rational ways in which citizens can influence the conduct and direction of 
human affairs. Democracy currently provides the best mechanism for promoting rational 
change in society and for this reason I want to lillie education in general, and science 
education in particular, to the democratic project. With this linkage, a primary 
justification for teaching science to all children lies in science education making a 
significant contribution to the advancement of a more truly democratic society. In 
previous times, the goals for teaching science have sometimes included implicit social 
goals, but explicit goals have more often been concerned with the narrower outcome of 
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learning science for its own sake. 
2.2 The Changing Goals for Science Education 
I want to argue that reasons for teaching science have often been confused with questions 
of what topics should be taught and what methods should be used to teach them. Of 
course, content and pedagogy of science lessons are not unrelated to the outcomes 
produced but, by themselves, content and pedagogy do not constitute reasons for 
teaching science. There are at least two reasons why this situation might have arisen. 
First, curriculum writers are often faced with a pragmatic task of producing something 
that can be used by teachers who are themselves lacking in science training and who are 
working in situations not conducive to practical work where there is a lack of equipment. 
Secondly, there is often a fundamental failure of curriculum writers to deal seriously with 
the nature of science, and there is the generally unacknowledged influence of various 
'stake holders'. 
From the early in the history of general education, there has been conflict over what 
should constitute science education. Spencer (1859) saw science of 'greater worth' than 
other curriculum areas because it appealed to reason, and it developed memory, judgment 
and moral discipline. What he and others envisaged was a very practically based science 
education that would be useful in economic life of society. Others, including professional 
scientists, were opposed to this notion of 'everyday science' because, they argued, such 
an approach debased science. They proposed that liberal education should include the 
study of pure, abstract science. In fact, a 'Science of Common Things' had been operating 
very successfully since the 1840s (Hodson and Prophet, 1986). This early curriculum 
included applied science such as mechanics and agricultural chemistry, and as such 
provided a context familiar to children of the labouring classes. The overt goals of the 
programme were the intellectual development of children, the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge and the provision of experiences for the exercise of reason, speculation and 
imagination. The underlying goal was to improve the moral and religious condition of 
children of the poor by improving their self-confidence and integrity of thought. The 
programme was designed so that the restricted linguistic experiences of so many 
elementary school children was no longer an insuperable obstacle to the growth of 
rationality. Critics were first to attest the success of the programme. Wrottesley (1860) 
visited a pauper school where he asked the class for an explanation of a pump, and he 
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reported: 
... a poor boy hobbled forth to give a reply; he was lame and hump-backed, 
and his wan emaciated face told only too clearly the tale of poverty and 
its consequences, unwholesome and scanty diet in early years; but he gave 
forthwith so lucid and intelligent a reply to the question put to him that 
there arose a feeling of admiration for the child's talents combined with a 
sense of shame that more information should be found in some of the 
lowest classes on matters of general interest than in those far above them 
in the world by station.' Quoted in Hodson and Prophet (1986) pI 73 
Although the reasons are disputed, the fact of the matter is that science was removed 
from the elementary school curriculum in 1862. It was reinstated some twenty years 
later, but in the pure and abstract form favoured by scientists and the upper strata of 
society. Hodson and Prophet argue that the changes occurred not because pure science 
was a more effective vehicle for educating children nor because it was a more worthy area 
of endeavour. They argue instead that the changes had more to do with social control and 
the desire of the ruling class to capture the advantages that science education offered in 
this new age. 
Interestingly, the stated goals for the new, pure science remained much the same - the 
1882 Code stated that elementary science lessons were to be 'adapted to cultivate habits 
of exact observation, statement and reason'. However, Uzzell says of the science syllabus 
for standards I to III that it 'completely lacked purpose and system' (Uzzell, 1986). 
What had altered was the accessibility and the motivation for both children and teachers. 
The lessons were to be similar to the 'Object-Lessons' of the New Zealand Primary 
schools in the same era. In such lessons children were to observe a common object 
closely, or in a new light, or to compare two similar objects; the stated aim of such an 
exercise was to 'extend children's powers of observation and to extend their reasoning 
powers'. Unfortunately, a survey of reports in New Zealand Gazettes of the time shows 
that inspectors' universal complaint was of the lack of observation and reasoning, and 
that teachers took lessons from books, or simply lectured on unusual objects; "lecturing 
on the wonderful" as one inspector put it (Longbottom, 1979). It was during this time 
that Armstrong, in England, argued strongly for a practical approach to science, and the 
science education debate shifted from the reasons for teaching science to the methods for 
teaching science. It is understandable why the problem of poor teaching assumed priority 
but it is unfortunate that this diverted attention from the reasons for teaching science. It 
14 
was still assumed, if not explicitly stated in syllabi, that the reasons for teaching science 
were to do with gaining 'scientific habits of mind' , seeing 'interrelationships among facts', 
and drawing 'appropriate conclusions from evidence'. Unfortunately, these aims tended 
to lose sight of 'the abilities of many of the children' and 'the often inadequate facilities in 
the schools' (Uzzell, 1986). Perhaps one might guess that the knowledge level of the 
teachers would also be a salient factor. However, even as teachers' knowledge of science 
improved, as schools received equipment and as students participated in practical work, 
the major problem, the abstract nature of the curriculum, denied the majority of children 
any real understanding of science and any real chance of gaining the ability to think 
scientifically. 
Bybee and Ben-Zvi (1998) assert that; 
'In primary and secondary schools, the main reason for teaching science 
today is the same as it has been in the past - to give students an 
understanding of the natural world and the abilities to reason and think 
critically as they explain their world.' p 491 [Italics added] 
I have highlighted the last part of the sentence because I believe that it represents a 
significant shift in recent times from the reason for teaching science in the 1850s. In these 
earlier times science was clearly a vehicle for developing rationality, the underlying goal 
related to broader moral and religious dimensions; this is in contrast to the implied 
narrowness oftoday's goals where reason and critical thinking are restricted to 'explaining 
their world'. Some confirmation of the restriction on the application of reason to a narrow 
context is given just two pages earlier where Bybee and Ben-Zvi (1998) state that; 
'Throughout the history of science education, three major goals for 
students have been (1) to acquire scientific knowledge, (2) to learn the 
procedures or methodologies of science and (3) to understand the 
applications of science, especially the relationship between science and 
society.' p 489 
Later in their paper, Bybee and Ben-Zvi conclude that if curriculum developers can 
integrate the above three goals then; 
' ... students lives will be enriched, 'the levels of scientific literacy will be 
heightened, and the sympathy towards science as a way of knowing will be 
enlarged. More students will pursue careers in science and engineering, and 
we should continue to develop the understanding and skills required to solve 
our most vexing problems.' p492. 
15 
Such views underpin major reform programmes such as Project 2061 where, despite the 
liberal rhetoric of scientific literacy, the major assumption is that more and better science 
can solve all problems. These views are descended directly from those of the professional 
scientists who helped ensure the demise of the 'Science of Common Things' and, in so 
doing, very conveniently assisted the ruling class to maintain its privileges. These views 
are also just those which will increase public disenchantment with science and help to 
legitimate post-modern attacks on science. (See Chapter 5) 
Roberts (1988) asked the question 'What counts as science education?', and concluded 
that it has 'a socially determined answer rather than one theoretically or academically 
determined'. He identifies seven emphases that a curriculum might have (for example, 
science for everyday coping, and science as correct explanation) and for each of these 
emphases he examines what the implicit view is of Science, of the Learner, of the Teacher 
and of Societal Needs. While this provides a useful analysis, a decade later Hodson (1998) 
says of Roberts' initial question, 'it is still a pretty good question, though we may only 
be a little nearer to a satisfactory answer'. Hodson goes on to paint a broad picture of 
science education as 'enculturation' and of the need to avoid both the 'exclusion' of some 
pupils and the 'assimilation' of others. He covers important and easily ignored affective 
aspects of teaching/learning, the issues of motivation and independence of pupils, and 
pedagogical concerns with practical work and authentic contexts. Hodson defines the 
goals for science education as the establishment of 'critical scientific literacy' which is a 
broader notion than the scientific literacy of Bybee and Ben-Zvi (1998). For example, 
Hodson's critical scientific literacy lays emphasis on the transitions between everyday 
ways of communicating and scientific ways of talking and arguing, and on social decision 
making and social action. The notions of social decision making and social action present a 
classic problem of how to resolve issues where the concerns oflay-people clash with the 
knowledge of experts, this issue will be addressed in section 5.4 
Wallace and Louden (1998) identify three recent phases of change characterised by the 
emphasis placed on i) discipline knowledge (where curricula are designed by curriculum 
experts), ii) relevant knowledge (where concern is expressed for social and environmental 
issues) and iii) imperfect knowledge (where attention was paid to children's prior 
understandings). It is easy to identify where the Nuffield schemes, STS courses and 
constructivist teaching programmes would fit in this analysis. For future reforms, Wallace 
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and Louden recommend four guiding considerations: 
, 1: Whose understanding of science will be operationalised in the 
curriculum? 
2: How does the curriculum relate to the understandings of school and 
science held by students? 
3: What do teachers already know about teaching and learning in science? 
4: What are the range of contexts in which the curriculum will be 
implemented?' Wallace and Louden (1998), p 480-481 
While these are clearly important considerations, a notable absentee is any consideration 
of why we might be teaching science in the first place! 
What of our own curricula? Prior to the present curriculum the primary school level was 
served by two official curricula; 'Science for Forms I and II' (Department of Education, 
1967) covered Year 7 and 8, and 'Science, Primary: to Standard Four' (Department of 
Education 1985) covered Year 1 to 6. The Form I and II document was heavily influenced 
by the structure of the subject matter, and in this sense it mirrored junior secondary 
school curricula (an integrated Form I to IV curriculum was produced in 1975 but 
remained in draft status). Justification for structuring of material into conceptual themes j' 
is related to the assertion that 'science teaching in the past had been concerned too much 
with the teaching and memorisation of unrelated facts'. [Science for Forms I and II, p 4 , 
italics in the original]. Although there is a succinct description of the teaching methods to 
be used, the level of scientific expertise required far exceeded that of most teachers, and 
the concepts simply became new 'facts' to be memorised. Part of the reason for 
developing the 1975 Draft I to IV curriculum was the expressed concern over the very 
abstract nature of the concepts and the resulting lack of enjoyment by both teachers and 
pupils of the 1967 Form I and II curriculum. 
The Primary: to Standard Four document had a much more 'user friendly' look to both 
the presentation and the content. A series of colourful and well illustrated four and eight 
page booklets set out such things as the aims, programme planning and the role of the 
teacher. While the amount of written material was not burdensome for busy teachers, 
there was an attempt to present a balance view. For example, science is described in ways 
similar to that of the current curriculum as 'both shaped by, and shaping our culture'. 
However, unlike the current curriculum, it is also clearly stated that 'Science as a 
discipline has a distinct structure' and that the primary curriculum 'introduces children 
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into the intellectual processes by which knowledge is gained and incorporated into this 
structure' . 
However, the previous curricula and the current one all fail to seriously address the 
question of why we should teach science in the first place. The 1993 Science curriculum 
gives twelve goals for teaching science (page 9). Of these, three are standard fare about 
developing the knowledge of science and the skills and attitudes for scientific 
investigation, four promote a loose, constructivist view of science as an everyday 
activity, constructed by people and evolving, two are fairly standard STS goals about 
making decisions and two refer to the needs of the scientific community and to student 
career needs. Bar one possible exception, there is no reference to developing reason or 
rational thought, and there is no reference to anything not directly related to science 
(either as a focus of study or as an influence on our lives). This one exception, the eighth 
in the list, gives a goal of science education as; 
'assisting students to use scientific knowledge and skills to make decisions 
about the usefulness and worth of ideas.' Ministry of Education (1993) p9. 
Even then, in order to interpreted this goal as having any wider application we must 
assume that the word 'scientific' was deliberately left off before 'ideas'. In terms of the 
context of the rest of the page, a more probable reading is, I suggest, that 'ideas' was 
intended to mean 'ideas as scientific ideas' 
In fact, the major problem with the curriculum lies in what it does not say. Commissioned 
by the Education Forum (New Zealand Business Round Table), Kelly (1995) provides a 
more measured critique than Matthews (1995). One of Kelly's conclusions is that 'the 
openness of the curricula to varying individual needs' and 'the broad approach to the 
purpose of education' are 'superficially appealing' but that 'tensions and other 
difficulties remain unaddressed or, indeed, unidentified'. With such a curriculum, Kelly 
points out, schools and teachers are left 'to carefully pick and choose their way through 
the myriad of possibilities'. Such freedom would be a very positive feature if there were 
clear goals or guiding principles, but it is on just such matters that the curriculum is silent. 
There is no mention of the nature of science, there are only inferences about the nature of 
the learner or the processes of teaching, and the aims that are given are jumbled with little 
focus or coherence. Without this support, the provision of 'choices' simply abdicates 
responsibility and abandons teachers. 
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Furthermore, Matthews makes a telling point that must be taken into account whenever 
we deal with open ended curricula: 
This seemingly progressive idea of tailoring education to student 
differences or interests is frequently a mask for schools' reproduction of 
social inequalities ... Schools that adopt progressive pedagogy and 
minimalist curricula, compound the educational disadvantage of deprived 
homes.' Matthews (1995), p 162 
If this is true, then it would scarcely help to meet the key goal I would like to set for 
science education, that of helping extend democratic society! 
At the end of their paper on curriculum reform, Wallace and Louden (1998) demonstrate 
tentative optimism that a way forward will be found if we can understand and respect the 
complex issues involved. They say that the key message of the last 40 years is that 
'curriculum change is a complex mixture of the facts of the change process and the values 
that underpin change' (p 482). I would rather say that the key message of the last 40 
years is that little progress will be obtained until we attend to the confusion over, or the 
neglect of, the reasons for teaching science. One of the reasons for the confusion and 
neglect has been the dispute over what constitutes science itself. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 
'I would suggest that we might begin. .. by prohibiting the use of the term 
"scientific" .. .jor a trial period of say, 10 years.' 
Polanyi (1957), p 484. 
'Science, rather than being automatically self correcting, is currently the 
greatest single source of human error, precisely because it is perceived 
as the source of certainty and truth. ' 
Rogers (1968), p 189. 
'The University is plagued as much as any other institution by 
superstition, prejudice and dogma. The healthiest antidote to such social 
disease has been science and scientific ways of thinking and working ... ' 
Kerlinger (1977), p 8 
It has been humblingfor scientists to come to recognise ... that science is 
in a sense a cultural artifact. A different society, with a different "cultural 
hypnosis" ... would have created a different science. Harman (1988), p 
132 
These first four quotes were collected, almost for amusement, to show how easy is is to 
find apparently conflicting views of science. In part, the contradictions apparent in the 
views expressed above lie in the different meanings that the authors have for 'science'. In 
this first section I will make explicit the position that I take on the nature of science and 
later I will relate this to a rationale for teaching science. 
The next quote raises the important relationship between truth and teaching, yet another 
area where we may find conflict and confusion. In section 8.1, I will defend the following 
view expressed by Bonnett, although I will want to clarify the meaning of 'transcendent' . 
The fundamental relationship between thinking, understanding and truth 
can be left out neither of an account of good thinking, nor of how to 
teach it . ... [Good thinking] rests in a sense of truth which, far from 
being essentially 'constructed' by us, is transcendent. 
Bonnett (1995), p 307 
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3.1 The Development of Modern Science 
First, let us look at science. What is science? One view is that science, proper science, 
arose in Western Europe around the middle of the second millennium. This is not a 
universally popular view, and it is a view that is likely to lead to charges of 
ethnocentrism, sexism, scientism, cultural oppression and other heinous crimes. 
However, this is a risk worth taking because I want to promote the teaching of science for 
reasons that relate to the social goal of building a better society - not a more scientific 
society - in fact a society where ethnocentrism, sexism, scientism, cultural oppression 
would be unlikely to exist. What I will do in the next sections is to outline the 
development of modern science, and outline the emerging disputes about the nature of 
scientific methods and status of the knowledge that these methods generated. I will then 
argue that modern science is a qualitatively different activity to the knowledge generating 
processes of other times and other cultures. My aim is not to settle long standing 
philosophical arguments but to set out a position from which I can develop a rationale for 
teaching science. 
It is important to distinguish between the claim that modern science first appeared in 
16th century Europe and the claim that modern science was a Western European 
invention. Any human advance has a history. No human advance has sprung fully formed 
from a particular culture, instead, each advance has some debt to previous times and 
previous cultures. Important foundations for modern science were laid down in Greece 
some two thousand years before the spectacular (some would say frightening) 
development of scientific knowledge was triggered by Galileo, Newton and their 
contemporaries. Plato defined and categorised nature by seeking the essence of things, 
Thales developed formal ways of thinking about some of the obvious truths in 
mathematics, Aristotle systematised knowledge about numerous aspects of the natural 
world and Democritus, in suggesting that matter was ultimately discontinuous, provided 
an hypothesis that was to bear fruit two millennia later. Greek society contained 
ingredients essential to the development of science; a society in which some members 
were freed from toil to think, and a body of scholars with an appreciation of academic 
endeavour. Two key metaphysical beliefs were also present. The first belief was in self 
authorship, or individual responsibility, (Socrates idea of 'know yourself) which enabled 
people to distinguish between 'accepted by others' and 'literal truth'. The second belief 
was in the concept of 'nature' - that the world was a coherent system and that this made 
it worthwhile for people to commit intellectual effort to trying to understand the world 
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Not unlike some disputes in modern philosophy, Greek endeavours were split into 
opposing philosophical camps. Some believed that knowledge was to be found through 
Platonic idealism, or rationalism, in which the primary task was to decide on how facts 
were to be organised and only then to go out to seek the facts. Others believed that 
knowledge was to be gained through Aristotelian empiricism where people allowed 
observations to determine theories. It is important to emphasise that 'empirical 
conditioning' meant that idealism did not lead Greek 'science' to be unrelated to reality. 
The ideas of order and predictability did not simply spring unbidden to mind, they 
developed in people because there is a degree of order and predictability to the world. 
Equally, it must be said that empiricism did not lead to knowledge derived purely from 
observation; it has been recognised by Quine and others that all observations are theory 
dependent. However, despite these similarities with disputes over modern science, the 
activities of the Greeks differed in significant ways from the activity of modern 
scientists. Greek 'science' was a contemplative activity and people were not motivated 
by the idea of generating new knowledge. Crucially, Greek science was not based on 
experimentation; knowledge tended not to be put to the test, and this limited the 
potential for intellectual development. 
While the Greeks may not have 'experimented' in the modern sense, neither were they 
simply passive occupants of the world and this gives one further similarity with the 
beginnings of modern science. The Greeks inherited a rich store of human technical 
knowledge accumulated through past human interactions with the world. There was 
knowledge about fire, about domesticated animals, about crops and irrigation, about 
medicines and metals - the Greeks lived in 'unnatural times' just as we do now and, even 
if they did not 'interrogate' nature in the manner of modern science, the Greeks 
Imowledge ofthe world was, like ours is today, derived from the way the world behaves. 
The Roman society which eventually eclipsed the Greek civilisation and held sway over 
much of Europe for several centuries had an interest in technicallmowledge concerning 
engineering and military and civil organisation, a pragmatic rather than intellectual 
interest. Tradition and survival rather than science was the feature of even later centuries, 
the Dark Ages, in feudal Europe. However, changes did occur, there was a slow 
development of technology and an accumulation of investigative procedures and 
knowledge arising, for example, from the practice of alchemy. By the 16th century, 
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religion had weakened the belief in magical explanations. There was again a flourishing 
community of intellectuals who accepted that investigating the world was not 
incompatible with holding religious beliefs. And the economic system freed some people, 
through personal fortune or through patronage, to devote considerable time to 
investigations and 'natural philosophy'. Above all there was a new-found belief in human 
intellectual ability. 
Galileo is usually given as one of the first modern scientists because his science was 
characterised by experimentation. He designed experiments and made use of direct 
observation, but he also extended knowledge by means of thought-experiments, by the 
use of mathematical reasoning, and through his ability to idealise from the rather messy 
real world. The science of Galileo, Newton and of others who followed, was firmly 
rooted in the ways the world behaved, but the mind played a large part in interpreting 
what was seen. The key accomplishment of the early scientists was the weaving of 
Platonic rationalism and Aristotelian empiricism into a single experimental tradition, and 
accompanying achievements were the further development of mathematical reasoning and 
the extensive use of measurement and numerical data. 
Following in the footsteps of Galileo and Newton, a raft of experimental scientists 
explored seemingly every aspect of the natural world. For example, Anton Lavoisier, 
William Hershel, Michael Faraday and Louis Pasteur all helped, in the best experimental 
tradition, to shape an increasingly integrated and evermore successful picture of the 
world. There were national differences in science. In England the experimental tradition 
was promoted enthusiastically by the Royal Society whose members included Boyle, 
Hooke, Faraday, Davey and most other famous names in English science. Not all 
scientists were convinced of the efficacy of experiments, and the European tradition 
favoured more mathematical approaches. Both Hobbes and Spinoza complained about 
the new scientific method, not so much because they doubted the usefulness of 
experiments but more on the grounds that experimental evidence was not accessible for 
others to critique in the same way that a paper of mathematical theorising was. However, 
as the culture of experiments spread there was an increase in the number of skilled 
experimenters who could reproduce experiments and check the results, and the 
experimental method became mainstream scientific practice. As Chalmers (1999) 
commented on the Hobbes-Boyle dispute 'Boyle lost the theoretical argument in the 
domain of philosophy but won the practical argument in the domain of experimental 
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science' (P328). 
Disputes such as that between Hobbes and Boyle tended to be about the relative weights 
that should be accorded to experimental work and mathematical theorising, and it was 
generally agreed that both were a legitimate part of scientific method. Another issue that 
did come to a head around the time of Newton involves a question that haunts us still 
today. That question is whether the goal of science was to gather restricted but certain 
knowledge or whether the goal should be to gain an understanding of the causes of things, 
albeit at a lower level of certainty. Newton developed four rules which he claimed 
governed his own method and which included an affirmation of 'deduction from 
phenomena' (induction) and a steadfast opposition to hypothetical reasoning. From this 
method Newton's claim was that: 
'if they are correctly understood, knowledge of both cause and certainty are 
obtainable' and in this Newton's view was 'distinct from that of Galileo and 
Harvey, who were willing to sacrifice knowledge of causes in order to achieve 
certainty, and from that of Bacon and Descartes, who were willing to 
sacrifice certainty in order to achieve knowledge of causes.' 
Gower (1997) p80. 
At this point, I would like to raise two other questions, although I will not attempt to 
answer them until section 3.3. The first question is; What is it about the human brain that 
makes humans investigate, think about, and generate knowledge about nature? One 
response might be to suggest that knowledge production is simply part of being human 
Gust like using fire, domesticating animals and growing crops) but this is not really a 
satisfactory answer. The second question is: What connection is there between scientists' 
ability to produce knowledge about nature and children's ability to learn science? This is 
of particular importance because of the growing interest of science educators in the 
theory oftheories, and in psychological theories oflearning. In Chapter 6, I will return to 
the question of the link between doing science and learning science. 
I now return to the question of the relative weight to be given to certainty and meaning. 
In contrast to the philosophical meaning of absolute truth, Newton had in mind 'practical 
certainty' as the goal for scientific knowledge and, from this, theories of probable 
certainty were developed, for example by Bayes (Stigler, 1982), and much later by 
Keynes (1921). Doubts about the inductive method had been expressed by David Hume 
in the eighteenth century, and these doubts continue to surface. The problem is that while 
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inductive arguments seem to give a good practical way of obtaining information about the 
world, induction cannot lead to truth or logical certainty as deductive arguments do. Thus 
what seems to be an eminently rational way of obtaining scientific knowledge is not a 
logical way of proceeding. In logical terms, to prove the principle of induction true you 
would have to produce a deductive argument, and this would have to assume that the 
principle of induction was true - simply put, one cannot gain evidence that the inductive 
principle is true, nor can we prove it false. In the nineteenth century, Charles Sanders 
Pierce attempted to rescue inductive reasoning through a modification he called abduction, 
and this appears in modem forms as 'inference to the best explanation' and'retroductive-
hypothetico-inferentialism' . 
Bertrand Russell concluded that induction was essential for the operation and 
justification of science, and he proposed that induction was a logical principle by virtue 
of what reason tells us about the method - that is, the principle of induction is true a 
priori. The implications of this are great because this cuts across the long held belief of 
science: the belief that our knowledge of the world is provided by the world through 
empirical evidence, rather than being provided by some a priori knowledge independently 
of our experience of the world. Russell was prepared to sacrifice strict empirical 
principles in order to save induction, but many were not. Mach, Reichenbach, Carnap 
and many others remained faithful to the empiricist principle that knowledge comes to us 
through our senses. An extreme form of empiricism shaped the beliefs of the logical 
positivists whose 'verification principle' allowed only two classes of meaningful 
statements; analytic (true by definition) and synthetic (empirically verifiable). However, 
these beliefs fall foul of their own rules for we can ask 'To which of the two classes does 
the verification principle itself belong?' . It is not simply a definition, nor is it empirically 
verifiable; it is a stipulative definition which carries a metaphysical belief. Science, it 
seems, could not be easily rescued from a logical quagmire. 
Popper (1980) recognised the weakness in the logical positivists case, pointing out that 
'positivists, in their anxiety to annihilate metaphysics, annihilate natural science along 
with it'. Popper was concerned to find criteria that would distinguish science from 
pseudo-science and concluded that induction was a major impediment to this. Writing of 
Max Born's notion of 'valid induction' he says that it was 
'meant to serve as a criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo-
science. But it is obvious that this rule or craft "valid induction" is not even 
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metaphysical: it simply does nor exist. No rule can ever guarantee that a 
generalisation inferred from true observations, however often repeated, IS 
true' (Popper 1980, p27) 
And for how science proceeds Popper writes, 
'How do we jump from an observation statement to a good theory? ... by 
jumping first to any theory and then testing it, to find whether it is good or 
not; i.e. by repeatedly applying the critical method, eliminating many bad 
theories, and inventing many new ones. Not everyone is able to do this; but 
there is no other way.' (Popper 1980, p29) 
Popper's dismissal of induction did not impress Reichenbach who wrote in a review of 
Popper's book Logik der Forschung, 
'the theses presented in Popper's book ... appear to be completely 
untenable'; and 'r am '" unable to understand why Popper believes his 
investigation to constitute even the smallest step forward in resolving the 
problem of induction'. (Gower 1997, p209) 
Of this dispute between Popper and Reichenbach, Gower (1997) writes: 
'Both Reichenbach and Popper ... were committed to the exposure of 
appearances as deceptive. For Reichenbach the task was to show that the 
apparent irrationality of induction was illusory; for Popper the task was to 
show that the apparent indispensability of induction was illusory. In both 
cases the illusions, if that is what they are, have stubbornly resisted their 
attempts to expel them.' p210 
Popper's actions of separating the contexts of verification and discovery, and of assigning 
the latter to some sort of trial and error process seems to have cut us off from the most 
interesting and creative aspects of science. In terms of the question about the 'truth' 
attainable in science, Popper was right to try to distinguish science from pseudo-science 
but wrong to identify science just with verification. Science encompasses the whole 
careful, painstaking community effort of scientists that is bound by a code of ethical 
conduct. Science is not a strictly logical process and there is no predetermined trajectory 
of discoveries that science must follow~ but this does not mean that science is not a 
rational enterprise. The problem with the efforts of both Reichenbach and Popper to 
show that some components of science are logical is that it leaves it open for others to 
claim the enterprise as a whole is irrational or, at best, a-rational - a matter I will return to 
in section 3.3. In the next section I will outline some of the more recent views of science. 
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3.2 Naturalistic Views of Science 
As science became more successful in building an understanding of nature, and 
particularly as science became an increasingly powerful force in all aspects of people's 
lives, two trends emerged in studies about science. First, there was increasing 
philosophical interest in explaining how science was able to produce reliable knowledge. 
Second, and most recently, some sociologists have shown interest in studying what 
scientists actually do. This has led in some cases to attacks on the status of science and 
on the status of scientific knowledge. 
Kuhn (1962) was the first of many to derive a theory from the study of case histories in 
science and his now famous notion of paradigm shift was first published in 'The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions'. Kuhn's notion of theory change as some kind of 
dislocation has been followed by Lakatos' softer view of science as a Research 
Programme with a central core of beliefs and protective belt of auxiliary theories and by 
Laudan's even more open view of a triadic network of ontological, epistemological and 
methodological beliefs that are not constrained to change simultaneously. I will only 
consider Kuhn here because his seems to have been the most influential view, particularly 
within science education. 
Serious and continuing charges of relativism are levelled against Kuhn, and he has 
steadfastly denied them. Kuhn (1980) writes that he has been 'very much surprised' that 
he has been held to have claimed that: 
'Members of a scientific community can ... believe anything they please if 
only they will first decide what they agree about and then enforce it both 
on their colleagues and on nature. The factors which determine what they 
do choose to believe are fundamentally irrational, matters of accident and 
personal taste. Neither logic nor observation nor good reason is implicated 
in theory choice. Whatever scientific truth may be, it is through-and-
through relativistic.' p 207 
Of such 'misinterpretations' Kuhn remarks that they are made 'only by philosophers'. If 
this were so then there would be no problem, but while scientists are likely to remain 
immune from such influences, there is strong evidence that science education has been 
greatly influenced by Kuhn's ideas (Loving & Cobern, 1999). Some, particularly those 
interested in multicultural science, have accepted the relativistic ideas (for example, 
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Ogawa, 1995). The problem is that Kuhn, like Popper, is silent on how theories are 
generated. Even of reasons for theory choice, Kuhn says that, while not denying that 
there are good reasons for choice, 'such reasons constitute values ... rather than rules', 
and that values such as 'simplicity, scope, fruitfulness and even accuracy' can be judged 
quite differently (Kuhn, 1980, p 209). Whatever Kuhn may have intended, he offers so 
little as an alternative that he should not have been surprised that he has been read as a 
relativist. 
Ohlsson (2000) claims that despite appearances the ideas of Kuhn and Popper are very 
similar, and he poses the question of why Kuhn was more popular. According to 
Ohlsson, the answer lies in the approach taken - Kuhn adopted a naturalist approach, 
Popper a normative one. Since Kuhn's work, the naturalist approach has been dominant, 
either through the broad study of case histories as in the case of Kuhn (1962), Lakatos 
(1970) and Laudan (1977) or through the intensive study of a particular scientist, for 
example that of Faraday by Gooding (1990). Ultimately, sociologists have developed 
views of science by studying scientists at work. These views have often been critical of 
science, and some have even portrayed science as just another way of explaining the 
world - one of the more extreme views being that in strong programme (Barnes & Bloor, 
1982). Poole (1998) has noted that the denigration of science, and the rejection of 
rationality in favour of either subjectivism (where truth lies in the mind of the thinker) or 
relativism (where truth lies in the collective decisions of society), has followed a period 
of scientific ascendancy and deification. If we are seeking psychological reasons for 
denigrating science I would add to the list, the increasing complexity of science, its 
increasing influence on our lives and, indeed, its very success in producing knowledge at 
an accelerating rate. The problem for those wanting to defend science is that its very 
success, and its influence across almost all aspects of life, makes it difficult to promote 
science without attracting the charge of scientism. 
Feyerabend, famous for his anarchistic, 'anything goes' view of science, does not actually 
denigrate science as a whole, but only the current form of science, and particularly science 
as it is currently taught. In assessing the role of science he writes: 
'Any ideology that breaks the hold a comprehensive system of thought 
has on the minds of men contributes to the liberation of man. Any 
ideology that makes man question inherited beliefs is an aid to 
enlightenment. ... It follows that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
science indeed was an instrument of liberation and enlightenment. It does 
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not follow that science IS bound to remain such an instrument.' 
Feyerabend (1980) p 57 
His view is that science or any ideology (which he holds science to be) is acceptable 
when countered by one or more competing ideologies, the danger lies when one ideology 
becomes dominant. As a tongue-in-cheek example in the field of education he gives 'three 
cheers to the fundamentalists in California who succeeded in having a dogmatic 
formulation of the theory of evolution removed from the text books and an account of 
Genesis included'. I will return to some aspects of science as ideology in section 5.4. In 
the meantime it is important to recognise the distinction between science as liberating and 
science as oppressive, and to try to tease out the varying views of science that conflict 
and overlap in a most confusing way. 
Where are the battles over the views of science fought? Loving (1991) has produced a 
useful categorisation of positions on a two dimensional grid in which the dimensions are 
Rational versus Ideal and Realist versus Anti-realist. This is a simplification first because 
views do not exist as nice binary pairs, and second because there are potentially five 
different aspects to science: Ontological, Epistemological, Methodological, Metaphysical 
and Explanatory. I say potentially because, for example, many empiricists are likely to 
deny that there are metaphysical aspects. To give some examples of the complexity of 
ideas, modern empiricists would include Giere (1988), van Fraassen (1980) and 
Cartwright (1983). All would claim primacy of observation over a priori theorising, all 
would hold to the existence of a world 'out there' but only to a semantic view of theories 
as models that mapped onto the real world. The first three would deny the place of 
metaphysical beliefs whereas Cartwright (1994) has modified her views to allow a limited 
metaphysical influence and, further, is not entirely opposed to realism (Clarke, 1999). In 
terms of methodology, Longino (1990) and Harding (1991) both argue, in a way that 
echoes F eyerabend, for multiple (subj ective) perspectives to operate in science in order 
to make science as a whole more deeply objective. They cite example of corrections that 
have occurred as the result of a feminist perspective being brought to science research. 
Alternatively, Kitcher (1993) sees objectivity occurring through consensus within a 
community and Giere (1988) takes it toreside within the individual. Even subjectivity 
and objectivity have an added layer to them as Scriven (1972) distinguishes between 
qualitive and quantitative aspects of subjectivity and objectivity. 
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3.3 An Evolutionary View of Modern Science 
I will now outline what I believe is a reasonable account of science. It describes and 
explains the growth and conduct of science and, I will argue later, also provides a good 
underpinning for science education. 
I will not try to model science as a complete system that can be governed by rules and 
logic: Bronowski (1968) concluded that it was impossible to describe nature in a single, 
closed, consistent language. Neither do I want to select just pieces of science to defend as 
logical, as did Popper, for this leaves science as a whole open to attack. I concur with 
Ziman who argues strongly for the need to considering science as a whole: 
'By assigning the intellectual aspects of Science to the professional 
philosophers we make it an arid exercise in logic; by allowing the 
psychologists to take possession of the personal dimension we 
overemphasise the mysteries of "creativity" at the expense of rationality 
and the critical power of well-ordered arguments: if the social aspects are 
handed over to the sociologists, we get a description of research as an N-
person game, with prestige points for stakes and priority claims as trumps. 
... Before one can distinguish and discuss separately the philosophical, 
psychological or sociological dimensions of Science, one must somehow 
succeeded in characterising it as a whole.' Ziman (1980) p 42 
In order to give a broad picture, I will assemble what I consider the essential parts. I take 
as uncontroversial that science requires a community of enquirers and requires the social 
conditions specified in section 3.1. Thus we need an economic system that can free some 
people to think and an academic tradition that values knowledge on more than pragmatic 
grounds. Furthermore, since experimentation is a key element to modern science, there 
needs to be a minimum level of technology. In contrast to the empiricists, I suggest that 
metaphysical beliefs are an essential component of science; specifically, the concept of 
nature as a coherent system and the notion of self-authorship (the distinction between 
self and group) are essential prerequisites for science. These conditions seem necessary 
but hardly sufficient for science to occur. So far we could not answer the question posed 
in section 3.1: 'What is it about humans that enables them to investigate, think about, and 
generate knowledge about nature?' 
To answer this question I will move cautiously to a speculative, evolutionary 
explanation. I say cautiously because, while I find this a useful way of thinking about 
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science education, I do not want to tie my argument too tightly to such a speculative 
model of science. Furthermore, naturalistic approaches can be seen to provide a kind of 
empirical foundational view that this is how things really are (as we have seen in the 
conclusions drawn by sociologists of science). However, there has been some interest in 
genetically selected aspects of brain function (for example, Edelman, 1992, & Plotkin, 
1994) and, in the next two paragraphs, I will outline some similar ideas and relate them to 
the development of science. 
Plants have structural features that assist their survival, for example leaves are the site of 
photosynthesis. Plants often have environmental reactions, for example a tree will drop 
its leaves in a severe drought. Simple animals have equivalent structures and reactions, 
and more complex animals have behaviours which appear to involve decision making - a 
cat crouches instinctively on hearing a noise, but then decides to run or continue on. At a 
higher level, animals develop more sophisticated strategies on the basis of experience 
(learning) - an alley cat will ignore some familiar noises that would spook a country 
cousin. In primates there is evidence for learning being passed from one generation to the 
next (teaching). In humans, learning is raised to a new level. The ability to seek patterns 
and infer meaning seems to be a key feature of this newly selected species. Of course, 
while 'learning' occurs within individuals, a second important feature lies with the 
communal nature of humans. The development of speech and symbolic representation 
allowed the pooling and passing on of tribal knowledge, and this elevated our pattern-
seeking ability from a feature that enhanced our survival to one that ensured our 
ascendancy. 
In a pre-literate society, social knowledge is passed on, and the world is explained, 
through the telling and retelling of story and myth. Typically, a pre-literate society will 
have a language with a small vocabulary, and will use words in a way that results in truth 
and metaphor not being routinely distinguished. The explanatory myths and metaphors 
of pre-literate societies are qualitatively different to the understandings produced from 
modern science. With the advent of written language, vocabulary expanded, there could be 
more precise communications, words could be given more tightly defined meanings, and it 
became important to distinguish literal truth from metaphoric use of language. However, 
even with the favourable conditions present in ancient Greek society, the philosophic and 
contemplative activities of this era were not scientific in the modern sense. So, what did 
trigger 'modern science' and the cognitive processing that we know as scientific 
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rationality? One thing is certain, we could not explain the spectacular changes over the 
last 500 years by evolution - what ever ability we have must have been already present in 
the earliest societies. What does distinguish modern science from all previous meaning-
making is the experimental tradition, the notion of actively interrogating nature. By 
actively checking the veracity of theoretical claims, and by developing the techniques of 
investigation, scientists have extended the range of 'observables' to include what were 
previously 'theoretical entities' (for example, the germ theory of disease and micro-
organisms). Our modern scientific ideas about the world are derived by using the same 
meaning-seeking ability possessed by our distant ancestors. The spectacular acceleration 
in knowledge generation is because truth-seeking (as opposed to meaning-making) and 
active experimentation (rather than passively observing) form a positive feedback system 
of critical reflection on our own thinking, on community knowledge and on the process of 
science itself. Scientific rationality is enhanced as we gain more understanding of the 
world, and our ability to think more scientifically enables us to get a better understanding 
of the world. This is not to claim that previous eras and pre-literate cultures were (or are) 
irrational; it is just that modern scientific rationality is a qualitatively different way of 
thinking, a qualitatively different way of using our long existing natural propensity to 
seek patterns and find meaning. 
One result of actively seeking an understanding of the world has been a dramatic shift in 
the way in which humans view nature and the way in which our harnessing of natural 
forces has altered the way we live. This is not an entirely new phenomenon; using fire, 
domesticating animals and building irrigation systems are also associated with social 
change. The period of modernity is characterised by a qualitatively different way of 
thinking and a quantitatively different way of living. Humans have always sought 
meaning but not in the same manner as modern science; technology and change have 
always been present, but not at the same speed as now. Post-modernists, and others, 
have legitimate concerns over our effect on the environment and the alienation produced 
by modern living, and they ask sensible questions about how much knowledge we need 
and who benefits from it. I suggest that it is impossible to dis-invent science and return to 
the life of some previous time, that it is increasingly dangerous to carryon as we are, and 
that one solution is to add scientific reflectivity to the way of thinking of all citizens. I 
will expand on this in section 8.2 
If it is dangerous to carryon as we are, then some changes need to be made. These 
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changes should involve rational solutions, and include science in any future human 
society - the changes should not be postmodern ones which involve the denigration and 
devaluing of science and scientific knowledge. However, is our society open to rational 
change? This is the subject of the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
4.1. Democracy and How We Might Achieve It 
A truly democratic system would be one in which all citizens express their humanity by 
making rational choices about their own lives, and where each of them is able to join 
others in influencing the general direction of society. In our present society, movement 
towards this ideal is retarded by the economic impotence of many. The rationality of a 
person's decisions is in question ifthey live with fear in their homes; if they are forced to 
watch their family go hungry; or if they exist without thinking, without a vision and 
without hope for the future. One of capitalism's weaknesses is that in most capitalist 
societies unemployment is endemic, and this excludes a significant percentage of the 
population from mainstream society. At best these people subsist on a paternalistic 
welfare system, at worst they are allowed to eke out a brutalising existence in 
overcrowded city slums or substandard rural housing. The situation of many elderly 
people, and those in low paid and casualised jobs, is little better than that of the 
unemployed. The reality is that behind all the rhetoric of opportunity and choice, there 
lies the crude fact that in a 'market economy' economic muscle is paramount - put bluntly, 
if you have no money you have no choice. This is not to imply a determinism, but simply 
to state that the opportunities and influences of Bill A Smith, company director, living in 
Remuera, are likely to be significantly greater than those of Bill B Smith, unemployed and 
renting in Mataura. This situation is in conflict with any enlightened concept of 
democracy, so why is such a socially destructive situation allowed to continue? The 
answer lies in the general lack of understanding of the processes and power structures in 
society. Probing questions are rarely asked, and action almost never taken, even over the 
grossest social inequities. This reflects an inability of most of the population to ask 
appropriate questions, and a conscious decision by a small minority not to act. 
The concepts of democracy developed within capitalism, and particularly those implied 
by Hayek and the current exponents of right wing philosophy, are all based on the 
primacy of the individual, that is on the maxim that what is best for each individual is best 
for society. Individuals are taken to be motivated solely by self-interest and, in its 
extreme form, ontological individualism leads to the conclusion that society is an 
abstraction - vide Mrs Thatcher and some of our own right wing ideologues - and can be 
said not to exist at all. Soltis (1993) describes a model of democracy for twentieth 
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century, amoral, consumer-oriented and acquisitive societies as follows: 
In such nations, be they one-, two-, or multi-party systems, a cadre of 
professional politicians are the "entrepreneurs" who sell themselves to 
the voter-consumers for a term of office wherein they, not the citizens, 
make decisions and maintain an equilibrium in the distribution of 
political, economic and social goods. The people are then free of 
political responsibility and go their own way in pursuit of their own 
interests, material needs and wants while being governed by professionals. 
Needless to say, in such a democracy, education for citizenship would 
seem to require only minimum effort. [p 151] 
Clearly, such a democracy will have very limited potential to promote general human 
development. 
Snook (1995) is even more critical of government under a 'New Right' or 'Libertarian' 
banner claiming that: 
as the communist regimes have collapsed under the democratic banner, 
some western democracies including [New Zealand] are in the process of 
instituting their own form of dictatorship. 
Both Soltis and Snook are describing societies that have some of the formal structures of 
democracy but fail to have the democratic spirit - such a characteristic is not 
unrepresentative of capitalist societies. However, within educational writings we find a 
broad and liberal (as opposed to libertarian) view of democracy in which emphasis is 
placed on community goals and active participation by all members. The democratic 
ideals of Dewey (1916) are implied in the radical critiques of Bowles and Gintis (1976) 
and Apple (1985), and extended by writers such as Gutmann (1987) and Levin (1998). If 
we are to make progress with democracy, it is important that education for democracy, 
and education about democratic ideals, continue to be a feature of general education. 
Education for a democracy places obligations on the school as a community to reflect 
democratic ideals (Dewey, 1916), and also places restrictions on the style of teaching 
used (Portelli, 1993). Portelli characterises teaching and learning as 'an intentional and 
cooperative activity'. He condemns 'hidden curricula' and any resulting covert outcome, 
even if these outcomes are educationally defensible. He argues that all goals should be 
made explicit since teaching must involve an element of trust, and trust demands 
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openness. In my view, educators should use all ethical ways possible to demonstrate and 
develop democracy within capitalism while avoiding the utopianism of Dewey, and the 
naively confrontational approach of the radical critics. 
What we must do is to break away from the image of education for democracy as simply 
preserving the status quo; such an image is based on the naive view that we have achieved 
democracy and simply need to protect it. Children need to be taught democratic ideals as 
part of general education. One possible path to a truly democratic system lies in the 
linking of the individual with wider society, as expressed in Habermas' theory of 
communicative action (Peukertruth, 1993). In this it is observed that individual 
development can only take place within a nurturing society, that is the development of 
autonomy and independence in a child is necessarily accompanied by a corresponding 
development of greater mutual interaction in human relationships. If every individual was 
enabled to consciously live their own life in a way that was linked to the ability of all 
others to do the same we would make individual freedom and universal solidarity 
complementary rather than contradictory concepts. In exercising rational decisions about 
our lives, we would be bound in our actions to ensure that all others can exercise the same 
rights. Such an ethic could not be satisfied with a merely formalised democracy because, 
for many people, democracy without the democratic spirit, means that notions such as 
'freedom to choose' do not represent real options. 
Unfortunately, even if we are successful in teaching democratic ideals, there is no 
guarantee that having such ideals will enable citizens to promote change. If human society 
is simply not open to change by conscious action, or if the power structure in a particular 
society inhibits change, then democratic ideals will remain as ideas in people's heads. The 
next two sections explore the relationship between individuals and their society and give 
an analysis of some aspects of advanced capitalist society. 
4.2 The Relationship Between Individuals and Society 
When analysing social issues it is easy to accord too much responsibility for action to 
individuals (when in reality they are greatly constrained by their social context) and it is 
equally easy to use the constraints imposed by social context as an excuse for inaction. 
The challenge is to steer a path between these two extremes. In this section I develop the 
view of Bhaskar (1978) which maintains a balance between individual independence and 
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social determinism. 
If we ask what distinguishes humans from other animals, the answer can be framed in 
concrete form. It lies in such things as using language, wearing clothes, printing books, 
extracting minerals, painting murals, building dams, writing poetry, constructing 
mathematical models of the atom, and walking on the moon - a mixture of curiosity, 
creativity, and the knowledge and technical ability to consciously influence both the 
physical and social environments. We can attribute these characteristically human abilities 
to neuro-physiological structures - an enlarged cerebral cortex - or to psychological 
characteristics such as intelligence and rationality. However, individual humans could not 
have utilised these neurological structures, nor displayed these psychological 
characteristics, without the physical, emotional and intellectual support provided by a 
social grouping. What this means is that social organisation is an aspect of the essence of 
being human, and that our humanity is partly defined by our social relationships. In other 
words, we have an individual existence but we could not exist independently of society. 
This indeed is the answer to those who hold to ontological individualism - 'the individual' 
makes no sense, and the individual could not even exist as a human person without the 
language and structures devised by social groups. 
In Bhaskar's view, society is a web of relationships (for example those within the family 
or those within the political and economic system) which exists within an objective set of 
physical and intellectual artifacts (for example, the climate, the roading system, concepts 
of equity or theories about the structure of the solar system) (Bhaskar, 1978). Each 
individual is born into a society which provides both the conditions for that person's 
development, and the framework for their intentional actions. Thus existing society 
passes influence downwards to its citizens through the process of socialisation (taken 
very broadly). Since society preexists any particular individual, intentional human action 
is moulded by society. 
However, this does not imply complete social determinism, for society itself does not 
exist independently of human action. The network of relationships, which is society, is 
confirmed and made real through the daily actions of individuals. This process of 
confirmation can be intentional, for example when we take part in elections or obey the 
instructions of our head of department. Alternatively, we may be unaware of the 
consequences of our actions, for example, by choosing to attend a science education 
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conference the participants are helping confirm the importance of academic research and 
also consolidating their own institutional position. There are also times when our actions 
promote change, for example, by choosing to take a car to work we intentionally, or 
unintentionally, undermine the public transport system. 
Individuals are not of paramount importance and society is more than the sum total of the 
actions of autonomous individuals. However, neither are humans the predestined 
products of their historical background and social environment. Providing that we are not 
lulled into accepting that choice is mediated through market forces, there is a degree of 
freedom in all aspects of social life. Teachers may not be able to mould children as they 
please, but teachers are able to present alternatives, to create opportunities and to implant 
ideas. The education system does provide one avenue for social change. 
Thus, the institutions of society are continually being reproduced or, to varying degrees, 
transformed. The mechanism affecting social institutions is the daily actions of people 
and this may produce change either intentionally or unintentionally. 
It is important that the institutions of society be reproduced, for this gives stability to 
society. However, a successful society will be one that exhibits change as well as 
stability. Society has been changed unintentionally as the result of a wide range of actions, 
the most dramatic changes often being related to the adoption of a new technology such as 
the spread ofthe printing press or the harnessing of new energy sources. Change has also 
been brought about by the conscious actions of a few or the considered actions of citizens 
as a whole, but rarely are such changes exactly as intended - neither the projects of 
ambitious kings nor the results of popular uprisings are entirely predictable. All of these 
change mechanisms have operated in the past and will no doubt continue to do so. 
However, we wish to promote the democratic development of society, where the 
considered and collective actions of members of society result in relatively predictable 
changes serving the interests of all members. To maximise the success of any such 
mechanism we need to understand the operation of our present society. 
4.3. Our Social Structure and the Potential for Change 
Human society and history can be bewildering in its complexity. In their everyday lives, 
human beings generate knowledge, pass on ideas and learn new skills. This activity creates 
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intellectual and physical artifacts that alter the material conditions under which the future 
is constructed. From this complex and potentially chaotic system, Marx produced a broad 
synthesis of human history and a small number of powerful generalisations and insights 
that help us to understand human affairs. In this way Marx's contribution to history and 
sociology is analagous to Newton's contribution to science and engineering. 
Marx traced the development of human society through the primitive communism of 
early civilisation, the slave societies, the feudal period and into the present capitalist 
phase. He expected and supported some form of post-capitalist society, but he also 
acknowledged the progressive influence of capitalism in breaking the hereditary power of 
the feudal system and in harnessing the productive forces of technology. Under 
capitalism, production has been stimulated to the point where it is feasible to eliminate 
the daily struggle to meet the necessities of life; this productivity holds out the tantalising 
possibility of all humans being freed to seriously consider the quality of life. However, 
Marx also saw that, while the technical problems of production were being solved under 
capitalism, the problem of equitable distribution of goods remained a problem. He 
envisaged therefore that capitalism would bring about its own demise. He predicted that 
members of the new working class, alienated by deskilling and ever increasing demands for 
productivity, would be united by their common situation and would eventually organise 
in opposition and usher in a new age of freedom and democracy. Thus capitalism, the 
system that enabled the bourgeoisie to overthrow feudalism, would in turn produce its 
own 'grave diggers'. The 1917 revolution did overthrow nascent Russian capitalism but 
the revolution failed to establish a new democracy. At the risk of oversimplification, the 
same could be said for subsequent communist revolutions in other countries. 
Commentators differ as to why these countries did not establish working democracies, 
but clearly the failure to do so had much to do with the recent dramatic collapse of 
European communism. 
In contrast to revolutionary change, the mechanisms that enabled capitalism to undermine 
the feudal system also ensure that capitalism itself remains fluid; change is endemic. The 
economic freedoms required for the market place have spilled over into the political arena 
where, at least in the advanced capitalist countries, the state is usually careful not to 
appear overtly oppressive. The accompanying development of democracy has resulted in 
a 'free market' for new ideas. The capitalist system offers large rewards to the successful 
and in doing so encourages the growth of meritocracy and taps more deeply into the 
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innovative capacity of human beings than any previous system. Capitalism has shown a 
remarkable resilience and adaptability, and in many nations it delivers a continually rising 
material standard of living to the majority of the population. 
In addition to these positive features, capitalism exhibits features that limit human 
progress. Capitalism has a logic based on the demand for a return on capital invested, and 
on the forces of competition. Thus the measure of the worth of ideas and innovations is 
strongly biased towards purely economic success. Furthermore, the investment capital 
which stimulates and supports business produces a return and so provides even more 
investment capital. This positive feedback loop generates ever increasing production and 
consumption but brings with it an inherent instability. Slumps, market collapses, 
unemployment and inflation are usually seen as the inevitable system responses to the 
boom and bust instability. A fundamental problem with the capitalist system is that 
human concerns are not adequately factored in, that is to say that the demands of capital 
are considered more important than the needs of people. Our present level of democracy 
is such that many people do not have their economic voice heard. Nonetheless, although 
we only have a stunted form of democracy, the fact that it is claimed to be at the root of 
capitalist society gives us a base from which to make changes. 
It is not easy to make fundamental changes to any society. Each of the past phases of 
social development contained its own world view and an all-pervasive set of ideas and 
values. These ideas and values, the hegemony of the ruling class, provided stability and 
were accepted as the natural state of affairs - even by disadvantaged sections of society. 
A useful analogy is the Kuhnian notion of a scientific paradigm in which everything is 
viewed and interpreted from within the framework of a given set of assumptions. Today, 
for example, under capitalist hegemony it is difficult for people to imagine alternatives to 
wage labour and the private ownership of plant - it all seems to be the natural state of 
affairs and, under the accepted system, people are led to make choices which perpetuate 
that system. In this way, ruling class domination places restraints on people's purposive 
involvement in influencing the direction of society. The success of capitalist hegemony 
can be judged by taking the repeated failure of the political left to make fundamental social 
changes in Western countries and comparing this with the speed and apparent ease with 
which recent changes took place in Eastern Europe. 
If one of the outcomes of general education is that people hold democratic ideals, then this 
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may promote the development of democracy in society. However, we should not expect 
simply to define democracy abstractly and then have people put it in place, for this 
would ignore the dynamic nature of social reproduction and transformation. Furthermore, 
the process of change will require more than a belief in democratic ideals. In Section 4.1, 
the importance of educating people in democratic ideals was emphasised but nothing said 
about the mechanisms by which a principle such as that of communicative action could be 
implemented; nor was anything said about the political will that would be required. In the 
face of capitalist hegemony, simply educating people about democratic ideals is unlikely 
to produce change. If we wish a healthy democracy to develop, then people must be 
willing and able to ask fundamental questions, to seek reasons for why things happen, and 
be prepared to change things when necessary. A prerequisite for such a state of affairs 
would be to have a general population with a rational view of the world, a predisposition 
to think critically and a respect for evidence. 
As it has developed over the centuries, science has evolved certain, rather exact and 
exacting procedures for assessing evidence and knowledge claims. It has also developed -
at least among its advanced practitioners - certain attitudes such as the predisposition to 
analyse and the inclination to resist premature closure. It is reasonable to expect science 
education to help produce a population able to apply creativity and reason to changing 
society. After all, it is by the use of rational analysis and the creative application of 
reason that the international community of scientists produces reliable public knowledge 
about the world. Unfortunately, the outcomes of science education are undermined 
because the view of science and the world held by most practising scientists is not shared 
by all science educators. In the next chapter I turn to the views of science, to the 
outcomes of science education, and to one way of exerting democratic control. 
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CHAPTER 5 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 
5.1. Positivism, Technology and Lack of Control 
Science has a very powerful and all-pervasive influence on modern society. The 
relationship between humans and their world has been influenced by a number of 
philosophies, for example the long fight of Christianity against magical beliefs. However, 
the most recent influences have been that of scientific thinking and our understanding of 
the material world. The general decline in belief in the supernatural is at least partly linked 
to scientific notions of tests and evidence, and the acceptance of the need of a physical 
cause for phenomenon. Similarly, scientific understanding of the heliocentric solar system, 
and of evolution through natural selection have altered perceptions of the place of humans 
in the universe. More directly, scientific knowledge fosters the rapid advance of 
technology which, in turn, alters the way we live our lives. While engineering inventions 
such as spinning and weaving machinery dramatically altered the rural face of Europe, it is 
the recent advances such as those in chemical and medical technology, and the ubiquitous 
silicon chip, that are perceived to be more directly linked to scientific research and 
development. Thus twentieth century technological changes and their effect on people's 
lives is likely to influence how science is viewed and the esteem in which it is held. No 
change is ever an unqualified influence for the better, and this leads some people to be 
willing or even eager to downgrade the status of science. 
Democracy and science have developed together under capitalism, and in many ways 
science exemplifies an international, democratic community. However, while people 
rarely reject democratic ideas, science is often under attack and we need to look for 
reasons for this. A common starting point for the criticism of science, and for the 
advancement of an anti-science philosophy, is a fear of technocratic control. This fear has 
two components. This first component is the observation that technology controls 
people rather than the reverse, for example the invention of trains, cars and aeroplanes has 
had a dramatic and irresistible effect on demography and cultural diversity. The second 
component is the belief that scientific certainty means that there is a totally determined 
technical solution to every problem, and that a scientific approach to a problem removes 
from people any choice about the solution. 
Some of the results of technology seem to justify the first fear, that of technology 
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controlling people. However, it is not the scientific ideas and technological capabilities per 
se that alter our lives, but the political and economic decisions that are made about the use 
of technology. Ultimately, the impact of science is mediated through the structure of our 
social organisation. Which ideas are developed, and which ideas lie dormant, is only partly 
a matter of technical feasibility. The overriding factors are always economic ones that 
operate through the ubiquitous 'market place' (which in theory is democratic but in 
practice is distorted by the unequal distribution of economic power). Scientific literacy 
for all, which is the aim of some science education reforms, will not give citizens effective 
control over the influence of science and technology. Rather, we need to strengthen the 
role of democracy in society, for this would give citizens control over the institutions and 
processes of political and economic decision making. 
However, while greater political and economic democracy is a necessary condition for 
controlling and humanising technology, it is not a sufficient condition; the scientific 
community too must play its part. In one sense science is value neutral because it gives a 
picture of how the world is, but at a different level the scientific community must be 
responsive to the social order in which science operates, and to the values on which 
scientific work impinges. Scientific research is a rational exercise, and its results are 
constrained by the behaviour of the real world, but decisions about where to put the 
research effort are open to prejudice, bias and undue economic influence. As a further 
complication, the results of science (the technologies available) have largely forged the 
material conditions under which decisions are made about research priorities. Thus a 
totally objective science is not possible, science itself is not immune from capitalist 
hegemony. For example, a major problem in setting priorities in the spending of public 
health money arises precisely because of the vast range of technically feasible, but very 
expensive, medical techniques available. Why these techniques have been developed ahead 
of others is a matter for debate but, once developed, they strongly influence further 
development. In this way, science sometimes generates ethical problems which, by itself, 
science has no warrant to solve (other than by offering a rational approach or by offering 
yet more technical possibilities). If we had a mechanism by which reasoned societal input 
could influence the direction of research endeavours, human concerns could be factored 
more strongly into the enterprise of science. Thus a strengthened democracy would 
influence the progress and direction of science. 
The second fear, that of poor decision-making based on 'scientific certainty', arises from a 
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belief in the narrow, positivist view of science. In this mistaken view, science is a strictly 
logical procedure for pursuing truth by objectively observing the facts of nature. This is 
an oversimplified and empirical picture of a scientific method that leads to claims of 
certainty of knowledge. Such a view is damaging to science and to society because it 
reduces the complex set of analytical, creative and critical behaviours that are the rational 
pursuit of scientific lmowledge to the mindless following of an algorithm. It paints science 
as a reflexive rather than a reflective behaviour. 
Philosophically, logical positivism was defeated several decades ago but a positivist view 
of science still lingers at the public level as an unfortunate and unintended outcome of 
traditional science education. Ifwe are to produce rational, creative and critically minded 
citizens, there is an urgent need for science educators to exorcise positivism from science 
courses; fortunately, most recent reforms in science education indicate an awareness of 
this. Unfortunately, the post-modernist view, which is one of the alternative views of 
science, is no less objectionable than the positivist view. 
5.2 Post-Modernist Non-Science 
In the search for alternatives to positivism, there is no shortage of views on science. For 
centuries philosophers have questioned how theories are generated, how they are 
justified, and what the relation is between our lmowledge and the external world. To these 
questions, sociologists of science have recently added the question of what motivates the 
work of scientists. Overall, views of science range from naive inductivism where scientists 
uncover objective truth by careful and unbiased observation, to the post-modern 
sociological interpretations of scientists' work as producing a culture-bound and 
inevitably relativist picture of the world. In the extreme, this latter picture suggests that 
modern science is just one of many equally valid ways of explaining the world, for 
example, Harman (1988) holds that the current scientific endeavour is simply a 'cultural 
artifact'. Modern science did have its immediate origins within European society, and 
modern science clearly carries historical baggage (lingering sexism in its operation and its 
research interests for example). However, it is not the case, as Harman claims, that a 
different society would have produced a different science. The explanation of the world 
provided by modern science is not just the 'best' in terms of the pragmatic criteria of being 
able to predict and control nature (Hesse, 1978); it can also be argued that it is 'true' in 
that it has uncovered some of the underlying mechanisms of the world (Harre, 1986). 
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If we go along with those who deny that modern science provides a privileged view of the 
world, we not only rid ourselves of positivism but we fall into an abyss where skeptical 
post-modernists, who have lost faith in reason, dismiss all knowledge claims as equally 
arbitrary and assume the universe to be unreliable in its behaviour and incapable of being 
understood. Such views lead to the continual mystification of both the material and social 
world, and in so doing they affirm, by default, the law of the jungle. Far from challenging 
the existing power structure, such ideas assist its continuation. In the extreme, the post-
modernist world is one in which there are no absolutes, no standards and probably no 
shared meaning, for example there is debate over whether text has any meaning other than 
those taken from it by me, by you or by any other reader. In this view, people each travel 
along in their own (imagined) parallel worlds that they construct for themselves. To move 
to such a world-view is to be disempowered, for the real world and real power will 
continue to exist and to control peoples' lives. The only people who could exist happily 
in a post-modernist world would be safely tenured academics! 
In the dark, nihilistic world of the skeptical post-modernist there is no knowledge and no 
possibility of progress (Rosenau, 1992). In such a world the practice of science is at best 
pointless and at worst a cynical sham that props up the existing power structure. 
However, the practice of science, as understood by scientists, is neither positivist nor 
post-modernist. Science is a robust and rational practice producing trustworthy 
knowledge, (Harre, 1986; Hooker, 1987; Lamb, 1991 and Ziman, 1978). Science is a boot-
strapping operation. There is no rock-solid reference point, and no fail-safe scientific 
method. Knowledge that is generated by individuals must be communicated to the 
scientific community and turned into public knowledge. This process is subject to the 
strict moral code of science; members must only communicate what they believe to be 
true according to the epistemological standards of their enquiry. Since all scientists will be 
subject to socio-cultural influences on perception, believing something to be true is not 
the same as it being true. However, as a pool of public knowledge is established in the 
scientific community we need to ask what is the source of the commonality in what is 
believed? Some commonality will be due to the socio-cultural background that scientists 
share but, as Harre (1986) points out, for 'a modest realism to be defensible we need only 
claim that not all commonality has a sociological explanation. Scientific theories are not 
direct constructions of the world from objective observations, nor are they simply social 
constructions unrelated and unresponsive to reality. In the future, it is always possible 
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that any theory may need radical revision or even be discarded, but it would be churlish 
not to acknowledge that the scientific community has a far better understanding of the 
world in 1999 than in 1899. 
Modern science and the knowledge it generates are integral parts of almost every society 
on earth and - in every conceivable scenario for the future - they are likely to remain so. 
While science has brought enormous benefits to human beings, its application has not 
been without problems. One way of addressing these problems would be to strengthen 
the operation of democracy within society to give some measure of public influence over 
the application and future direction of science. Without some mechanism for public input, 
there is the danger that science will be perceived as intrinsically elitist and authoritarian 
and consequently people may be drawn to support post-modernist attacks against it. One 
of the consequences of this would be the loss of a powerful educational tool for the 
promotion of democracy. 
5.3 Post-Modernist Science Education 
Unless the public funding of science is affected, scientists usually ignore controversies 
about the nature of science. Without any formal training in the history and philosophy of 
their discipline, scientists can be effective in their work. Such is not the case for science 
educators because one of the outcomes of teaching will be to influence public perception 
of science and of scientific knowledge. Such perceptions will influence people's decisions 
and actions and will influence the reproduction and transformation of society. For these 
reasons, it is important that science educators be clear about what view of science they 
convey, as well as being competent in the scientific knowledge that they teach. 
Unfortunately, many science educators are no better prepared in philosophical matters 
than their scientist counterparts. 
The goal I have set for science education is the production of citizens who are creative, 
critical, analytical and rational. In other words, I want citizens who share many of the 
values and attitudes of practising scientists. If science education reinforces a positivist 
view of science then this may limit citizens' critical and analytical attitudes, and suppress 
their justified skepticism. This would hardly encourage citizens to question the 
fundamentals of their society since they would be predisposed to accept information on 
the basis of authority rather than evidence. Most modern curriculum developers are well 
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aware of the dangers of positivism and curricula are designed to avoid promoting a 
positivist view. However, if science education leads to the promotion of a post-modernist 
view of science and of the world, then this is equally dangerous because skepticism will 
be pushed to a level where it can destroy the very belief in 'meta-narratives' such as the 
democratic project. 
I accept the need for a 'kinder science' (Rosenau, 1992), but hold that moderate realism 
shows science as both a human and humanised activity, and one that has the potential to 
be even 'kinder' under a fully democratic society. Positivist science does need to be 
rejected, but this does not mean that we have to embrace post-modernist non-science. A 
form of realist science, with an offer of reasoned choices within a reliable universe, 
provides a better model for education towards democracy than the random and chaotic 
individualism of post-modernism. 
Knowledge claims about non-trivial matters need to be qualified, and complete certainty is 
not attainable. However, it does not follow that we cannot be justifiably certain of 
anything, nor does it follow that all views of the world are equally valid. In addition to 
trivial truths, such as 'This thesis is written in English' and personal knowledge such as 'I 
feel hungry', there are justified true beliefs within the realm of public knowledge. The 
discrete nature of matter is an example; whatever the precise nature of the structure of 
atoms, the description of a glass of water as consisting of discrete particles is more than a 
useful metaphor, it is a true description. The epistemological claims of science are of 
greater worth than any other when it comes to knowledge of the natural world. Thus 
questions of 'whose knowledge is of most worth?' and talk of 'personal epistemologies of 
teachers and students' (Shymansky & Kyle, 1992), must be carefully nuanced. In our 
efforts to rid science education of its positivist ancestry it is easy to step towards what 
Good (1993) describes as 'the slippery slopes of post-modernism' .. 
Unfortunately, and from the best of intentions, some science educators do risk sending 
their students down the 'slippery slope' by advocating post-modernist views of science. 
This is particularly (but by no means inevitably) a feature of science education reforms 
which address socio-cultural aspects. As an example of a sensible integration of socio-
cultural aspects into science education, Jenkins (1992) claims that 'young people's 
perceptions of science as an activity which increasingly shapes the world in which they 
live may be far ahead ofthat which underpins much of school science education'. For this 
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reason he advocates 'accommodating the political and social dimensions of contemporary 
science in ways that.. . have been marginalised within, or excluded from, school science 
curricula'. He is advocating the broadening of science education goals, rather than 
advocating a shift towards post-modernist views of science. 
In contrast, O'Loughlin (1992) seeks to emphasise science as a social construct and 
clearly moves towards a post-modernist view. In a critique of Piagetian constructivism, 
O'Loughlin gives his view of the task facing science educators: 
'Science teachers, therefore, face the simultaneous challenge of validating 
their students' personal ways of knowing, introducing them to the powerful 
speech genres of conventional science, and equipping them with an 
understanding of the fundamentally socio-culturally constituted ways of 
knowing that underlie science so that the process of doing science is 
demystified ... ' 
I am happy with the idea of 'demystification' but not with a later statement. O'Loughlin 
ends ambiguously, stating that science should not only be demystified but that the 
students 'should not feel compelled to defer to the intrinsically authoritative power of the 
received view'. While this may be interpreted in different ways, some of which would be 
unproblematic, it is clear from an earlier remark that O'Loughlin views rationality itself as 
an artifact. Thus the very attempt at teaching science rationally is restricted from the 
outset. This raises the fundamental question of whether post-modernism is a coherent and 
empowering world view and a viable alternative to rationality. Now, while there may be a 
certain consistency to postmodern critiques, they are inherently disempowering because 
the implicit relativism removes the criteria by which people may criticise the status quo. 
In an effort to produce a SCIence education that is 'more authentic and inclusive', 
Cunningham and Helms (1998) seek insights from the sociology of science. One of those 
insights is that 'there is nothing extrordinary about science - its status stems from its 
purpose as a tool of persuasion', which is dangerously close to a relativist view of science. 
Ogawa (1995) makes this relativism specific by linking multiculturalism with 
'multiscience'. Such views have been vigorously attacked, for example by Gross and Levitt 
(1994) and Matthews (1995), and gently but firmly refuted by Loving (1997). 
In some other proposals for reforming science education, it is unclear whether it is the 
goals of science education that should be altered, or whether we are being asked to adopt 
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an alternative view of science. Hurd (1994; 1998) considers the nature of science and also 
offers a socio-cultural dimension based on the changing nature of society and on the 
characteristics oftoday's young adolescents. Hurd's goal is to have a curriculum 'that can 
be lived and which has cultural as well as scientific validity' and which results in students 
knowing themselves and their culture. He expresses concern for cultures such as inner city 
youth, but leaves it unclear what is his recommendation. Should we adjust the delivery of 
science education so that the scientific (dominant) culture is made accessible to everyone, 
or should we devise new curricula based, for example, on 'black science' or 'working class 
science'. In his earlier paper, Hurd (1994) supports a post-modern science which, he 
claims, is embedded in social and cultural contexts. But was science ever not so 
embedded? Only the positivist view of science places it in some sort of objective vacuum. 
Real science takes place in, and is subject to, socio-cultural influences, but it is also 
ultimately judged by the behaviour of the real world. This key feature of science makes 
science education invaluable for a training in rational decision-making on the basis of 
evidence. I suggest that the ambiguity over the need to adopt an alternative view of 
science arises from the failure to distinguish between realist science, which takes place in a 
socio-cultural context, and the post-modernist view that science is simply a social 
construct. 
Some science education reforms express legitimate and commendable concerns about the 
inequalities in society and clearly express a hope for the future. For example, Kyle (1991) 
wishes 'our youth to fulfil their dreams, rather than settle for the tarnished present-day 
reality.' Kyle's ideas for escaping this reality through cultural pluralism, diversity and 
relativism have been criticised by Hostetler (1993) and I have a further criticism. If there 
is concern about inequality, then questions must be asked about what are the 
characteristics of the dominant social group that enables it to maintain its power over 
other cultures and subcultures? It is significant that in his paper, which is subtitled 
Hegemonic Control vs Counterhegemony, Kyle refers to conservative ideology and elites, 
but does not mention capitalism. If socio-cultural aspects are to be taken seriously then 
all the aspects need to be carefully identified. The disadvantaged student will only be 
further disadvantaged by being led into a make-believe, post-modern world. This adds yet 
another reason why it is important that science education avoid any relativist view of 
science and of the world. 
There is a further reason for teaching realist science, a reason that is directly related to the 
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social and political context. In the absence of any credible alternatives, we must conclude 
that modern science provides the best understanding of the world that we have. Similarly, 
democracy is currently the best form of social organisation. Leaving aside cynical self-
interest, the defence of democracy is at least one of the motivations for the powerful 
countries of the world to intervene in places like Bosnia or Iraq. Even a benign state run 
by a conglomerate of paternalistic companies would be, or should be, an unacceptable 
substitute for democracy. No culture should expect to be free to choose a non-democratic 
path; in the modern world social organisation is not relative. It has also been argued that 
there are superordinate notions that transcend any specific cultural situation and 
consequently neither rationality (Blake, 1997) nor ethics (Puolimatka, 1997) can be taken 
as relative. Given this, it would seem inconsistent for anyone to teach science as just one 
way of understanding of the world. 
I agree that science education is in need of reform, both in terms of the curriculum and in 
the way that science is taught, and I agree that positivist elements need to be exorcised. I 
have argued, however, that we must be careful not move to the extremes of post-
modernist 'science', and that moderate realist science provides the suitably humanised 
replacement for positivist science. I agree that compulsory science education should be 
designed for the general population, rather than for a specialist group of future scientists, 
and I have sympathy with the notion that science education should lead to 
'empowerment' (in some general sense of giving citizens more control or decision making 
ability). However, we must be careful not to ask too much of science education. The role 
of science education in this change is limited to providing citizens with rational, critical 
skills and attitudes. Citizens will improve their society by using these skills and attitudes 
to push for an extension of democracy under which all voices are heard. Democratic 
ideals, and related skills and knowledge, will be taught in general education, but the nature 
of these is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In the next section, I will show how citizens may mount a democratic challenge to the 
applications of science and to the influences these applications have on their lives. 
5.4 Science, Expert Knowledge and Social Control 
To control the effect of science and technology on people's lives we must find a way of 
acknowledging the expert nature of scientific knowledge without acquiescing to all the 
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demands of experts. We must also find a way of challenging decisions without resorting 
to the excessive skepticism of postmodernism. As I have argued previously, although 
postmodernism uses the rhetoric of empowerment, it is ultimately disempowering. I also 
hold that we are unlikely to be able to get citizens to the stage where their science 
knowledge will be sufficient to challenge scientists in their own field. Furthermore, the 
goals the STS movement to integrate scientific knowledge with a range of cultural, social, 
political and economic aspects are well meant but overly ambitious. 
The interaction between expert knowledge and political decision-making is, like all real-
life, inevitably complex. As Ulrich (1983) describes, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) first 
distinguished between those political questions which rational enquiry and scientific 
knowledge could answer, and those political questions which required normative, 
subjective decisions. Hobbes' motto was 'power rather than truth makes the law' and, in 
Hobbes' scheme of things, science was to inform those in power about the proper means 
for their political ends. With the Enlightenment, came thinkers such as Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau who countered Hobbes' motto with one of his own: 'truth rather than power 
makes the law' (or perhaps more correctly, truth rather than power should make the 
law). That this has come to pass if only partially, can be seen in the last few decades 
when politicians have increasingly paid attention to environmental issues for example. 
The irony is that technical aspects of issues can themselves easily become the ends. The 
political process is then relegated to the task of finding means to technically derived ends, 
and this subverts the democratic process because experts and advisors are not 
accountable to the public at large. This subversion of political debate by expert 
knowledge is amply illustrated by the extent to which advice from treasury and the 
reserve bank is accepted almost unquestioningly by both right and left leaning 
governments. This is the 'technocratic' model of decision making, criticised by Habermas 
(1971), where the rationalisation of power occurs because the 'logic of facts' replaces 
political debate. Knowledge no longer serves power, knowledge is power. 
So far, we have a decisionistic model where knowledge is simply used for political ends 
and a technocratic alternative where democratic political decision making is subverted by 
the claimed privilege of expert lmowledge. Ulrich (1987, 1988, 1994) develops a theory 
of Critical Systems Heuristics that offers a way forward. Ulrich's theory has two basic 
requirements - ethical behaviour by experts and critical thinking by citizens. I will deal 
first with the ethical behaviour of experts. This requirement does not imply that experts 
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currently act unethically, although there may be times when some do. This ethical 
requirement is for a new type of whole-system ethics; one that is capable of considering, 
for example, environmental responsibilities on a global scale; one that is future-oriented in 
that the consequences of our actions on future generations are considered; and one that is 
critically oriented in that the demand is not just to be moral but to continually evaluate 
the limits of our moral judgments. To be truly whole-system is, of course, an 
impossibility - no one could take into account all factors because interconnectedness is a 
characteristic of human existence. In practice, decisions are made, and actions are taken, 
after a system has been defined by drawing a boundary around merely a subset of all the 
possible factors. Often, this boundary is then taken to mark out the extent of the system 
(that is, features outside of the boundary are assumed to be irrelevant) and the boundary 
is taken to declare the region within which experts can make priority claims to 
knowledge. For example, applications of scientific knowledge, which produced the 
'Green Revolution' in Third World agriculture, are actions that had behind them the best 
of intentions (at least scientists had the best scientific intentions). Unfortunately, they 
were also applications for which the downstream social and economic effects had not 
been fully considered. Some would argue more cynically that economic dependency was, 
in fact, a conscious but covert objective of the Green Revolution. However, unless we 
ascribe bad intentions to all involved, the point at issue is not why problems occurred but 
how could they have been anticipated and avoided. Ulrich's solution is for experts to 
engage in a 'sweeping in' process that identifies a wider and wider range of factors, and in 
a 'critical' process that sets boundaries but acknowledges those factors which have been 
excluded. This critical process makes greater knowledge demands on people, and the issue 
of moral competence shifts from good will and personal responsibility (volitional ethics) 
to knowledge and understanding of the total system that is involved (cognitivist ethics). 
Simply acknowledging and making problematic the boundary conditions is not, in itself, 
sufficient to avoid inappropriate application of science. To do this we need the second of 
Ulrich's two basic requirements - critical thinking by citizens. Ulrich argues that in 
setting boundary conditions the experts are forced to go outside of their realm of 
expertise. Thus citizens may challenge the boundary conditions set by experts and, 
without any particular expert knowledge, citizens may argue for their own: 
'As against the expert's boundary judgments, [citizens] can with equal 
right and with overt subjectivity advance their own boundary judgments, 
thereby embarrassing the expert for being unable to prove the superiority 
of his boundary judgments by virtue of his expertise.' Ulrich (1987) p 
282 
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Of course, citizens lose their advantage when challenged to prove their own boundary 
judgments, but the way has been cleared for open and democratic debate about the 
boundary assumptions and about the ethical issues involved. That neither side can 
produce an entirely rational justification for their case 'provides no sound argument 
against a systematic effort to promote critical awareness with respect to our failure to be 
comprehensively rational' (Ulrich, 1994). Furthermore, Ulrich argues that; 
'[ u ]ncovering the lack of comprehensiveness - the unavoidable selectivity 
- of [experts'] designs and then systematically tracing the practical 
applications of that selectivity is perhaps the only way to prevent the 
difficulties in question from becoming a source of systematic deception.' 
Ulrich, 1994, p 36 
Thus the process is one of making transparent the reasoning and the lack of reasoning 
behind technical decision making. 
I suggest that 'pure science' research could be challenged in a similar manner. As a rather 
simplistic example, it would be legitimate to ask if such and such research should be 
funded while there are people starving in the third world. The outcome will not 
automatically be to shut down the research and divert funds into food aid, because 
sending food to a country does not necessarily solve the underlying problems of internal 
corruption, interference by Western multinationals ... and so on. The outcome should be 
that the issues are widely debated by all interested parties. It is not that debate is lacking 
now, it is just that current debate is often framed in terms of humanism (uninformed by 
science) versus science (unleavened by humanism). Reasoned argument lies at the heart of 
a successful democracy and, while citizens may successfully challenge boundary 
judgments without any expert knowledge, it is clear that citizens will need rational and 
analytical skills and attitudes. The contribution of science education should be to develop 
in people the skill of thinking scientifically. In so far as STS and science literacy 
programmes develop scientific thinking, I believe them to be useful but, in so far as such 
programmes set goals of developing expert competencies, I believe them to be naive. 
In terms of setting the widest possible boundaries, I suggest that for science and for 
science education, for education, and indeed for most of our social activity, the goal 
should be to attempt to answer the following question: 
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'Can we secure improvement in the human condition by means of human 
intellect?' 
C. West Churchman. Quoted in Ulrich (1998) p 16. 
Are we in danger of setting science up as a new religion? The answer is a clear yes and no. 
The answer is yes in the sense that religions give people ideas (or a faith) and these can 
produce real effects through people's decision-making. Science can develop the idea of 
rational, critical thinking and this can affect people's world view and affects their 
decision-making and behaviour. In turn, this produces real effects in the reproduction and 
transformation of society. The answer is also yes, science is a religion in the sense that 
ethical values are embodied in religions and in science. Science carries its own ethical 
values such as honesty, integrity and even a 'cosmic piety', as Bertrand Russell put it, 
developed as our growing knowledge serves to emphasise how much we don't know. 
But, to the question of whether science is a religion, answer must also be no. To the 
extent that religion might not encourage questioning of its faith, and the extent that 
religion might teach its values simply as rules, science is not a religion. Perhaps it would 
be safer to say science should not be a religion, for we must bear in mind those like 
Feyerabend who criticise present-day science, and especially science education, for being 
an authoritarian ideology that neither fosters nor accepts dissent. Real science has at its 
heart a positive and healthy skepticism, and a process of rational questioning - science 
education must foster in all people the ability to think scientifically. People may then 
bring this skill to the task of improving the human condition by means of the human 
intellect. 
What about thinkers such as Thomas Aquinus from the Christian intellectual theological 
tradition, or religious philosophers from other cultures - were they not rational?, did they 
not try to improve the human condition by means of the human intellect? Clearly the 
answer to both questions is yes. For a long time in human history, religion provided a 
way of thinking about the world and religion was the source of conscious, ethical 
theo --~ -ing. Beyond the cynical employment of the authority of the church for personal 
gain, and beyond the mindless ideologies aimed at gaining obedience rather than 
thoughtful reflection, there lies an intellectual tradition that is critical, analytical and 
reflective. A full discussion of the relation between thinking in this tradition and scientific 
thiniuug is beyond this thesis. However, my claim is that, for inducting children into 
critical and analytical thinking, scientific investigation of an objective physical world is a 
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more accessible educational context than ethical theorising about our socially constructed 
world. 
I have given general indications of the role that science education might play in social 
changes and in improving the human condition. In the next chapter I will work towards 
defining a more specific outcome for science education. 
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CHAPTER 6 SETTING A GOAL FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION 
6.1 Science, Psychology and Science Education 
What exactly is science education? What should teachers and students be doing in a 
science lesson? There a many simple but quite different answers. Children should be 
learning about everyday phenomena and common devices, or children should be learning 
the powerful generalisations of science. Children should be learning the content of 
science, or children should be learning the processes of science. Children should be 
following a hands-on programme, or children should be thinking about what counts as 
evidence ... and so on. For their part, teachers should be following the interests of the 
children, or teachers should be designing a logically structured programme. Teachers 
should be learning along with the children, or teachers should be making use of their 
subject expertise ... and so on. Perhaps the answer to our questions should be 'all of the 
above'? The outcome of science education are usually concerned with learning in science 
and learning about science, with the traditional bias being towards learning in science. 
Indeed, even recent STS curricula and constructivist pedagogies still have learning in 
science as a main goal. 
If learning in science is important, what do we know about it? Chinn & Brewer (1998) 
claim that 'there are few if any comprehensive theories of knowledge acquisition' (p 110), 
and within their paper they develop eight questions: 
'What is the nature of knowledge change? 
Are there intermediate stages in knowledge change? 
What initiates knowledge change? 
What factors influence knowledge change? 
What is the fate of the old knowledge and the new information after 
knowledge change occurs? 
What is the relationship between belief and knowledge? 
What factors influence belief change? 
What changes in meta-awareness occur during knowledge change?' 
F or each of these questions a number of positions are outlined, some of which are at least 
partially conflicting. For example, in response to the final question about meta-
awareness, three positions are identified by Chinn & Brewer. One is that of Kuhn (1989) 
in which it is claimed that children remain largely unable to reflect on their theories and 
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that beliefs about the world remain largely at an implicit level. A second position is that 
as children learn, they become increasingly aware of the principles that govern their 
knowledge, and become increasingly able to reflect on their knowledge (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992). (It must be said that later research leads Kuhn (1993), as well, to a similar 
conclusion.) The third position is that learners are always aware of their learning. 
In the last two decades the idea of producing 'conceptual change' has been a dominant 
factor in science education theorising. Not surprisingly, given the range of positions 
across the range of questions given by Chinn and Brewer above, the common feature of 
research in this area is the importance placed on conceptual change; how this conceptual 
change takes place and how change can be facilitated are the points of difference. 
In recent efforts to understand science education, focus has shifted from curriculum 
development and pedagogical practices to the the history and philosophy of science and 
to the cognitive processes involved in gaining, processing and evaluating knowledge. The 
inclusion of history and philosophy of science has been advocated in order to put a 
human face on science and to facilitate the learning of science concepts (for example 
Stinner & Williams, 1998, and Matthews, 1994), in order to avoid the 'scientistic legacy' 
of science (Duschl, 1988), and to achieve all of these things (Hodson, 1998). Conceptual 
change has been related to both the nature of science and to developmental psychology; 
first by comparing the thinking of children with the thinking of scientists, and second by 
comparing the cognitive process of conceptual change in learners with the process of 
theory change in scientists or within scientific communities. 
Much of the early conceptual change theorising was concerned with trying to escape 
from the presentation of science as a logical and structured progression of ideas. Put in 
terms of the nature of science, the early ideas were concerned with escaping a 
presentation that was almost exclusively concerned with the context of justification. 
Duschl (1988) suggested that learners' disenchantment with science lay with students not 
knowing how scientific knowledge came to exist, rather than with any inability to learn 
the fundamental scientific concepts. In particular, Duschl asks: 
'how does science remain a rational enterprise in the mind's eye of the 
students if theories evolve (and they do) and if students do not understand 
the mechanisms or criteria for guiding such changes?" Duschl (1988) p58 
The answer suggested - inviting philosophers, historians and sociologists of science to 
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contribute to curriculum design - turned out to be a little simplistic, but so too were the 
early conceptual change models. For example, based on the theory change models of 
Kuhn and Lakatos, the pedagogical moves for producing conceptual change proposed by 
Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzog (1982) were based on two stages. First, students 
were to meet anomalous phenomena that would cause dissatisfaction with students' 
existing ideas. Second, commitment would be transferred to a new idea that was seen to 
be more coherent, plausible and fruitful (in terms of its explanatory powers). That this 
was not entirely successful is, in hindsight, not surprising. Duschl and Gitomer (1991) 
suggest that the Kuhian and Lakatosian models imply a hierarchical view of conceptual 
change in assuming that 'changes in central commitments' will produce 'changes to to 
other ontological, methodological and axiological commitments'. Duschl and Gitomer go 
on to develop a model based on the more piecemeal approach to theory change of 
Laudan, and to support the ideas of Carey (1986) and Giere (1988) that there is much in 
common between scientific theories and cognitive schema. Teaching students the 
procedural knowledge for evaluating observations and data in terms of evidence for 
theory change then assumes great importance in move towards achieving conceptual 
change. In other words, the development of learners' epistemologies must be taken into 
account in any teaching scheme. In their 1991 paper, Duschl and Gitomer explore the 
issue of assessment, particularly as it relates to a 'portfolio culture' but, while I accept 
this as important, assessment is one of the issues that I have excluded from the scope of 
this thesis. They also touch on the notion of 'teacher empowerment' and the inherent 
complexity of the teaching and learning environment and I will return to the ideas in 
Chapter 9. 
There are alternatives to conceptual change theories. Thagard (1992) suggests that it is 
the relationships between concepts that builds new knowledge rather than changes to the 
concepts themselves; diSessa (1993) claims that knowledge is built by refinement of 
'phenomonological primitives' which are small pieces of knowledge produced by 
experiences; and Vosniadou & Brewer (1992) envisage knowledge building in terms of an 
evolving sophistication oflearners' naive frameworks. The idea of conceptual change has 
also been supported and elaborated. Drawing on work by Lemberger (1995), Hewson and 
Lemberger (1999) suggest that knowledge of the status (intelligibility, plausibility and 
fruitfulness) that students accord to concepts is sufficient for teachers to design 
instruction and evaluate learning. Work by Beeth (1997) supports the idea of status as an 
important instructional factor, but also suggests that judging something like the 
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'fruitfulness' of a concept presupposes a level of metacognitive processing in students. 
Thus Beeth sees the provision of metacognitive tools, and provision of opportunities to 
practise the use of such tools, as a crucial, additional task for teachers. This call echoes 
the point made by Duschl and Gitomer (1991) about the need to attend to student 
epistemologies. 
However, the notion of conceptual change has not gone unchallenged. Linder (1993) 
argues that less effort should go into changing student concepts and more effort be put 
into; 
'enhancing students' capabilities to distinguish between conceptualisations in 
a manner appropriate to some specific context - in other words, being able to 
appreciate the functional appropriateness of one, or more, of their 
conceptions in a particular context, making science education into a 
functional base from which to view the world.' p 298 
Ohlsson (1999) suggests an explanation for the commonly observed failure of 'anomalous 
data' to trigger conceptual change in learners. He proposes that the level of commitment 
with which children hold concepts is low, and that the failure to trigger conceptual change 
is because such data may not actually appear 'anomalous' to the child. The nature of 
understandings held by children is also questioned by Rowlands, Graham & Berry 
(1999). They argue that children do not hold concepts in any well defined or well 
developed way and that this explains the absence of any coherent and successful 
paradigm of constructivist/conceptual-change teaching. Their scheme (for mechanics) 
gives a Vygotskian role to the teacher in building alongside the children's ideas the idea of 
idealised abstraction 'which has as its starting point the logical structure of Newtonian 
mechanics rather than the cognitive state of uninstructed students'. They contend that; 
'It is not the presentation of facts as anomalies, but the presentation of 
anomalies as props and hints to arouse higher mental functions. The 
construction process is not the reinvention of the Newtonian system ... 
rather, it is the class understanding the way the Newtonian system speaks of 
the world, and in the way that each student makes the system his or her 
own.' Rowlands, Graham & Berry (1999) p 267 
Strong links have been proposed between the thinking of children and the thinking of 
scientists. The 'theory theory' is based on the close analogy between cognitive 
development and theory change in science. It is generally taken that children's 
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development of ideas tends to mirror the historical development of ideas in science, 
although Gopnik argues the reverse. In her characterisation, 'it is not that children are 
little scientists but that scientists are big children', and indeed that 'science may be 
successful largely because it exploits powerful and flexible cognitive devices that were 
designed by evolution to facilitate learning in young children', Gopnik (1996). I find 
interesting the idea of the evolutionary selection of traits and these are related to some of 
the ideas in section 3.3. However, if the nature of the concepts held by children are 
different to those held by scientists (Ohlsson, 1999 and Rowlands, Graham & Berry, 
1999) and the commitment with which they are held is different, (Ohlsson, 1999) then 
this does throw doubt on the depth of the metaphor linking theory development in 
science and conceptual change in children. Furthermore, Hewson and Lemberger (1999) 
reject the need for a theory of theory, pointing out that theory change happens within a 
community of scientists whereas conceptual change is necessarily an individual affair. 
The linking of historical development of ideas with development of concepts in children 
has also been questioned. For example, Grandy (1997) says of children's 'intuitive 
physics' that it; 
'bears many resemblances to the sophisticated neo-Aristotelian physics of 
the sixteenth century, but it would be a mistake to treat them as identical. 
And the motivations of sixteenth and seventeenth intellectuals were 
different in many very important respects than those of our current 
students.' p 51. 
Finally, with regard to the general analogy between theory change in science and cognitive 
development in children, I believe that Levine (2000) has made some apposite 
observations. He argues that, in developing the model of theory change in science, Kuhn 
was inspired by Piaget's study of conceptual development in children. Further, he argues 
that Piaget, in developing his theories of conceptual development in children, drew on 
analogies from the history of science. Levine concludes that there is enough evidence of 
circularity to cast doubts on any claim made, on the authority of Kuhn or Piaget, for 
parallels between the thinking of scientists and that of children. 
Other ways of conceiving of children's knowledge-building in science have been 
proposed. Ohlsson (2000), casts Kuhn's paradigm shift as a naturalised version of 
Poppers falsification principle, and he further advocates moving to a naturalised paradigm 
of cognitive change. In his view, all cognitive change is 'a side effect of activity', rather 
than cognitive change being a process for accounting for larger and larger bodies of 
evidence. Ohlsson (2000) claims that our knowledge structures undergo changes as we 
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engage in intellectual activities. In addition, Ohlsson's view is that: 
'which change occurs ... depends primarily on which knowledge structures 
become active and how they jostle each other in the person's mind and 
not on the purpose or meaning of the activity. Consequently, there might 
not be any semantic or rational connection between the activity and the 
resulting change in knowledge.' Ohlsson (2000) p 184. 
Schwitzgebel (1999) takes a very minimalist definition of a theory as something that 
provides (good) explanations and he proposes that theory-building could be explained by 
the existence in children of a 'drive to explain'. Duschl, Deak, Ellenbogen & Holton 
(1999) among others raise objections to the 'drive to explain'. In particular, Duschl et al. 
note that Schwitzgebel's notion of drive smudges the distinction between everyday 
thinking and scientific thinking, and it also favours theorising as an individual activity, 
rather than a socially mediated activity. Duschl et al. go on to present a version of theory 
building within specific domains which involves children in boundary crossing. This 
boundary lies between thinking that involves common-sense explanations based on sense 
perceptions and thinking that involves scientific theories based on theory-driven 
observations. This differentiation between types of thinking ties in with the idea of 
advances in science itself, which I proposed in Chapter 3. 
While it is important to tease out what science education is, I would like to return to 
what I see as a key goal for science education - building a rational population. The further 
development of democracy and its continued operation at new, higher levels requires a 
rational population, not one paralysed by fear or political impotence, nor one driven by 
economic necessity. Not that I believe that the production of a rational population will 
automatically eliminate violence, disempowerment or poverty, but without rationality 
and critical skills people may never thoroughly question the origin of such evils. In the 
next section I will look at which science education goals will help achieve the overall goal 
of furthering democracy. 
6.2 Science Education as an Agent of Social Change 
What outcomes are currently set for science education? Unfortunately, the very success 
of science encourages us to take the learning of science for granted, and to ignore the need 
to set explicit science education goals. For example, Anderson (1992) presents a detailed 
account of the complexities of curricula reform but mentions goals only in the last section, 
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and then almost incidentally as 'largely a value question [that is] often overlooked in the 
research context'. To his credit he goes on to acknowledge this as 'critically important...in 
that we do not have a consensus on what educational goals ought to be pursued'. In 
previous years, outcomes have been derived and justified in terms of the content and 
structure of science. Hirst (1974) makes the case for science as a specific form of 
knowledge but, while there are many aspects of this that I might want to defend, the 
influence of such a view on science curricula has been justifiably criticised as producing a 
science education designed mainly for the next generation of experts. Current 
replacements for these expert-biased curricula are based on the slogan, 'science for all'. 
These too have their problems, for if the scientific discipline does not provide 
appropriate structure and aims for science education, what does? Even the constructivists 
have failed to grapple with this problem. For example, Bell (1991) describes the 
curriculum seen from a constructivist perspective as 'a series of learning tasks and 
strategies' which will 'enhance the likelihood of conceptual change within a knowledge 
area'; constructivists' concerns are with the narrow goals of individuals' learning of 
science. In contrast, Science-Technology-Society (STS) and scientific literacy curricula do 
have goals that are extensive. However, STS goals are often overly-ambitious, a feature 
which produces its own set of problems (Shamos, 1988; Millar, 1996). 
I wish to site science education in the context of social change but to set concrete aims and 
outcomes that have close links with the business of science and that are clearly achievable 
within the context of science education. We must not make the mistake of taking too 
much responsibility on science education (as has happened in STS), nor should we 
narrow the goals to something like 'conceptual change' (as some constructivists have). 
I start by asking where science education should be headed and what its goals should be. I 
have assumed that the primary justification for teaching science to all children is that it is 
able to improve the quality of human existence by contributing to the advancement of 
democracy. Having this justification for science education raises two main issues; first is 
the need to flag inherent difficulties in producing social change and the second is to 
determine what science education outcomes would best serve the goal of social change. 
The first issue is to note that producing coherent social change is no simple matter and 
this issue has been dealt with in Chapter 4. At one level we are autonomous individuals 
but, at another level, our behaviour is determined by the historical milieu and social 
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grouping into which we are born. Our genetic predisposition, along with family, social, 
political, economic and other cultural forces, develops our 'world view' which is the 
framework for our intentional actions. However, we do not live in a deterministic world. 
Formal education is one ofthe cultural forces shaping our world view but, despite the fact 
that schools themselves are a specific cultural product, education does provide one 
weakness in the fabric of cultural hegemony (see for example Willis, 1978). Our society is 
not so monolithic that it can prevent teachers as individuals from making a difference. 
The second issue, that of determining concrete outcomes for science education, can be 
approached by considering the specific skills needed by citizens in promoting social 
change. If citizens are to question rather than simply accept the existing social order, they 
will need a critical frame of mind; if citizens are to suggest alternative solutions they will 
need a creative flair; and if citizens are to carry out changes they will need self-confidence 
and trust in others, faith in rational problem solving, and a method of continual critical 
review. Such characteristics are demonstrated reasonably consistently by members of the 
international scientific community (although it is fashionable in some quarters to deny 
this) and thus it is important that the public lmow something of the workings of science 
and of the commitments of scientists. As science itself is a quintessentially rational 
enterprise, science education can help foster the skills and attitudes needed to conduct 
human affairs in rational ways. How these skills might be developed is the subject of 
Chapter 7. In the meantime, I must sound a caution that scientific rationality is an 
essential but by no means sufficient condition for the proper conduct of human affairs; 
compassion, altruism, courage, and other human attributes are also important. Science 
education must be seen in the broad context of general education and the development of 
an overall world view. People's world view helps mould their decisions and actions, and 
in this way people's world view influences the reproduction and transformation of 
society. 
6.3 Science Education and Measured Commitment 
The relationship between world view, general education and SCIence education is 
illustrated in figure 1. One of the two main contributors to a person's world view is their 
experience, and one of the components of experience is schooling. What is taught in 
science education, and how it is taught, will influence people's world view and, 
consequently, the conduct of human affairs. 
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Fig 1 
Showing the contribution made by 
science education towards the 
development of a world view. 
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The potential influence of education, and science education, gives great importance to the 
outcomes that we set for these endeavours. This raises the questions of which science 
education outcomes will have a desirable effect on the world view? and how might we go 
about achieving such outcomes? 
One inevitable outcome of science education is the development of a view of science. 
Views will be derived from both what teachers teach and how they choose to teach it, and 
these views may be promoted consciously or quite unconsciously. Since science has a 
strong influence on our lives, people's view of science will influence the development of 
their overall world view. It is therefore crucial that science educators consciously develop 
in their students a view of science that will foster rational, critical 
thinking. One of the views of science produced in the past was the rather simplistic, 
positivist one. This has been largely discredited only to be replaced, in some quarters, 
with the equally distorted, relativist view of the post-modernists. However, post-modern 
criticism can be credited with causing realist philosophers of science to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of science (Aronson, Harre & Way, 1994) and it is argued by 
Cole (1992) that it is through the 'new realists' that the public perception of science will 
be altered for the better. I will argue in Chapter 8 that the commitment we ask of students 
in order to learn science requires that the search for truth be a goal of science. This favours 
a realist view of science. 
For science educators, one of the challenges in developing a realist view of science is to 
teach science content that is beyond all reasonable doubt, while at the same time 
maintaining a scientific skepticism in their students. This matter is dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter 7. In the meantime I find a useful way of thinking about this problem is 
provided by Norris (1997). His solution involves teaching science in such a way that non-
specialists develop what he calls a genuine 'intellectual independence' (Norris, 1997). As a 
result ofthis sort of teaching, non-scientists should be able to place an 'epistemic distance' 
between themselves and scientific knowledge. Norris suggests that there is a balance point 
between, on the one hand, believing without question everything that science says and, on 
the other hand, being skeptical to the point of pathological doubt. I take this balance point 
to 1 ring a 'measured commitment' to specific theories. Such a commitment requires 
that, within their study of a science topic, students develop a commitment to a theoretical 
view based on understanding, rather than faith. I will argue in section 8.2 that having such 
a measured commitment allows the possibility of students revising their commitment on 
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the basis of further evidence or a better theory. In this way the limited goal of 'measured 
commitment' (to specific theories) gives a route into experiencing and understanding the 
process and commitments of science itself. 
What I have done is to define a single outcome for science education, that of producing in 
children a 'measured commitment'. This can function as the key goal for science education 
because reaching it implies that learners have both an understanding of (some) science 
concepts and an understanding of how science works. In reassessing their commitments, 
children will engage in rational, critical thinking. In Chapters 7 and 8, I will expand on 
what it means to be teaching science, and I will return to the idea of measured 
commitment in section 8.3. 
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CHAPTER 7 MEETING THE AIMS FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION 
7.1 Three Aims for Science Education 
How will we establish a measured commitment? What are the specific goals that willl 
contribute to this? In this section I set out three fundamental aims for science education. 
Their importance is twofold. First the aims must help children understand science and 
scientific knowledge and build a measured commitment. Second, the aims must help 
science educators to keep their nerve in the face of post-modernist attacks. If we 
misguidedly adopt relativist or other emasculated forms of science, then we inadvertently 
give up on rationality and the possibility of human progress. The aims themselves are not 
particularly revolutionary in terms of teaching science, but their justification within the 
wider social and political context is new. 
The first aim is that children should understand that scientists are successful in 
developing an objective understanding of the world even though they do not have a fail-
safe method, but that science is fallible (thus avoiding a positivist view). By meeting this 
aim we avoid the dependency on authority that positivist science education is likely to 
engender. Furthermore, in the process of developing democracy, citizens will require 
considerable confidence and perseverance to reassess goals and actions when the 
complexities of the real world cause well-planned actions to produce unwanted results. 
Thus it is important that science education demonstrate that a fail-safe algorithm or 
method is not needed for rational and successful knowledge-building. Otherwise 
empiricism may lead us to conclude (from observations of human behaviour) that humans 
are naturally and inevitably individualistic and competitive, and that a better society is 
against human nature. Conversely, it is easy to fall prey to rationalism, where idealists are 
content simply to construct models of 'how things should be'. To counter these traps it is 
possible to present realist science as a successful but not infallible blend of observation 
and theorising. In science a democratic community of enquirers engages in what Harre 
(1986) characterises as 'not only society's greatest intellectual achievement but also its 
greatest moral order'. 
A difficulty in achieving this first aim is that fallibility lies at the frontiers of science and 
for the standard science content taught there is no reasonable doubt. While we can have 
learners undertaking real investigations into topics that are unknown (to them), this can 
lead either to stopping at students' individual and idiosyncratic theories (which is not 
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science) or to teachers eventually using their authority to inject an appropriate version of 
the accepted view (which is not science). Some teachers adopt for themselves the role of 
naive learner and attempt to do some subtle guidance of the learners, but this seems to fail 
Portelli's honesty criteria (Portelli, 1993). A cooperative learning approach, where a class 
works on a single problem, and differing theories are argued out, may come close to the 
way 'real science' is conducted by the scientific community. Some 'interactive' or 
constructivist teaching methods contain elements of this as they are based the notion that 
knowledge is socially constructed. However, constructivists often see the social context 
as helping construct individuals' knowledge, rather than the individuals in the class 
attempting to negotiate some agreed public knowledge. (Caution is also needed in the 
adoption of constructivist methods because some constructivists - for example, Hawkins, 
(1994) - are too closely associated with relativism.) One further method of introducing 
genuine uncertainty and fallibility into classroom work is to use 'real life' problems with 
which the learners can become involved - a common example is some sort of local 
environmental issue. Such issues do raise awareness and do involve people critical 
thinking and in social action. However, the background science of real life issues is often 
very complex and we risk oversimplification and, even worse, the reinforcement of beliefs 
which are held on grounds other than the thorough examination of evidence. Overall, if we 
wish children to learn about the success, failure and fallibility of science, it may be best to 
use case studies of historical or current scientific work. 
The second aim is that children should value scientific knowledge as the best we have (so 
limiting skepticism to a justified level). At the same time students need to recognise that 
there are limitations to the authority of science (see section 5.4). The issue of public 
versus expert knowledge is important as it relates to the notions of openness, honesty 
and trust in a democratic society. Where there is an absence of trust the public feels 
alienated and powerless, and may readily compensate for this by embracing a 
disempowering level of skepticism and a belief in irrational and unscientific forms of 
'knowledge'. This can only damage and delay the growth of democracy. I would not wish 
to inculcate a blind faith in science and scientists, because this would be a return to a 
positivist perception - there needs to be developed in students a critical frame of mind 
coupled with a healthy respect for evidence. However, it must be underlined that even the 
most successful science education will not raise the general level of 'science literacy' to 
the point where lay citizens can legitimately dispute the validity of scientific knowledge 
or arbitrate between claims of professional scientists. However, given suitable critical and 
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analytical skills, there. are ways in which citizens may challenge the applications of 
science. Furthermore, there may be ways of democratically influencing the nature and 
direction of scientific research, as I indicated in Chapter 5. 
I noted in Chapter 6 that the impact of scientific and technical matters on our lives leads 
some science education reforms to advocate raising general science literacy to the point 
where there could be informed public decision-making. Against this, Kelly, Carlsen, and 
Cunningham (1993) argue that science educators should 'retire the idea that by learning 
science citizens will be automatically equipped to make good public decisions' and that 'an 
over reliance upon the mastery of scientific facts may make people more, not less, 
helpless'. Now, while I am in agreement with Kelly et al. on this, I do not concur with the 
general thrust of their paper which is to use a sociological critique to weaken science as a 
privileged view of the world. Interestingly, although Kelly et al. embrace an emasculated 
view of science they have cold feet about expressing this to children for fear that children 
might "carry away from their science studies an incapacitating distrust of science's 
motivations and findings or a belief that science is nothing more than mob psychology". 
The action that they suggest to overcome this does not express confidence in either 
students or in education; they conclude that "a sociologically 'accurate' description of 
science may not be what we want to teach students, at least initially" - so much for 
Portelli's (1993) notion of teaching as an honest, open and cooperative exercise! It is my 
contention that, within the limitations outlined in section 5.4, it is rational to attend to 
expert advice in situations concerning scientific matters. This puts some onus on science 
educators to ensure that the public perception of science is such that expert advice is 
valued. 
The third aim is that children should adopt many of the critical and creative attributes of 
scientists (giving students the skills to seek and evaluate evidence, and to take part in 
reasoned debate). Enhancing rationality can be claimed by a number of curriculum areas, 
not only science but notably history, mathematics and philosophy. However, only 
science operates in such a direct way with a real, mind-independent world that is reliable, 
stable and readily accessible. Science education provides ideal opportunities for students 
to engage in a wide range of investigations and knowledge building activities in which 
mistakes and wishful thinking are readily exposed. Science education can value creativity 
but, at the same time, not accept personal theories as an end point. The ability to 
adjudicate between knowledge claims in ways independent of human desires is a special 
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feature of science that has allowed it to build up a public body of reliable knowledge. 
Science educators should convey these aspects of science in their teaching. 
However, meeting the three aims will not be straight forward. For example, in meeting the 
first aim and showing science to be fallible, there is potential for conflict with the second 
aim of advocating a rational trust in expert lmowledge. The variation between classrooms 
precludes any universal solutions to such dilemmas and teachers must face these and 
work through them on a case by case basis. The theme of dilemmas in teaching is 
developed in Chapter 9. Teachers should plan specific episodes to meet specific aims and 
then evaluate the results of their teaching in terms of its contribution towards producing a 
rational population that would be capable of advancing democratic society. 
7.2 Scientific Knowledge 
The three aims for science education set in the previous sections are important. However, 
the immediate goal for science teaching, and indeed its major activity, should be to do with 
children learning science. I do not advocate returning to science courses that are aimed at 
producing future scientists, but neither do I wish science education to become a liberal 
arts course about science. Children need to interact with the real world and develop the 
understanding and confidence to apply the theories and models of science to the world 
around them. It is in this way that children will come to learn about science and to gain a 
rational view of the world. Furthermore, since science education is likely to be in 
competition with manifold unscientific and antiscientific forces in both formal and 
informal education, the onus is on science educators to teach in a manner that captures the 
imagination and reveals to children the fascination of the known and the challenge of the 
unlmown. 
Paradoxically, the major problem for science teaching lies in the very success of science. 
Modern science is a truly amazing human achievement and we should celebrate the 
lmowledge of the world that it has given us. Science is a very creative activity in that 
those working at the frontiers of science develop and extend their understanding through 
continually questioning and testing their own ideas and the ideas of other scientists. 
Science is also authoritative in that it represents the most sophisticated and coherent 
understanding of the world that we have at anyone time. This authoritatve aspect of 
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science has an effect on the field of science education. The very success of science I 
sometimes leads teachers to take pedagogical short cuts, and to teach scientific knowledge 
in a way that makes it appear as a fixed set of truths. In terms of simply learning the 
content of science, this is not umeasonable - the structure of the solar system or basic 
human physiology are unlikely to be challenged at the school level of learning. BQwev~, 
~uch1}1~!p-ods of~~ply that science is infallible,~~ncl theol:l!!f2rl11n~!e_Q1.lkQll1~~f 
this i~JllilL~l11clel}ts ~~'!Y develop an attitud~innin.g-helief. Tht~_ raises two key' 
question~ Jf sci~nlific~Q~1§~~~~ world is auth2tiJ~tive~ how can we teach it in a 
IVanner that is not authoritarian? and !jow can~~repr~en~t1!~~'!tiv~id~of s~ 
'Yithout~uggesting that scientific knowledge. i~n~to £ml1e~J2yJ~ar1!ers7 
In answering these questions, we need to distinguish between the authoritarian teaching of 
science, in which the views of children are devalued and dismissed, and the creative 
teaching of authoritative science, which is totalitarian only in the sense that the behaviour 
of the real world is not subject to the whims and wishes of individuals. Somehow we need 
to get students, who are learning knowledge which is beyond dispute, to be able to 
experience something of the scientists' creativity in evaluating and critiquing concepts. 
One of the factors which contribute to the ability of scientists to be creative is their 
existing expertise; a scientist working outside the established knowledge base has only a 
vanishingly small chance of making a contribution to human understanding of the world. 
The same holds for the teaching and learning of science. It is only by inducting children 
into the concepts and thinking of science that we empower them to question the 
understandings that they hold. What this raises for debate is whether induction into 
science is a method by which rational and effective critical evaluation is encouraged, or 
whether induction is a form of indoctrination designed to subvert criticism. People who 
have experienced science teaching that demanded unquestioning belief may be excused for 
viewing induction as indoctrination - they will have had science presented as a mystical 
set of preordained knowledge placed above the scrutiny of ordinary people. However, 
this is not sufficient cause to abandon the scientific approach for the epistemological 
anarchy of post-modernism. What it should do is to warn us to ensure that induction does 
not unduly restrain children's thinking and critical faculties. 
There are gradations in understandings of any science concept, and even a simplistic 
understanding does give some grasp of the way the world works. If we acknowledge this, 
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we can induct children into science, and simultaneously encourage them to think critically 
and creatively. Tea~Is must .Q~se1!t~fi~E:~t:H~~al!!hgrit~tiv~glnd scienc~lm(~_~L~dge as 
!rushy.orthy, b}l~ emphasise that koowledge ~ists at vari.ous levels oL 
sophistication and 'correctness'. Any science taught should add to the learners' ability to 
understand and explain phenomena around them, albeit at a level that is unsophisticated 
when c.ompared with scientists current views. The connection of lm.owledge t.o the real 
world provides a 'reality check' f.or theories and for understandings held .of them. The 
experiences children have .of the w.orld will provide evidence of the inadequacy of s.ome of 
the ideas and theories that they h.old. In this way, children will c.ome t.o questi.on and ~ 
challenge their .own level .of understanding. By this pr.ocess, students can be successful 
learners .of science and, at the same time, learn ab.out science. Children's kn.owledge is not 
~i 
at a level at which they can justifiably challenge the f.oundati.ons of science, put 11!.~y 
sh.ouLqJm.ow that the processes of questi.oning and ~ chall~nging_,_}Yl1ic;~gc;£ur as scien!ists W 
-----_.---_._-- ,-,-- --- ----- -- - ., - -~--~-------
ll1~eas uP_~gil!~t t~.os~ of otl1ers and againsUh~b~hayiQllr~Qfth~aellLworlg, 
~~ imp~_t!~~!PCl!t_.of science. 
There is n.ot a unique 'c.orrect' scientific explanation (alth.ough there may be many quite 
inc.orrect and unscientific explanations) and a skilled teacher will select a topic and level of 
sophisticati.on that suits the class and then teach it in an appropriate manner .. Chilill'.s:!Lin 
their earlti~Jl1~~~~u~~~s,sf1.Il at uncl~l',StandingJh~qJlites.ophisticated ~lii~~}"Jl~Q~l ~ 
.oL th<:L1)1~Hil!g_~p!()~~§s. QhiLdrerLag~d~fiy¥~are unlikely to c.ope with the <,kgree of Jf' 
ilbstraction rSll:i~ t.o d~vel.op an ul1derstandLng_Qf-p-articles, ancito teach this m.odel in ~ :~ 
[.ot~:~Slrning m~Jo enc.ourage an 'unquesti.oning belief .outc.ome. However, 
children of five can be given experiences which develop their c.oncept .of 'melting' beyond 
the simplistic noti.on that 'melting is what happens to ice cubes'. If substances such as 
co.oking .oil, honey and ch.oc.olate-peanut slab are sealed int.o plastic bags and placed in the 
freezer, children can later .observe the changes as the bags heat up to r.oom temperature. 
The range of substances that melt can be further extended if the bags are then placed int.o 
c.ontainers of h.ot water. The process of melting can be distinguished from burning by 
extracting the unmelted peanuts from the choc.olate bar and trying to melt them by direct 
heating. The concept .of melting could be further extended by using a soldering ir.on to melt 
s.older and s.o include metals in the category .of 'things that melt'. In w.ork such as this, 
children are expl.oring and extending their ideas in a measured way and avoiding the 
positivist and p.ostm.odernist extremes. 
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7.3 Scientific Thinking 
A measured commitment to a theory does demand an understanding of science, not just of 
the concepts but of the methods, attitudes and philosophy of scientists. To decribe this 
as a 'tall order' would be something of an understatement, particularly as we do not 
advocate that science courses become liberal arts course about science, nor that science 
courses simply have a bit of philosophy grafted on. Monle and Osborne (1997) have 
developed suggestions on how history and philosophy can be successfully integrated into 
content learning in science courses, but a word of caution from Cobern (1996) needs to be 
sounded here. It is sometimes assumed that understanding the concepts will lead to the 
appropriate appreciation of science and the subsequent development of students' world 
view. ~~st Jhis ~Cl:~§Jlffi121i~11}_Q2J2~cL(i1l--E-cli[ferent contextLKnhn_ (199]), argue 
!hat we ~gJQffiake the sg_~g!i!1£_Yi~w~xplkjt in_our t~chinE. lJ,lis is because l?!iEg_~91~ 
to_ c~lliLthe~~~~e~t ()Lscience __ may_(kll~ndon-having _~lll_,!pPI~9jatjQJLQJ th~~ 
c;on~!-2f scieIl.()e its~lf. This has a certain logical appeal to it. Children will only really 
understand a concept or scientific model if they appreciate the status of scientific 
knowledge or understand what scientists are attempting to achieve with a particular 
model. One of the basic complaints that critics have of constructivist teaching is that 
personal, 'children's science' is developed at the expense of public, 'scientists' science'. 
That is to say, something fundamental to the nature of science is being neglected. 
However we must be careful not to imply that, in order sucessfully to learn science, 
students have to appreciate the ontological, epistemological and metaphysical 
commitments of modern science. Such a state of affairs would be to reproduce the overly 
ambitious goals of the STS and the science literacy reformers to which we refered in 
section 6.2. 
In talking of making the scientific view explicit, Cobern goes on to make an important 
distinction between developing a scientific world view, and developing a world view that 
is compatible with science. The scientific world view is narrow, and too specialised to be 
of use to those other than scientists - and, even then, only in their professional work. The 
second, a science-compatible world view, is much broader and it links better to a world 
view that might be justifiably developed in general education. Furthermore, the science-
compatible world view fits more comfortably with the previously expressed aim of 
intellectual independence for the non-specialist. 
Both intellectual independence and a science-compatible world view imply the need for an 
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understanding of science based on a familiarity with the aims and commitments of science 
rather than on a detailed knowledge of the intricacies of specific content. Such an 
understanding would be fostered if students had the ability to empathise with scientists, 
and be able to think like a scientist. I next consider the teaching of scientific and critical 
thinking as an essential component of the science education. 
Science education can be conceived as a mode of thinking in two ways. The first way 
involves :t:.~ising the level of students' epist~mologi~al sophiE)ti9gtiQllJmd_gettingthJ~m_t{L 
"--.. -".,,~-. '--. -- -- - - - -
t4i11k:~,!QQ!l!!11~11Ji1ur~of science. For example, Duschl and Gitomer (1991), argue for the 
need to adopt a more sophisticated epistemology in science education in order that 
learners develop a 'sense of the rationality of science and the recognition that [knowledge] 
,/ 
restructuring is central to scientific development'. In this way, they argue, learners will 
become capable of 'assessing the degree of legitimate doubt associated with scientific 
claims'. Such skills would need to be taught explicitly and, although this is a 
'philosophical' area, there are programmes available aimed at teaching philosophical 
thinking to quite young children (for example Cam, 1995). Furthermore, if teachers have 
in mind the broad goals for science education ~hat I have been advocating, such 
philosophical outcomes are likely to be reinforced in a concrete manner by the way in 
which science is taught. 
The second way of looking at thinking in science education involves the lllore_g~neml 
II' 
12Qtion~of critk~J thi~ng ... to which authors give different but clearly related emphases. 
If f- ~~~~~ding ~~~~~_(1~~2n~!!Sj$~'!1.tbinkingj~~_cientifi~ thinking, an<ithe_4~YQ~of 
... 9!i!killJlrinking f~Q~!!f1cation for teaching science. Sieg~lJ19JJ1£QQ£eives 
of critical thinking as an ~tiy~'~!i!icaI~riC~itlLwhi~ll12eQJ2Le_~~lu~_gQQ_d n~51s()1111!.K 
and are dis.Ros~gJ~Q~li~V'e,j~gg~Clg<L~~LQ!J its. b~asis'; alld thisJinl~itical thinldng to 
Jhe wider world view. A connection between critical thinking and the broader 
-~.~~<'""~-~~~~~,~~~-.---~--~-~~~ 
sociopolitical goals for science education is made by W~il1steiIl(1991). ije argues. that 
qiticaL thinking of~ 'a.J>Q~ghl~ mechanism for edll.~atL<L1LfoLdemocracy , because 
~l1inK_()K£liticallhinking helps stlLdents to 'fOcJ!~QJ:Ltheir own rational pLO_cedures 
thr?_~~h interactive deli~e~ti()J:l'" witbillasJ.ij2pQrtive cQmmunjty QUquals'. Ihi§JinlLill. 
.~g~iCl!_goals is made ~fitmlyJ2y_J¥irth (1991) who sees the ullikrs1anqjgK<lll<L 
l11~aning-making develo12ed through criticalfuinki!lg as a way of 'retainin~~tr.in­
,a fearsomely new_PQ§t:-industrial electrmllc age' , 
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Cli!ical t~inkingis ;t!ot ""ithQutjts gr!tic~.J<ore2C.ClmJ21.~,---M():P~~l<j!?~I).~~~ Barrow 
(1991) criticise critical thinking (cognitive skills) programmes on the grounds that the 
- ~-~--~~~-~~--=-----~---- ~--
s~ills are domain specific and cannot be taught in the abstract. However, eve!l. advo~ate~ 
s~~~.~~Siegel (1991), who CiIg!.le strongly for the g~l1er~liIDQility of Gritk'!l!h!nliil!g~~!<:ig~. 
acknowle4ge th~Jle~~!11.!2 1J~Jal.!ght ill.S()lll~£()l1!~xt.Qthers critics, like Rorty 
~,~----- -------- -----
(19 8?),'lrgue that .the GriJicaLC!~IL~QLofedncfl.tiQl1J:;ho1.!ld be delaye_<iIL}}!iLl~arners have 
~ceiY~clA longJ2eriosL()L~9.hooling~f()!"..§_()ciali~'ltio1l., __ Cl.§~l!gg~~tio!L!QatJ:lat:.e~(12~~?1 ~_~~~!s 
.as ;ret '!l!other j!l~!ification for.'.Cl.li!Q9!i!1:!!!<l1l appr()l:tgh~§.J(Lle<l~hLng~ A.W.J)Ie fundamental 
sI:l'lJleng~ is _made by 0 'LoughJillD222)~ Ij:~[itical Qf th~ t~.fl.~hing of fQt:.~'!:l~()gn.i!ive 
slcill§..Qn th~wunds~e _ mgt}: il}cr~Cls_~_thechild'_s.a.bility.tQJldC!P.:t: J9.pre~~:9JJ?Qgety. 
rather than t<LQriliG!§e or change. it .. As support, O'Loughlin cites Freire's claims that 
--------~<-------~"---~-,-.-~'- -"-~-~ 
abstraction is the source of mystification and oppression, (Freire, 1970). The 
acknowledgement that critical thinldng needs to be taught from a concrete base is unlikely 
to allay O'Loughlin's fears about abstraction. This is because hY.Cil~Qembra.ces.the-11otiillL 
..,,--~--,- ,_.-.-"-------
th-,-'!:!Eation~!i~_~~llitural constructi0l?--'--~ll<i~~~uch h~~_~Q12!jyil~ctst'!!IL§~~.Cl w~~()f 
t~~ing. Glaims like O'Loughlin's are characteristic of the post-modern mO..Yeme.!1DYhi~p. 
rejects any notion with transcendental or foundation~'!lj:t[12ect. Such_claims r~st01?: the 
excessiV'.~_~I~~2.tL~~~!!1()f p()~~modernism and we sho:uld 1!oJ~ talce them !2(LSYtiQJ.l~Y. 
However, as with post-modern critiques of science itself, neither can we afford to be 
complacent. Weinstein (19912j§.@jJJl9ItiYG~oLthe.n.QtiQnQf critical thinking ~bJ.ltwarnL 
___ ~~~.~_~.~=o~ __ ,c~·,~·_~~~ 
that, while critical.Jhinking is 'characteristically fallibilist and ]JJu~(lH~(, it is still 
_~ •. ~ __ ~ ". - - -~--~~ __ ~O"~~_-~-~~ 
Koundationalist and_~n lQ._challenge by_radical post-modernists. In a later paper he 
expands on these challenges to rationality and acknowledges the contribution of Siegel 
(and Habermas) to the defence of the enlightenment project (Weinstein, 1995). While he 
refers to critical thinking somewhat cynically as 'resplendent with best-selling textbooks 
and quick fixes', he maintains that it is important to give it serious consideration.jIG, 
,,!rguest~~!,.JLSiegel is ~9rrGct Lllj~!lli:'ing critical thinking as the educational c()rrelate 
,~~~?n, [then] getting what reason require~traight becomes the central job of educatiQn 
t~day, and critical thinkingjs the terrain oLchoice~. TostJyngthen critical thinldng against 
---~~~- "-~"----
attacks we need to show that can Q€:,unoreJhan.aqukk::.fi1LQLapas.sing novelty. 
--.---.-
Critical thinking is important in developing both a world view that accommodates science, 
and in developing a view of scientific knowledge that accords respect but not awe. Further 
to this, Kuhn (1993) adds a very apposite aspect to scientific or critical thinldng . .she 
phll:racteti§~_£t:iti£ll:I.thinki.!l:~~~!h§~gIlthering~an~.wcighing~idenceJ(LSllpport.M 
75 
'argument', rather than a process involving exploration and problem solving. She also 
rejects the notion that the spontaneous explorations of children shows them to be 'natural 
scientists'. For Kuhn, scientific thinking is 'an endpoint...of a complex process of 
i~ ""-" """ ""--- -"---" " --- --"----"--""-"-------"--- ------
intellectual development', and something that 'does not come naturally but. .. once you get 
" -" 
~t you do not l()_~~it'. A rational argument can be constructed either internally as part of 
our own thinking or externally as part of social interaction. One of those skills needed for 
this is the ability to distance ourselves from our own beliefs to the extent that we can 
evaluate them as objects o(cognition. An"extreme relativist objection might be that such a 
distancing is impossible, but this would be to deny the existence of any form of sensible 
social intercourse. To admit that distancing may be possible, butto object none the less 
on the grounds that we cannot do this absolutely, is to take an excessively positivist view 
of the world. Rational argument is put in question if people hold absolute and unshakable 
beliefs, and it is equally in doubt if people are excessively skeptical or hold a totally 
relativist view of beliefs. Kuhn notes that: 
'[T]he student who says (quoting from one of the adolescents in our 
argument research), "You can't prove an opinion to be wrong because an 
opinion is something somebody holds for themselves," lacks any basis for 
judging the strength of an argument beyond its power to persuade.' [p 
335] 
The skill of argument is important for rational social interaction but, from Kuhn's 
research, it is a skill that is poorly developed in many adults. This leads Kuhn to suggest , "It 
that the relevance of science education might be established by 'connect[ing] the process 
~ 
of science to thinking processes that figure in ordinary people's lives' rather than by 
'connect[ing] the content of science to phenomena familiar in students' everyday lives' /It 
[italics in the original]. Kuhn makes two further important points. First, while scientific .,j 
thinking can be linked to everyday thinking, the two forms of thinking are not the same, a 
matter which is expanded on by Reif & Larkin (1991). Second, the connection between 
scientific thinking and thinking in the broader sense must be made, not just in our minds 
as educators, but also in the minds of our students. This, Kuhn suggests, may best be 
done by going outside the pure science domain because many students may be inhibited 
by a feeling of ignorance about science topics. The social science topics used in her 
research are selected so that 'average people see themselves as competent to hold opinions 
and make judgments'. Kuhn sees it as paradoxical that 'to enable students to see the 
significance of scientific thinking we may need to move outside of traditional science 
domains'. However, I see such a move as essential, not just to see the relevance of 
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scientific thinking but to meet the broader sociopolitical goals for science education. 
Scientific thinking not only can b,e, but must be, routinely applied in social contexts, 
otherwise it will have failed to influence the wider world view, it will have failed to 
produce a science-compatible world view that is functional. Such a failure would reduce 
science to being an optional extra within the general education of citizens! 
What then can we assemble as outcomes for science education? Learners need to be able 
to think clearly and critically, and to mount a coherent argument with all that is involved 
in assembling and weighing evidence. The cont~lJt1!ll~J2Iocesses cover~e<Li!l..~,ce 
Gourses must be linked in order that that students will not onl~Je'lrn s~i~nce_}ut~lSQ 
,---_., . -- -
come tQjg10w about science. In thi~ w~eohuild both an understanding of science, ando~ 
an intellectual independence from it, that is,. a view J)LscienceJms.edooonlmowledge...Jath.er 
than on faith or prejudice. What.shoul~Lw~oli:Las~Qutcomes of scienceed]J~ian? We 
sh~~l~~~~void getting children to accept whatJheY-.JlreJilld_,withQJJLQ.ll<2.s1iQlLQ.r~l!1Qr~JQ., 
the poin1 without guestioningJhe-epistemi~_grQ1l1)ding_of.theJmowledge_Qffere~E9.!ll:tJ1y, 
we should ~~~_~es~Cl:bil(sing~~hUd.re!l's Qeli~f~ to su~lLan extent that they helieY,ejn 
~@1g",~Jo, dQllbl~y~.!Y!!:t!llg~I.enlOves any~me.aning_fmm~whatitisiQ_d.o.l1bL·unless 
YQ!l~~ant~Q. doubLwhethecmeaning,exisJs"alaU! We should not insult children's't¥ 
intelligence by spoon-feeding them predigested information to be memorised without , 
explanation or application. Neither should we give them an unrealistic faith in any ideas i 
that they may generate, because they may then fail to question their own own ideas, and If 
fail to grow in knowledge. Children should not accept science as the ultimate source of 
j( 
truth, for they may then accept unquestioningly anything labelled 'scientific'. Neither 
should children be led to see science as yet another passing fad, to be placed alongside 
tarot card readings and colour therapy. 
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CHAPTER 8 TRUTH, CULTURE AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 
8.1 Science as the Search for Truth 
Let me summarise what I have argued so far. In the last four or five decades we have had 
academic science curricula strongly motivated to produce a continuing supply of 
scientists; we have had STS and Science Literacy curricula based on 'relevant science' 
with the goal of helping people live in (and even have some control over) our scientific 
and technological age; and we have had curricula, based on children's ideas and children's 
cognitive processes, which are primarily concerned with producing 'conceptual change' in 
learners. Most curricula also mention learning about science, or learning scientific 
attitudes, but this is not a major emphasis. For example, the 'Nature of Science' strand 
has been dropped from the National Curriculum in the United Kingdom, and in New 
Zealand this strand is significantly under-developed in comparison to the other five 
strands. 
A major goal for science education should be to build in children the capability of critical, 
analytical, rational thinking (ie scientific thinking). The reason for this is that we will need 
people capable of applying scientific thinking to the social world in order to make 
democracy work more effectively. And it will be through having a more genuinely 
participatory democracy that adequate mechanisms will be found for public input into 
both the direction of science and the application of technology. A factor that has 
confounded attempts to define goals for science education has been the development of 
philosophies of science which either directly challenge the traditional motivations and 
methods of science, or can be interpreted as doubting the status of scientific knowledge. 
This philosophical drift is related to a general postmodernist unease about where 
science/rationality/technology are leading the human race. The unease is legitimate but the 
solutions, despite the rhetoric of empowerment, are likely to lead to disempowerment 
and nihilism. 
In this chapter I will propose a view of science that maintains its authority but requires 
us to acknowledge its vulnerability and the limits to that authority. I will also explore 
facets of science that are useful in developing general principles for science education. I 
will then examine, in more concrete terms, what these views mean for the classroom and, 
in Chapter 9, I will present a model for teaching that acknowledges the complexities of 
78 
the classroom and assigns a vital role to teacher wisdom. 
There are two key features of science that I need to develop further. This involves 
looking first at the behaviour of scientists and second at the goals of science. In turn, this 
will then require us to revisit the question, What is science?, not in order to settle some 
long running philosophical debate about the nature of science, but to see what the 
implications are for science education. First, let us consider the behaviour of scientists. 
Several decades ago Merton (1942) proposed a set of norms for the conduct of science: 
1. Universalism. The validity of scientific knowledge is independent of 
the personal, social, cultural, and national attributes of the scientist and 
should be evaluated by cognitive criteria. Careers in science are open to 
individuals from all cultures. 
2. Communism. The products of scientific endeavours belong to the 
community of scientists. This norm requires open communication within 
the scientific community. 
3. Disinteredness. Scientists are motivated by a desire to extend the 
domain of human knowledge, without personal interest in particular 
scientific conclusions. Self-aggrandisement and spurious claims are 
discouraged. This norm has been cited as responsible for the relative 
absence of fraud in science. 
4. Organised skepticism. Scientists have both a methodological and an 
institutional mandate to consider only empirically established facts in 
scientific decision making. This norm requires scientists to suspend 
judgment until "the facts are at hand". 
Along with anyone with a post-positivist view of science, I would require considerable 
amendment to the fourth norm. However, others (for example Kelly et al.,1993), support 
the view that all of these norms should be read as an ideology of science, an ideology that 
serves the interests of the scientific community by enhancing the epistemic status of 
science knowledge, by increasing scientists' political power and by elevating their social 
status. But are the Mertonian norms simply shallow ideology? Consider the reverse of 
the first three norms: 
1. Particularity. The validity of scientific knowledge is dependent on the 
personal, social, cultural, and national attributes of the scientist and should 
not be evaluated by cognitive criteria. 
This may well apply to the world of art, but not science. 
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2. Isolationism. The products of scientific endeavours belong to the 
particular scientist. This requires there to be restricted communication 
among the scientific community. 
This may well be a necessary condition for the operation of commercial enterprises under 
the competitive rules of capitalism, but not for science. 
3. Self Interest. Scientists are motivated by personal interest in particular 
scientific conclusions. Self-aggrandisement and spurious claims are to be 
expected. 
This may bear some resemblance to public relations or advertising activities but not to 
SCIence. 
Of course, any contention that (the first three) Mertonian Norms do describe science is 
only weakly supported by showing that their inverses do not, but highlighting these 
counter norms does illustrate where a rejection of them may lead. 
Consider the following criteria which, according to Longino, a community must meet in 
order for consensus to qualify as knowledge: 
1. There must be publicly recognised forums for the criticism of evidence, of 
methods, and assumptions about reasoning. 
2. There must be uptake of criticism. The community must not merely 
tolerate dissent, but its beliefs and theories must change over time in 
response to the critical discourse taking place within it. 
3. There must be publicly recognised standards by reference to which 
theories, hypotheses, and observational practices are evaluated and by 
appeal to which criticism is made relevant to the goals of the inquiring 
community. 
4. Finally, communities must be characterised by equality of intellectual 
authority. What consensus exists must be the result not of the exercise of 
political or economic power, or of the exclusion of dissenting perspective, 
but a result of critical dialogue in which all relevant perspectives are 
represented. (Longino 1994, pp 144-145) quoted in Duschl & Hamilton 
(1998) ppl050-1051 
Criteria such as these of Longino, or indeed Merton's norms, are important, not because 
they describe how science operates, but because they are idealisations that provide a set 
of expectations for scientific behaviour. There are similarities between this idea of an 
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idealisation for science and the idea of a guiding 'myth' for education (Beeby, 1992). Such 
a myth, or perhaps more accurately such a vision, is a commonly held goal that is distant 
enough to give guidance and coherence to decision-making without the myth itself having 
to be continually adjusted. I suggest that the norms of Merton and Longino help to form 
a vision for the behaviour of scientists. If the norms are accepted as defining how 
scientists should behave, then individual scientists will consciously attempt to conform 
to them, and the scientific community will censure anyone who consistently fails to. For 
example, scientists agree that open communication ought to characterise the conduct of 
science, but there will be occasions when this does not happen. However, the with-
holding of results by individuals will be criticised by their peers; the restrictions imposed 
for industrial or military reasons will be resisted; and communication between scientists 
of nations of vastly different political persuasion will occur because scientists' belief in 
science is stronger than their belief in the politics that keeps other citizens separated. It is 
important to have this vision overtly presented so that decisions and actions can be 
challenged on the grounds that they are not consistent with the vision. This is in contrast 
to Kelly et al., and others of a like mind, who wish to reject science because actions of 
some scientists are not consistent with the vision for science. 
This leads me to the second consideration of this section, the goal of science. For the 
overall scientific endeavour an appropriate 'myth' is, I suggest, to find the truth about 
the world. This returns to the important issue of truth which I flagged in Chapter 3 with 
the quote from Bonnett (1995). On this topic of truth Carson writes: 
'No one believes anymore that science discovers the truth. Our theories 
arise from what we have seen, but what we see evidently is influenced by 
our theories, and by general culture and language that formats our 
perceptions and imposes structure on the manifold of conceptual 
possibility. Nevertheless, science is not like any other cultural form - it 
entails an enormously courageous commitment to keep striving toward 
truth, however elusive "Truth" may be (Bereiter 1994). Its putative 
failures are part of the evidence of its continuing success.' Carson (1997) 
p 234 
Science is a source of reliable knowledge not because it always speaks the truth but 
because it actively seeks to recognise the limits of its theorising. Science is not 'objective' 
in the sense that the empiricists wish, but scientists work hard to identify all the factors 
that confound their observations and interpretations. Science is not 'logical' in the sense 
that Popper wanted, but scientists recognise the need for cogent arguments to be 
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mounted and defended on the basis of the best evidence available. The methods of science 
evolve (for example, see Worrall, 1999 on double blind testing) and there are changes in 
metaphysical beliefs (for example about the nature of space and time). This means that 
any attempt to define science from naturalistic methods (ie by examining how science is 
or was conducted) will at best be only a partial definition. I suggest that the question 
'What is science?' carries with it an unfortunate assumption that science is a finished, 
logical entity. A more useful question would be 'How is science becoming?' 
The issue is not so much with science finding the truth, in the sense of generating 
knowledge that is certain, it is more to do with the values that science holds. Science is 
not so much a matter of discovering the truth, but more a matter searching for truth. And 
truth does lie in a real world that is 'out there' and that is independent of our existence. 
This is the meaning I take from the Bonnett (1995) quote that, '[G]ood thinking rests in a 
sense of truth which, far from being essentially 'constructed' by us, is transcendent.' It 
follows then, that if good thinking is to be a primary aim of science education, and I 
believe it should be, then a moderate realism will provide better philosophical support 
than empiricism or even semantic realism. For, unless semantic realism acknowledges that 
the aim of science is to find the truth, the notion of scientific knowledge as models that 
can be 'fitted' to the world can be taken as simply an instrumental or pragmatic view. If 
science education is to teach values, and I believe it should, and if science education is to 
be worthy of the effort expended by both teachers and students, then the following point 
is well made; 
"Making sense" of our sensory inputs hardly seems sufficient warrant to 
maintain the scientific enterprise; and in a science classroom it hardly 
seems sufficient warrant for the teacher to disturb deeply ingrained and 
important beliefs of children. Finding out the truth might provide such a 
warrant.' Matthews (1992) p 305. 
8.2 Science as Culture 
In discussing the place of science within a liberal education and the content and aims of 
science education programmes Carson (1997) comments that; 
'[I]n the grand procession of human history, SCience has played an 
extraordinary role, impacting deeply upon all the most important and 
interesting questions humans have ever posed.' p232 
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and he complains that little of this comes across to the learners. Furthermore Carson 
says, of the relation between science and society, that; 
, [science is] a profoundly influential cultural force which puts it into 
complex interaction with other cultural forces, competitive as well as 
cooperative. It is also, inevitably, a moral and ethical orientation.' p 
225. 
and, most importantly, that; 
'[B]y distinguishing "science" from "culture", science appeared to be a 
replacement for culture rather than one of its variations.' p226 
Hodson (1998) characterises science education as enculturation and warns of the twin 
dangers of assimilating and excluding learners. I argued in Chapter 3 that scientific (" '5{;-
thinking is what defined science, and I will take this a the defining characteristic of 'l( 
scientific culture. Internationally, science is conducted by Indians and Chinese, by ~ 
Christians and Moslems, by communists and capitalists, and by feminists and male 
chauvinists. ~j~ nQ!llin~ inherently Western European or }llal~ about sci~nc_e~ 
Although, in science as as currently practised, there may well be extant historical biases 
(and it may well be that, for example, male prejudice is particularly resistant to 
extinction). \ylu,!!j~of importance is that scientifi~_clllJllr~_ ci1n~itctl.o~g~c!e ~ cultures 
-"~~--- -- -- --- ---- --- - - - - - - - -----~----' 
- th1!S~.~~i~1}ti§..t~a!l:a,ls() b~a\Y()rki!!g class, J11.ale Jew~QL~bourgeoi~~E1:~!.~~theist. 
Thu§-,-_al1h~mghJheI~ Will. be llluiticl!ltural .. science .. education+-:w.hereJheped_'H~.9.,gL!~ 
adapted to suit the background of the learner, thtg~ are no multicultural sciences based 011 
~---~'~~~-~~-~~~~ ~ - -- - - -
<ilj.fferent cultures~.Put bluntly, there is the culture of modern science and there are other 
cultural ways of viewing the world. These latter ways of viewing the world are not 
science and to compare them with modern science is helpful to neither science nor to the 
other cultures. To avoid the charge of scientism let me hasten to acknowledge the 
arguments of feminists such as Longino and Harding that a feminist perspective brought 
to science can improve scientific knowledge by removing biases (see Longino, 1990 for 
example). However, I take corrections such as these as part of the evolution of modern 
science rather than as an argument for a separate 'feminist science'. 
Sci~!!tific thinking. does not rely solely on common se!!s~:Jti§_ofte1!CQlLnJeI.jntllitive -
~.---- --~---- -------- - - -- ---- - ------- --- -------- - -----
and ~cientifi~_ thinking requires an-.inte!lectual commitment in order to come to an . 
----- ~- - ------~--------- ' '----------"" /
. ~ 
understctl'ldinK o:(the theories agel metaphysical beliefs of science. Scientific thinking , 
l~'~~'- -.~ . --. .'-.-. -- .. .... . _._.. ..... --... -.-_.-._. . ...... . 
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requires, at times, a willingness to submerge ones ego and submit to the force of evidence 
and, at other times, scientific thinking requires the courage to stand up for ones ideas 
against the existence of apparently disconfirming evidence. ~£ielltific~_ c;uJtt!re\:Yills:lll~~ 
.*, 
1YitlLtl~culture that is satisfied 'Yifu.2imlili'. makilfE~meanigg, 5t will clash with any 
,?ulture that4.2~~11Qt~aye.g()l11l11J!l!l~n~ tofin"Ugg the truth, and withJillY culture thCJj <1-
.. does nqt have Citr;:Ldit!91LOf fL~§tioging.and critic. ally interrogating ideas. ~cientif!9 culture 
;if 
~clash with tr~l cultures, particularly those with an oral, tradition, and scientific 
~ will_~lash with the culture~QhilQ!.~ll. F_urth~rmore, I suggest thCi!many adu!!~jll )/:. 
our society live perfectly harmonio1!~!yill a ll1~a!ling-ma:!(!llKl11J)A~ wh_cre,jnuthe '* 
~~ ~---~'~~~ ~ 
~~e, in the home,and with frie1l4~'-ll1()st<;onvers~tions are designed to retell )i/. 
stories and maigt~i!120cial relationl'hill~_Il!th~r tbm!!Q_§_~l'iQJ.l§ly_qll~stiQll_fnlytl1illg. Tl1ns * · .... __ ~_~_c _"_~" --
scientific culture will also clash with the culture of many adll~ ~~________ "'----==~~c_~ ___ _ 
Cobern (2000) mounts an interesting argument for science education to acknowledge the 
presuppositions of science and to remove the distinction between belief and knowledge. I 
have no objection to these proposals because Cobern is arguing against '[t]he anti 
metaphysical project of positivism [that] sought to make science a self contained rational 
endeavour'. The metaphysical underpinnings of science need to be made transparent but, 
despite Cobern's eschewing of an 'anything goes' attitude, I have misgivings about his 
notion of plurality and the claim that there can be no privileged stance on what 
presuppositions are necessary to science - this is too close to a relativist position. ~ 
beliefs, for example the Maori belief in the spiritual link between people and land, are 
.... - ---~-~---------~------------- __ -__ ~ ~- "' _____ e __________ ~ __ ._, _ 
simply incompatible with modern science, but this is not to say that one cannot be a 
~ -.--~- -------------- --------------------~--~---- - ---~---
Maori and a scient~J, Furthermore, it is not to say that science education should try to 
~-~-~-----~---------~ ... - - . - -'~--~ 
eliminate the belief in spirituali~L~nor that science should be prepared to accommodate 
.-._--- ------ ~---------~ - -- - - ------ ---- -- ---------------
some sort of spiritual dimension - the two different views will simply coexist within the lIP - 11>-. __ _ 
~~~~~stems an<LwilLQe \!~eAj!lJ!l212LQ.Qriate c:ultur'!Lcont~xts. The e~am1?le~ that 
S:obern does give of clashingp.~~~PE()~!!i<:>!l~_al'eJ)'pi~_alJ)L'1>Qundary setting' that has 
been discussed in section 5.4, and I see no reason to make contestable any fundamental 
metaphysical beliefs of modem science. 
The above arguments about the nature of science would not be of crucial importance if 
leaning of scientific concepts was all that was at stake. However, as I have indicated, 
adoption of scientific thinking is a key goal of science education and this is all too easy to 
subvert. Stinner and Williams (1998) are anxious to avoid the influence of postmodernists 
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and radical constructivists and suggest a way of overcoming the public disenchantment 
with science. Their proposal is for a 'Science for Everyone' (SFE) that is not only for 
everyone but perceived to be so. They give four principles for SFE. The fourth principle 
relies on basing science education on 'sound scientific principles' which, they claim, have 
'made great strides in recent years'; this is in direct conflict with Chinn and Brewer 
(1998) quoted in section 6.1. What of the other three principles? The first principle is 
that science should be comprehensible for most students and to ensure this there will be a 
core of essential material that 'does not make intellectual demands on students that are 
beyond their capacity'. The second principle is that science should be meaningful; 
, ~ 
students are to be able to 'make sense out of the natural phenomena that they experience 
in their daily lives and to solve their real life problems. The third principle is that science 
"i: 
is to reflect the nature of science by providing a human face to science and presenting 
science as 'an eclectic and creative process of search and discovery'. I hold two 
reservations about these principles, first, they suffer from the problems of STS and 
science literacy claims (see section 6.2) and second, the principles clearly accept that 
science education has the limiting goal of 'learning in science'. In addition, I find that 
these principles smack of 'dumbing down' the science in order to meet perceived 
inadequacies in children, rather than getting children to meet the challenge of 
understanding science. 
Getting children to meet the challenge of learning science does require considerable 
pedagogical skill and this is the subject of the next section. Bow~y~n wiil1,Jh~_.l!lQsL 
~killed and the most m?~iY_<l:!i!lK_t~a.~h~r~ l~ctmil1:KJ'()J~P£~_ is ~never going tobe easy. 
fE:ildren in __ <l:!Lcultules_ii!lcl'll~~ng _()urs) ~xp~!te~~_~()lll~J(?1~fl;Lof~ite.sgtRa._ss~,~'LCl 
cll!!ural induction to the waJ:s gfJlttUJtllogg.,For many children, this consists largely of 
- -------~--"--~-~------".---- . - - ---. ----- ----------- ---------~-~--~--.-. 
. lea.rlling the protocol ~L,!dl~It~trib_cttJife._(o! eJ\:~IJ:ljJJe.PCl~,tsing QQll1l}1e.ll1;;_~lWJltJ~ 
Feather, 0~dis~~sing~p2rt: Ip these __ ~J:tingsL!llgl'tQQnve.IsCitions are 'meaningless' 
unless they are seen as 'story-telling' designed to reinforce the social fabric. An example 
"'""----~------ ---_.--- - --------~---- ,'--- - - - --
of induction to the culture of work is given in Willis (1978). !n_colltrastJiL,'Iile1LQf . 
passage', induction into scie@!icthinki!1g is t.9 move children from thinking tr!bCillY-JQ'" 
------=~-~~.~~-- --~"---~--.--. .--. 
thinking globally, to raise rati2..l!alttL to a _!l~~l~vel and with it the level of ethical 
---- ' --~ " ' ~--'---'-------------- ----------'-'-----,- ~ 
.thi~~g. ~!!fLCJhl!1kil1~~S_ ~()!_t~~~pl<l:~_~~!ibal story-telling., this, is still ~eq~ire~ for 
~2!!L~~t~fic-!~~i!!gi~,_t() lie a]()l1ggde m~lli1!&!!l'll(i!1KCl;!ld t2.. addjlne\y .. , ,II 
level of ch.oiceto cllildren's actions The move from meaning-lllaking to_scielltif19 Jh!nkipg\ ,'* 
~nl;kely to occur naturally, nor is it likely to occur by just letting children explore, nor 
.--~~---", .--,--- '- -- . . .. 
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even by getting children to mount 'arguments' on the basis of their own ideas and 
experiences - ~i~~r~~n~!,,,~~~e, is~iJn.l?lynot sciencq. ~onsider~ble h~tellectua~ effort is 
l!eedeC!j!!.QIc!~IJbJ!U~~r!!i!1g in sC~~~Jql].E.Je~rn.ingab~~t sci~llce le,!p ch,ildr.cn to ap. 
und~I~landil].K of science and to the skills of scientific thinl<:ip.g, This is the reason why 
"'->;.-- --:--" - ---- --------"-, -~~--"----" -- ,------- ,"~~ ~,.' ---.--,-~-p---. 
learning science must be worth the effort, this is why anything less than moderate 
realism's commitment to truth is unacceptable. 
We need to raise the level of rational thinking and with this the level of ethical thinking in 
order to cope with the complexity of modernity, in order to build a better society, and to 
in order to become more reflective about science itself. We cannot disestablish science as 
the postmodernists might wish, but we may be able to rationally and democratically 
question what sort of knowledge we need, where science research should head, and so on. 
Opponents of science and technology are not irrational, they are looking for a solution to 
the inhumanity of science and technology, they are looking for some way of closing the 
Pandora's box that was opened half a millennium ago - they are muddled in their analysis, 
but sincere in their intent. Science and technology do not need to order people in the 
ways that so concern critics such as Heidegger (1997: 1949). The concerns raised are real, 
but any solution that denies science is unrealistic and will end up disempowering the very 
people it purports to help - there is no post-modern solution. Not all critics seek to 
denigrate science, Feyerabend (1980) looks for a return of science to a non-ideological, 
liberating force, and Toulmin (1990) sees the solution lying in combining Renaissance 
humanism with modern rationality. Modernity is not about technology but about a way 
of thinking, it is not that modernity has overtaken people but that the thinking of a 
majority of people needs to catch up with modernity. Scientific rationality must be a 
mode of thinking available to all people and a mode of thinking that gives additional 
choices to people so that society might then be more reflective and truly democratic. It is 
not so much that we need to graft Renaissance humanism onto society, but that we need 
a new, robust form of humanism that is an integral part of a rational modernity, a 
humanism that will ensure that the culture of science works for humanity and not the 
reverse. It is to this goal that science education must contribute. 
8.3 Science in Science Education? 
Science educators often paint science as an 'every day activity' and a 'human invention' 
in order to provide a 'science for all' and a pedagogy that teaches science humanely. 
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These are commendable goals but we must be careful not to make SCIence out as 
something that can exist at a meaning-making level, and we must be careful not to 
understate the intellectual endeavour involved in learning science. Even as a pedagogical 
strategy, such views are dangerous. Teachers without scientific expertise may believe that 
'talking about the needs of pets' represents sufficient intellectual commitment to be 
learning science, and teachers with scientific expertise may believe that attending to 
lessons and carrying out laboratory exercises represents sufficient intellectual 
commitment to be learning science. In neither of these situatuations will the teacher be 
promoting scientific thinking. Over the last few decades science education has been 
concerned with conceptual change and, this does involve a deeper commitment for both 
teacher and student. But science education is both more than conceptual change and less 
than conceptual change. Science education is more than this because changing the 
concepts in itself is insufficient. What is required as well is a' change in thinking, the 
development of a rational, scientific way of viewing the world. Science education is also 
less than conceptual change because there are few, if any, concepts that are crucial to 
running our lives, and because we are not seeking to convert children to scientific thinking 
but simply to add this to their other ways of viewing the world. 
In order to characterise science for the classroom, I suggest that the following questions 
are significantly asked in science: 
I wonder what would happen if. .. ? 
Why does this happen? 
In what other ways could I explain this? 
Which is the best way of explaining this? 
Why do I believe that is the best way? 
These question could be used as a framework for children's own investigations, because 
children need to get a feel for 'doing science'. However, more importantly, these 
questions should be used as a framework for studying existing scientific lmowledge, 
because it is the concept of science that we are trying to teach, not the scientific concepts 
themselves. Scientists 'do science' by using scientific thinking to generate science 
lmowledge and children 'learn science' by coming to understand scientific lmowledge, and 
thus developing scientific thinking. 
It is a truism that students must construct their own lmowledge but I rej ect the narrow 
constructivist notions of learning as personal construction. I endorse the broader notion 
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of learning as public construction of knowledge, and also support the notion of 
scaffolding and the use of 'existing knowledge' as an essential component in the 
construction process. This casts the teacher in a much more proactive role in the 
classroom while not diminishing the need for pupil participation. The classroom should 
be seen as a learning community or even a lmowledge generating community, but we must 
be careful when comparing this with the scientific community. For example of Longino's 
four criteria for a knowledge producing community, the three concerned with standards 
and uptake of criticism would translate quite easily into the classroom. However, the 
fourth criteria that requires equal intellectual authority must be treated with caution._lL 
would be simply deceitful to pretend that learners, the teacher and established science 
.,..-_., ~ .. --~-- - --~.~-."-~~"--"-.--~-~--~~-"-,~"- ._. __ .. -,,-."-.~--~-----~-- ---------.--. --.- ---~ 
k~~~l~dg~~s embod~in texts for example) are of equal intellectual authority.§()i~!ltifi~ 
~~:'Y!t)c!g~js authoritative (and presumably, to varying degrees, so is t~~t~(lch~rt Having 
said that, and before I bring down the liberal wrath on my head, let me also emphasis that 
~-"-" - ~. ,, ___ '._~ ___ ~~~.~~ ___ ~~'-"'_'_n~~~ ____ ,. ____ ,~~ 
it is important not to teach science in an authoritarian manner. Some traditipnal science 
("/7'-_.--- ... -.,-------., --~------'-"-.---.--.-~-.. -----~-----.---.------------ -'.- ,--"" ~-'----'---- ~ 
~~i!?-g~could reasonably be cillicised as being ideolog!cal- what a skilled science teacher 
dge~ is ~jgduct children into science without jn~l.9~~ Jhem" IdeQIQgy.-is 
c:Ql:tracteris~!py muddled thinki~ll!l<;:~Q!!§~~d a~ct!sm~>~JJ.dL~flexible_ decision-mal~i!!g 
rased on ~radition; indQctrillil1im1intQ~.§~9~~gives_no groJ:!!!ds_fQ.L£tlii<;:tsm~ILIY~ag~ tQ 
~isempowerment.~ali2nality is~characterisedJ2y clear thinking, considered action and 
Eecision-making thaLisJe>Yi~able~b~s~ ~~~~tifal evaluation; Jnduc1Lon intq, 
science teaches grounds for criticism and leads to e-!llpo!\,erment. ~ching that lead~ly 
~,~~~~~~~~~- -
-.t~~::-lllJ!king..J)tlQ@1illiYist vi~~~~of sci&nceLdQ§~not ~§LQut tQ.~~ti-y~lY~jJ1:~ven! 
criticism.2- but it subtly denies the possibility by> removing the JQ'_ouq.~s for critical 
-~~--- ---====~~~=-' 
~is; because of its covert effects, thllL~'!9l1jngjs ____ IItof(;uiang..eIQJlS-ilialLOYeIt 
ind9ctril}(:lti9Jl~) 
It is clear that we need to avoid indoctrination into science, it is not as clear exactly what 
induction into science entails. The use of analytical and critical faculties in the scientific 
community presupposes a high level of background lmowledge. £low could children use 
--~,~, -.".---~--,,----~~ 
analytical and critical skills in the classroom if existing scientific knowledge is 
.--,-'"-.. ---~.-.. -.-.--,,---~"--- - .---------~--~-~--~---.~.- ~ ----.------~--~-~~~~-~-~~p~--------~-- --~ 
authoritative? ~!!~LllQF do childrtm. gain these analytical and critical skills in the first 
-.~. ~-~~""-,£-~ - -- --- - -
plac~? In _l!ll~:w:~ringJhe first question, I hold that, the oc~ional child pro~~~~ep~~3~ 
children will never be in the possession of sufficient knowledge to seriously critique 
existing scientific knowledge - this is not scientism but simply an honest assessment. 
Children should be taught in a manner such that they see their own knowledge as 
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something that is occasionally revised and becomes progressively more sophisticated and 
inter linked. A key to this is the notion of having a 'measured commitment' to a theory. 
By this I mean that children will have developed a 'theory' in which they have a 
'measured' belief - that is they have measured the theory against observations, other 
vicarious evidence, and rival theories. Children will have a 'commitment' to the theory in 
that they will expect the theory to explain new observations, be consistent with new 
evidence, and be better than any new theory. If Ohlsson (1999) is correct, then having 
this sort of commitment should highlight the 'anomalous' nature of any counter evidence, 
and so enhance the chances of children questioning the theories that they hold. Children 
will question either the depth or the extent of their own theories and understandings,J2lJl 
this still leaves the question of how will they judge 'when to ho!4C!nd wh~n to fold?'. At 
~ ___ .~~"_.' - C"-- "-"-<"-~-~~' -' --,~-~-------
this point I suggest that the difference between doing science and learning science 
L--.._"_O'~ __ ,-
becom~r. Chil,Qren do recognise that there are authoritative sources that they can 
consult, and teachers should not shrink fro~e of these sources. I am not 
~. -
advocating that teachers simply 'tell' childr~n what to think, nor, I suspect, would many 
teachers want to do this. What I am aQyocating is that~achers (sometimes) set children 
the task of identifying the wa~ in which a theory or explanation that the teacher 
.~
presents is better than that held by the children. Even, and perhaps especially, if the 
,-=--- - - ~----~~ 
J:~:~~ted theory is counter-intuitive, teachers will need to have established a climate in 
which children readily accept that the theory is 'better' in certain aspects. The te~c~~~!!' 
t~_~lus then to motivate children in the task of identifying the way~hich it is better, 
~arners can 12racti~_~J:he scientific thinking ~~cientists engaged inlm()wledg~ 
~duction without the nonsensical pretence that established scientific knillYledgsd_s~ahle 
,to be challenged and revised by learners._ 
The question of how scientific thinking develops in learners can be answered by looking 
at the development of science itself. I argued in Chapter 3 that, along with certain 
metaphysical beliefs, social and economic conditions, and the existing meaning-making 
trait, the community of modern science arose from a high level of critical reflection and 
the active pursuit of evidence through experiments. Furthermore, science contains a 
positive feedback mechanism whereby initial advances brought about a snowball of 
further advances. We should be able to make use of the same feedback mechanism in 
science education - once you understand a bit about science then it becomes easier to 
learn more. If this is so then a teacher's key role is to 'prime the pump'. Teachers could 
use the five significant questions outline previously as a framework for presenting the 
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ideas of science and for children's own investigations. A further implication is that the 
earlier this starts the better. Whether ideas are children's own, informally developed ones, 
or whether the ideas are derived from a more formal study of standard scientific 
knowledge (of an appropriate level of sophistication) the earlier we can get children 
seeking evidence for ideas the better. 
The questions now are, 'What does this mean for specific programmes in specific 
classrooms?' and 'How does a teacher set up the correct classroom climate?' The answer 
to these and similar question is, 'It depends'. And it depends on so many factors that the 
usual curricula, wherein particular content is specified or particular methods are 
prescribed, are almost bound to fail. In the next chapter I will develop an alternative, 
much more open ended approach. 
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CHAPTER 9 TEACIDNG DECISIONS IN SCIENCE EDUCATION 
9.1 Questions of What and How to Teach 
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I have moved from a broad rationale for science education to three 
general aims and then to a more detailed look at how aspects of scientific content and 
thinking could be structured to meet these aims. However, there are good reasons why it 
would be presumptuous to try to prescribe what and how teachers should teach. 
I start with an analogy. A London bus driver, a New York cabby and a Beijing cyclist all 
make the production of order from chaos look deceptively easy. Each of them is required 
to continually make decisions based on a myriad of incoming data. There are general 
traffic rules operating, but the quality of the decisions made is dependent on professional 
judgment and 'local knowledge'. Teachers operate in a situation with a similar of high data-
flow and, like drivers, teachers must be allowed to exercise professional autonomy within 
some well defined constraints. 
More so than drivers, teachers have difficult decisions to make, and with fewer guide 
lines. Research in science education has produced a number of imp()rtant insights and ~ 
'---. .. " .. -. ---'"~~'~~-'~"""-~".~.-.--.'."--~-'--.-.- --.~-~-----~.~-~,--,-~~ -'-~-~.~~-
~QPments. For example.-current teaching methods are influenced by the recognition 
that children's preexisting ideas affect learning. 1l0'Yever, while these 'constructivist' 
~ . . 
~eaching methods have merit, they do not provide the ultimate answers to teaching 
guestions (Osborne, 1996}. Similarly, research into the characteristics of a successful 
teacher has provided disappointing results, even if the search has not been entirely 
fruitless (Brophy & Good 1986). So, when conducting pre-service or in-service teacher 
training in science, can we provide a mature and comprehensive educational theory on 
which teachers can base decisions? Clearly the answer is no. To return to our driver 
analogy, one might say that there are a few tracks rather than clear roads, there are 
arguments over which of these to take, and arguments about the nature of the destination. 
And, to push our analogy even further, some drivers feel that their passengers are at best 
apathetic about the journey or, at worst, openly hostile. 
A feature that makes teaching into a complex activity is the need to continually resolve 
tensions. These tensions arise in at least three areas; in the relationships between teachers 
and learners, in the process of selecting which knowledge and skills to be taught, and in 
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the interactions between education and the many facets of society. For a comprehensive 
theory on how to resolve these tensions, there are many questions that we would need to 
answer including: 
• first, about learning, 
How do human brains recognise patterns in data? 
How do children develop abstract concepts? 
Is learning limited by maturation or is maturation enhanced by learning? 
Are education and entertainment complementary or contradictory concepts? 
• second, about teaching, 
Do teachers have some authority to teach, and if so from what is this derived? 
Who or what provides the motivation to learn? 
Are teachers curriculum developers or followers? 
Are teachers sources of knowledge or facilitators who learn along with the children? 
Why do we have schools at all? 
• third, about science, 
What is the scientific enterprise about and how does it operate? 
What is the status of modern scientific knowledge? For example, does matter have a 
particulate nature or is this just a convenient metaphor? 
What are we to make of concepts such as truth and objectivity? 
• fourth, about science education, 
Why do we insist on teaching science to children? 
What are the most important science concepts and when can they be taught? 
How and when do children best learn science and how is it best taught? / 
Is scientific thinking just enhanced everyday thinking or something different? v 
How accessible is the scientific world view and what enhances and what blocks its.v 
adoption? 
• and finally, about society, 
What influences the course of human history? 
Are there transcendental principles influencing human behaviour? 
Who benefits from modern science? 
Where is human society heading? 
What is 'the good life' and how can we achieve it? 
Do we have 'democracy', and if not what might 'real democracy' look like? 
What complicates education even further is that when, or if, we get answers to these 
questions, we must keep in mind the distinction between what is and what ought to be 
92 
(Carr, 1995). We may find, for example, that middle-class children are better at abstract 
thinking than working-class children, but is this an unalterable biological fact or a cultural 
artifact that needs redressing? 
Some of these questions about society, science and education were raised in earlier 
sections. The questions of immediate concern are: How can we teach confidently in the 
face of uncertainties? and How can research help in this? 
9.2 Dilemmas in Teaching 
I would not presume to prescribe how to achieve the outcomes for science education that 
are outlined in Chapter 5. There are two main reasons for this reluctance. First, 
educational theory is not at the level that it can offer unambiguous guidance. Successful 
education is still a matter for the creative and critical combination of teachers' craft skills 
and local knowledge. Only the teacher knows which of the children's other curriculum 
experiences and knowledge science can be linked to; what it is that interests and motivates 
their students; what level of challenge their students respond to; what level of practical 
skill the class has developed; what attitudes towards learning and towards science their 
students bring from home; what school and community resources are available to support 
the science programme; what the level of cooperative skill is in the class; and what the 
immediate and longer term distractions are (such as the weather and forthcoming 
swimming sports). Second, there are often conflicting demands on teachers which are not 
amenable to a single resolution because some questions may, in principle, have no 
definitive answer. For example, should teachers help particular children to cope by 
making an adjustment to the task asked of them or should teachers help children face the 
challenge by insisting that they meet the criteria set? To assist teachers to consider and 
consciously react to sets of competing demands, I introduce the notion of 'dilemmas' 
(Berlak & Berlak, 1981). 
Some recent papers have taken a superficial view of dilemmas as problems that are met 
by beginning teachers, and to some extent resolved by them, (Tomanek, 1994; Volkman & 
Anderson, 1998). In contrast, Berlak & Berlak view a dilemma as a fundamental tension 
between two opposing demands. I have adapted from Berlak & Berlak (1981) and Suppes 
(1995) a list of dilemmas (by no means exhaustive) and loosely classified them as 
applying to schooling in general or to the content and method of science education in 
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particular. 
Dilemmas for schooling in general, involve decisions regarding: 
intrinsic motivation 
versus extrinsic motivation 
learning as social 
versus learning as individual 
learning as holistic 




teacher as involved human being 
versus teacher as objective professional 
children treated according to needs 
versus children treated equally 
individual freedom 
versus the discipline of the group 
In deciding what to teach, there are dilemmas for the teacher relating to: 
teaching through an applied science topic 
versus teaching through a pure science topic 
selecting the descriptive aspects of a topic 
versus selecting the theoretical aspects of a topic 
emphasising the processes science 
versus emphasising the content knowledge of science 
presenting science as problem solving / 
versus presenting science that involves searching for the truth 
In deciding how to teach, there are dilemmas for the teacher relating to: 
being a fellow learner 
versus being an authoritative source of knowledge 
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approaching knowledge as contestable 
versus approaching knowledge as a given that must be comprehended 
involving students in first hand explorations 
versus involving students in formal laboratory exercises 
basing lessons on the generation of knowledge 
versus basing lessons on the confirmation of knowledge 
Such conflicting pressures are by no means restricted to education. For example, our lives 
involve a tension between free will and determinism, that is, between our position as a 
conscious individual and our position as a product of an all-encompassing set of social 
forces. We do not 'resolve' this by exerting our free will nor do we submit to being a total 
pawn of fate. Instead we live out our lives in a constant interplay between these two 
extremes which, in the view of Marxist dialectics, is a state of affairs that is natural and 
inevitable, rather than contradictory and resolvable. Consider again our previous dilemma 
of whether the teacher should adapt the task to the child or the child to the task. Clearly 
there are no universal or final resolutions to such a dilemma, and teachers will continue to 
meet such situations and be forced to respond to them on a case by case basis. 
At our present level of pedagogicallmowledge, teaching remains as much an art as a 
science but, like science itself, educational theory is still developing. Research on such 
diverse topics as 'Family Science Nights' (McDonald, 1997) or the operation of the brain 
(Anderson, 1997) will continue to provide further insights, and may eventually produce 
coherent theories of teaching and learning. In the meantime, while some research may 
promise better knowledge and theories tomorrow, teachers must continue to operate 
today. It is for this reason that we develop a model that provides an educationally 
defensible 'destination', empowers teachers to exercise their professional autonomy in 





Figure 2 A model for evaluating science teaching 
Teaching episodes are classified according to the content that 
is selected, the teaching method used and to the outcome 
that these produce in learners. 
The zone of good teaching lies close to the horizontal mid-
plane in which the outcome for learners is the development 
of a measured commitment in science 
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9.3 A Model Based on Teacher Autonomy 
In the model shown in figure 2, teaching episodes are classified by the three 
characteristics; what is taught, how it is taught, and the reason that it is taught. The 
teaching episodes are then represented in the model as points in three dimensional space 
where 'Why' is the vertical dimension, and 'What and 'How' are the two horizontal 
dimensions. I have used, from section 5.2, Norris' ideas of 'unquestioning belief and 
'pathological doubt' (Norris, 1997) to mark the two extremes on the 'Why' axis. These 
extremes must be avoided, and we must aim instead at the central 'balance point'. This 
point on the outcome axis is a 'measured commitment' to theories, that is to say, a 
theoretical commitment that is relatively stable but is revisable on the basis of further 
evidence or a better theory. An explanation for the labels on the What and How axes is 
given below. Broadly speaking, teachers are free to make whatever content and method 
decisions they see fit, providing the decisions are ethically defensible, and providing that 
the decisions lead to the general goal of 'measured commitment'. Thus, in terms of the 
model, a teaching episode is 'good' if lies close to the central plane, and increasingly 
questionable as it moves above or below this central plane. 
In section 7.2, I suggested four dilemmas that may influence decisions on the what is to be 
taught. These dilemmas were concerned with: 
teaching through an applied science topic 
versus teaching through a pure science topic 
selecting the descriptive aspects of a topic 
versus selecting the theoretical aspects of a topic 
emphasising the processes science 
versus emphasising the content knowledge of science 
presenting science as problem solving 
versus presenting science that involves searching for the truth 
In reacting to anyone of these dilemmas, the decision made will be influenced by other 
decisions on what to teach, by decisions made on how to teach and by decisions made on 
general educational matters. Furthermore, the effect is reversible and as soon as anyone 
decision is made it may alter a teacher's judgement of the appropriateness of other 
dilemma decisions. In the model (figure 2), decisions on what to teach should themselves 
should be located in multidimensional space. However, the point of the model is not to 
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provide researchers and curriculum developers with a comprehensive analysis of 
classroom decision-making, and it is certainly not to define courses of action for teachers. 
The point of the model is first to provide teachers with a clear goal for science teaching, 
and second to provide a simple framework from which teachers can make decisions, about 
what to teach and how to teach it, based on the best evidence at the time. 
There is one problem with collapsing all decisions about what to teach into one 
dimension, and that is to find useful labels for the axis extremes. On the left hand end of 
each of the dilemma descriptions lies lesson material which is applied, descriptive, that 
emphasises process and that involves problem solving. Lesson content with these 
characteristics is likely to have been chosen because it is primarily 'concrete' in nature, 
and this end of the axis has been labelled accordingly. The alternative is content that is 
presented within a pure science topic, covers theoretical aspects, emphasises content over 
process, and involves the notion of truth. Under such circumstances I suggest that the 
content selected is likely to be primarily 'abstract', and this forms the second label. Two 
points must be made at this stage. First, I do not mean to imply that responses to the 
four dilemmas are necessarily linked in the two combinations given above. Clearly, 
selection of particular topics could lead to theoretical aspects within an applied topic, or 
process could be emphasised within a pure science topic. Second, unlike the 'Why' axis, 
there is not a central or preferred lesson content to be aimed for, and neither is there any 
that must be avoided. The goal of developing a measured commitment does not exert an a 
priori exclusion on what to teach. Each dilemma in this area is reacted to for a particular 
class or particular child under particular circumstances. 
In section 7.2, the dilemmas associated with decisions on how to teach were: 
being a fellow learner 
versus being an authoritative source of knowledge 
approaching knowledge as contestable 
versus approaching knowledge as a given that must be comprehended 
involving students in first hand explorations 
versus involving students in formal laboratory exercises 
basing lessons on the generation of knowledge 
versus basing lessons on the confirmation of knowledge 
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How to teach is similar to What to teach in that it should really be defined in 
multidimensional space, rather than being represented by a single dimension. On the left 
hand end of the dilemma descriptions are methods where the teacher is a fellow learner, 
knowledge is contestable, there is first-hand exploration of a topic and the emphasis is on 
generating knowledge. Such a combination would be likely to be 'child centred' and I use 
this as the appropriate marker. Alternatively we have 'teacher directed method' which 
relates to decisions where the teacher is an authority, knowledge is taken as given, and 
there is formal laboratory work related to the confirmation of knowledge. As with the 
content dimension, the four 'How' dilemmas are not necessarily linked in the 
combinations given above, and neither is there is any central or desired method. The goal 
of developing measured commitment does not exert an a priori exclusion on how to teach, 
nor does it privilege any particular method of teaching. Each teaching decision made in 
response to dilemmas on how to teach is made for a particular class under particular 
circumstances, and must also take into account the particular decisions made on what to 
teach. It is the combination of what to teach, and how to teach it, that should contribute 
to the outcome of a measured commitment. I would like to restate here that the purpose 
of the model is to emphasise to teachers as clearly as possible that topics and methods 
cannot, in isolation, be judged 'good or bad'. And to demonstrate that 'good teaching' is 
represented by all of that zone in the model which leads to the outcome of 'measured 
commitment' . 
Although teachers will make autonomous decisions based on local knowledge, I do not 
want my model to give the impression that all teaching decisions are idiosyncratic, 
pragmatic and beyond general guiding principles. Nor, indeed, I am advocating any 
dramatic changes in science teaching. If science education has a common goal then, 
allowing for local conditions, all teachers are likely to make similar decisions. These 
decisions are also likely to have much in common with the decisions now made within the 
best of current practice. Take, for example, decisions about the general topics to be 
studied in science. Currently, topics are fairly predictable; few courses would not at some 
stage introduce students to electric circuits, dissolving, and the structure and function of 
plants. There may be variations in the timing, the emphasis or, most recently, the context 
in which these topics are introduced and studied, but it would be an unusual course that 
avoided these subjects. This would continue to be true because my model specifies the 
rationale for selecting topics, rather than exerting any direct influence on the choice of 





real-life or 'relevant' science and that this introduces difficulties because of the inherent 
complexity of such topics. However, if we take up Kuhn's suggestion from section 6.2 
and align relevance with process rather than content, we remove the pressure to focus on 
the relevant but rather messy 'everyday science' topics. 
A high degree of autonomy for teachers has been advocated, not because this is 
necessarily a good thing in itself, but so that teachers make conscious decisions on what 
and how to teach. The outcomes of teaching must be continually and consciously 
monitored because we cannot rely on judging the content and method decisions as 'good' 
or 'bad' in their own right. A 'traditional' examination course in science may contain 
content that is largely abstract, and it may be taught in a teacher-directed manner. Some 
learners may find the subject difficult and sometimes be bored but, while this is not 'good' 
science teaching, it will not necessarily lead to undesirable outcomes. Students may work 
hard to gain an understanding and a 'measured commitment'. On the other hand, if the 
teacher is so worried about 'getting through the syllabus' that not only is the majority of 
the course abstract and teacher-directed but students are also coached in answering 
questions without any real understanding, then there is a real danger of developing an 
attitude of unquestioning belief (or simple rote learning!). In contrast, there are good 
educational justifications for making science interesting and relevant by dealing with 
everyday topics and by capturing the children's imagination through creative teaching 
methods. However, if so much emphasis is placed on both child-relevant content and 
child-centred method that the teacher over-emphasises the generation of personal ideas 
and loses sight of the pool of public knowledge that enables us to understand the world, 
then there is a danger of moving towards relativism, doubt and the devaluation of science. 
The point of the model is to alert teachers to the reasons why they are teaching science, 
and to encourage them to evaluate the learning outcomes in terms of their contribution to 
meeting the overall science education goal. 
The reason for advocating autonomy in the model is so that teachers can develop a clear 
rationale for any particular bit of science they are teaching. For example, laboratory work 
has been criticised as having being applied without much thought to its purpose (Hodson, 
1988; Osborne, 1993). 'Pracs' have often been assumed to be motivational, to teach 
laboratory techniques and investigative skills, while at the same time giving concrete 
experience of new or abstract concepts. In reality much 'lab work' probably does none of 
these things very well, and is considered by many students a pleasant social interlude and 
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a welcome break from taking notes. At a different level, investigation of a thick corn flour 
paste (which behaves in a peculiar and fascinating manner when it is stirred or left to sit) 
has been used with preschool children for language enhancement and the development of 
observation and other process skills (Fleer and Hardy, 1996). Teachers could also use the 
paste to illustrate the idea that not all systems can be simply explained; the children 
would be asked to speculate on the observed behaviour of the paste without any intention 
on the teacher's part of judging the value of the suggestions made, or of providing a 
publicly accepted explanation. Alternatively, children may be allowed to freely explore 
the behaviour of this paste as a purely motivational activity with no follow-up intended. 
Each of these activities - whether developing skills, illustrating complexity or simply 
allowing children to have fun - could be judged as making a useful contribution to the 
overall goal of science education, providing the activities were consciously structured as 
part of a balanced science programme. 
So far the model may appear unsatisfactory in that it gives little concrete guidance to 
teachers. Unfortunately, I believe this to be inevitable. There is a problem with any 
curricula which specify content, method or both, without allowing for the myriad of 
variables which daily affect each classroom. Such curricula risk producing poor teaching 
and ineffective learning because the teachers have great difficulty meeting the curricula 
requirements. I believe that a curriculum could be built around my model (although this is 
not a task I will be attempting in this thesis). Such a curriculum would need a minimum of 
three sections. The first section would be a discussion of the background themes of this 
thesis (the nature of science, the nature of society and their inter-relationship) pitched at 
an appropriate level. The second section would give suggested science topics and, rather 
than giving lists of content, for each topic there would be examples of scientific theories 
that might be held at different levels. The third section would contain, for each topic, 
examples of teaching units that have actually been tried and evaluated, and examples of 
methods used to teach the topics (with teacher evaluations of their effectiveness). Most 
primary teachers have enthusiasm and wisdom, and a desire to do well by their students. 
Most primary teachers lack both the time to collect resources and the scientific expertise 
to evaluate them. All primary teachers could evaluate, adapt and use resources in the form 
of pre-trialled teaching materials (particularly when there is no demand to replicate what 
is in the materials). The materials would need to cover the full range of 'teaching' shown 
in the model - from teacher-directed presentation of theoretical content to, child-centred 
approaches using concrete content. I believe that the curriculum material should 
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consciously avoid promoting any particular topic or method. In terms of what and how to 
teach, I am a thorough-going pragmatic, eclectic, relativist! - this really is an area where 
'anything goes' (providing, of course, the teaching outcomes lead towards the overall 
goaL) 
The exercise of autonomy precludes the notion of a curriculum that prescribes what and 
how to teach, but it does not preclude the existence of general guide lines to good practice 
nor the ability of researchers to enquire into teaching and learning and so enhance 
teachers' wisdom. How can we advance our knowledge of science teaching? How can 
researchers best help teachers? It is to these questions I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 10 ADVANCEMENT IN SCIENCE EDUCATION 
10.1 Paradigms and Progress? 
Perhaps the most consistent feature of science education reforms is that they gain many 
disciples and fail to live up to what was expected of them. We need to identify the 
problem with such approaches and find a different way of improving science teaching. 
In a comprehensive examination of the reform needs in teacher education Dana, Campbell 
& Lunetta (1997) see the failure of previous reforms as the result of inappropriate 'top 
down' development models by curriculum 'experts', and lack of ongoing support for 
teachers. In order to make intelligent teaching decisions, teachers need to understand what 
a reform is trying to achieve and, for this reason, Dana et aI. reject both 'bags of tricks' 
approaches and the production of 'teacher proof materials as ways of promoting change. 
Marx, Blumenfeld, Krajcik & Soloway (1997) reach similar conclusions in their very 
detailed analysis of the adoption of project-based science. One of the numerous 
documented problems in getting this approach to science teaching implemented was that 
teachers would adopt partial strategies in order to meet particular challenges, rather than 
adopt the approach as a whole. However, I would question what the key feature is here; 
is it the 'new method' itself or the outcomes that it is supposed to produce? It is an error 
to focus teachers too narrowly on the new method (or new content), for the extent to 
which these are adopted then becomes the criterion by which teacher success is judged. 
The priority accorded to the new content or new method becomes the driving force and 
this distorts teachers' decision making processes. Schemes from the past, such as the 
Nuffield science courses or PSSC physics, provided excellent teaching resources. 
However, these resources tended to prescribe content andlor method, and these 
constraints made it difficult for teachers to respond to the full range of daily dilemmas and 
to meet the outcomes demanded. Currently, a constructivist curriculum that places heavy 
emphasis on interactive teaching method will automatically impose constraints to the way 
in which teachers can respond to content dilemmas and this is likely to limit the outcomes 
that can be achieved. In terms of the teaching model in this thesis, any prescription placed 
on content or method will restrict access to the full 'zone of good teaching' . 
Both sets of authors, Dana et aI. and Marx et aI., stress the need for a total approach to 
curriculum development and they reinforce the notion that curriculum development is also 
teacher development. According to Dana et aI., teachers need understandings of 
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'themselves; their students; human development and diversity; subject matter; educational 
theory; curricular design; instructional methods; federal, state and institutional regulations; 
and political, social and moral relations between education, the community, and the world 
at large'. As an ideal, there is little fault with such a list, and I certainly support the case 
made for 'lifelong learning', for a supportive 'professional community', and for self-
learning from 'reflective practice'. However, I find it difficult to accept Dana et ai. 's notion 
of the need for, or existence of, a 'paradigm shift' in teacher development. Such a notion 
implies a final 'solution' to dilemmas or a 'new way' of doing things, and this simplistic 
approach leads to the sort of single-dimensional 'reform solution' that has failed in the 
past. A more fundamental objection to the notion of paradigm shifts in educational 
research is raised by Lakomski (1992). She points to the strong relativist implications in 
claims that are sometimes made for the incommensurability of different paradigms. There 
is more than one way to skin a cat, but equally importantly, it is possible to agree that the 
cat has been skinned and, with some argument, to judge which was the more effective 
manner of skinning. We do have standards of adjudication, and in science education it 
should be possible to judge, for example, which programs give students the maximum 
intellectual independence. 
Thus, while I have sympathy for many of the ideas of Dana et ai. and Marx et aI., 
particularly those related to the need for reflective practice and for teacher collaboration in 
a collegial atmosphere, there are better ways of influencing practice than through the 
implementation of 'new' schemes or theories in the form of 'paradigm shifts'. In the next 
section a case is made for informing teachers through a type of cooperative research. 
10.2 Research and Reform 
In section 7.l, the problem of distinguishing 'what is' from 'what ought to be' was raised 
using the hypothetical issue of the differential achievement of middle class and working 
class children; should this be taken to reveal a biological given or a social artifact that 
needed addressing? Based on the same general is-ought problem, Carr (1995) raises a 
fundamental (but not necessarily fatal) dilemma in the relationship between theory and 
practice. He expresses the dilemma as follows: 
'If the professional understanding of teachers is to be regarded as informed 
by the outcomes of certain kinds of quasi-scientific empirical observation 
and experiment then there would appear to be little to prevent the 
collapse of practical reason into the technicism of applied science. On the 
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other hand, however, if we insist that the scientific findings of action and 
other educational research do not determine educational conduct in any 
technological way but are liable to be influenced, even rendered irrelevant, 
by moral and evaluative considerations, then we are back to observing 
Aristotle's clear distinction of Phronesis from both theoria and techne and 
it can only be misleading to characterise moral wisdom in terms of either 
a moral or a practical science'. (p 324) 
Carr's way around this dilemma is to 'embrace fully' the Aristotelian view that practical 
wisdom (Phronesis) is significantly distinct from both theoretical and technical enquiry' 
(theoria and techne). And for the development of that principled understanding and 
deliberation required for the wise conduct of education he encourages a broad 
understanding of social issues and comments that: 
'I have long been convinced that students may stand to gain far more from 
a sympathetic reading of Dickens, Orwell and Lawrence in relation to 
their understanding of education than they are likely to get from studying 
Skinner, Bruner or Bloom's taxonomy [but] one is liable to attract the 
reputation of an educational flat-earther for even hinting at this 
possibility'. [p 329] 
While this is something of an exaggeration I sympathise with this viewpoint, first because 
it refutes the notion that teaching can be theory driven in a simplistic, prescriptive 
manner, and second because it emphasises the essential connection that education (and 
science education) must have with wider sociopolitical issues, that is, with 'real life'. 
However, there is a place for research informing practice, and practice guiding research, 
even in the face of the is-ought problem. In science, what 'is' in the real world provides 
both the basis for the development of theories and the final judgment of them, that is, we 
theorise about and investigate the behaviour of the world but we cannot will it to behave 
in a particular way. In education we must start with what 'is' in the real world but then 
use the ethical judgment of teachers and others to supply the 'ought', that is, to argue 
how we think things should be and what we should be trying to achieve. There will be 
limits of all kinds but we need to explore how to push the boundaries of what exists and 
how to do this within the complex dialectical relationship between teacher, student, 
knowledge and society. 
Despite the acknowledged theory-practice problem, I am by no means opposed to the 
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notion that advances in educational theory are able to inform teachers so that they 
improve their professional practice. However, this should not be a prescriptive, top-
down process. Researchers need to value the detailed skills and craft knowledge of 
teachers as a rich source of data and, as part of being reflective practitioners, teachers 
should acknowledge the broader and more detached view of the researcher. Tomanek 
(1994) makes a case for researchers to study the 'experienced curriculum' at the level of 
content and the meanings that are shaped during classroom interactions, that is, to study 
the actual outcomes of science education. In particular she makes a plea not to restrict 
studies to methodology and then prescribe how teachers should behave. The importance 
of recognising the craft skills of teachers is also emphasised by Haney et. al. (1996) when, 
in discussing barriers to progress in reform, they conclude that 'empowering teachers by 
providing them with both decision-making opportunities and needed resources appears to 
be central to lasting educational reform'. A potentially profitable approach lies in teachers 
and researchers working jointly, along the lines recommended by Kyle, Linn, and Bitner 
et. al. (1991), Shymansky and Kyle (1992) and Linn (1992). A similar sentiment is 
expressed again by Kyle (1994) when, in reference to the then new Handbook of Research 
on Science Teaching and Learning - Gabel, D. L. (editor), - he muses that 'perhaps the 
second edition will celebrate a new vision in which theory and praxis are linked among 
members of a dialogical community'. However, the most comprehensive and practical 
proposal is by Lijnse (1995). 
Lijnse highlights a basic dilemma. Researchers can report a detailed, well grounded project 
that involves a teacher and a particular classroom - but this will be non-generalisable, that 
is, it cannot be easily applied to other specific classrooms because it lacks any theoretical 
bite. Or, researchers can produce a theoretical piece of research that is abstract and 
'generalised' - but this will not be easy to translate into informed classroom practice. To 
avoid this dilemma, Lijnse sees theory developing from specific studies referred to as 
scenanos. 
'A scenario describes and justifies in considerable detail the learning tasks 
and their interrelations, and what actions the students and teachers are 
supposed and expect to perform: It can be seen as the description and the 
theoretical justification of a hypothetical interrelated learning and 
teaching process. In trying it out and closely monitoring it, it can be put to 
the test, and consequently revised. In the end, the scenario can be regarded 
as a rather detailed domain-specific theory for the teaching of a particular 
topic. Reflection on scenarios for various topics may lead to "higher level" 
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theories ... The intent is not to "prove" anything but to make it possible for 
others to judge what has been done and to enable them to "reconstruct" for 
themselves the processes described.' [p 196] 
This acknowledges a more equal partnership between researcher and practitioner, and this 
is in stark contrast to the idea of curriculum development through the implementation of a 
fully fledged 'new' scheme (even if there is a well supported scheme of concurrent teacher 
development) . 
My model lacks a way of improving content and method decisions. I have simply relied 
on 'teacher professionalism' and, although Dana et al. and other authors describe clearly 
how this might be supported, one could legitimately ask how this develops in the first 
place. What Lijnse's developmental research does is provide a non-prescriptive 
mechanism for this development, that is it provides a way forward that does not involve 
implementing 'new' schemes. However, on its own, Lijnse's model has nothing to prevent 
it from being a lot of isolated 'solutions to problems', that is it lacks a framework. What 
my model does is provide that framework and allow developmental research to reform 
science education. At the same time the model allows maximum teacher autonomy, it 
provides defensible educational outcomes and it supports the rationale of social change. 
10.3 Where to Now? 
If we are to apply scientific modes of enquiry to the improvement of science education 
then one thing we might expect to do is to squarely face challenging questions and 
assertions. For example Dutch (1996) challenges some assumptions about learners' 
curiosity: 
The fact that modern humans existed for several hundred thousand years 
without progressing beyond hunter-gatherer technology does not inspire 
confidence in the idea that curiosity is a hallmark of our species. The 
curiosity of children is superficial and short-lived: the adult equivalents are 
pseudoscience, channel surfing, supermarket tabloids, and the ten-second 
sound bite. The real educational tragedy in America is not that so many 
outgrow their childlike curiosity, but that so few do. 
[p 246]. 
Matthews (1995) follows a similar theme in objecting to constructivists who propose 'a 
facile continuity between the activity of children and the activity of scientists' where 
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'children are proto-scientists and scientists are somewhat older children'. What must be 
asked is whether constructivists seriously hold that science is by nature 'commonsense', 
or whether they stress the 'everyday' aspect of science as a pedagogical strategy that 
makes science more accessible to children. 
In stark contrast to the view of science as a very natural activity is the claim by Dutch 
(1996) that: 
Science, foreign languages, and history are unpopular because they are 
hard, not because they are poorly taught. They require students to focus 
on things outside the self and learn new modes of thought ... anti-science, 
math anxiety and science anxiety are largely rooted in narcissism ... 
(italics in the original) [p 249] 
Do we need to ask whether we do expect too little effort on the part of students when 
they learn science? or does Dutch mistakenly equate learning with mental pain? Perhaps a 
balance has been struck by Bereiter, Scardamalia, Cassells and Hewitt (1997). Their 
report on an exercise with sixth graders describes how, rather than following 
postmodernists' urge to 'cut scientists down to size', they tried to 'bring students up to 
size, instead'. 
All the above points touch on serious issues about the nature of science and the nature of 
teaching and learning. They are deserving of equally serious debate, even if it is to 
discover that on many points the various parties hold similar views but express them 
differently and so talk past each other. The rationale and model for science teaching 
described in this thesis makes debates more productive by providing a framework that 
will help us avoid old mistakes. In his book, Challenging New Zealand Science Education, 
Matthews (1995) criticises a set of 35 lesson plans because, while most contained 
'pleasant enough activities', only two 'were concerned to inform pupils about what food 
goldfish ate, what temperature water they survive in .. .' (p133). In this case, before 
rushing in to support or condemn Matthews' criticism, we can ask whether or not the 
activities were part of an integrated programme aimed at producing a measured 
commitment to some theory. In isolation, individual activities, and even individual 
lessons, cannot readily be judged good or bad. 
Matthews extended his criticism to science education in general and the New Zealand 
science curriculum in particular. The criticism was so fierce that a rebuttal volume was 
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assembled and distributed by the Waikato science education centre (Bell, 1995). While the 
debate was overly acrimonious it did have the positive effect of raising the public profile 
of science education with numerous articles featuring in the major newspapers (see 
reprints of these in Bell, 1995). When considering these criticisms of the curriculum we 
must look at the reasons for curriculum change. There was a desire by academics to put 
into practise the 'constructivist' principles arising from research here and overseas, and 
there was a political desire on the part of the Minister of Education to gain 
'accountibility' through the specification of levels of achievement. However, there was 
also an expression of dissatisfaction from teachers; the documents from which they were 
then working were certainly not ideal. 
The current science curriculum is a curious document. Its heart and soul come from a non-
prescriptive, Form 1 - V science curriculum that was completed in 1990 but never 
officially released, and its structural form comes from the highly prescriptive, 
Achievement Initiative set up in the United Kingdom. The result is a very open ended 
document that is little influenced by the content imperatives of science but one that 
specifies Achievement Objectives at eight different levels. Despite the plethora of 
curricula change over the last few years, I believe there is a strong case for reviewing the 
present curriculum document. 
First, the curriculum document is open-ended in terms of the content and method, and 
while this is a positive feature, there needs to be some sort of guiding principles for 
structuring learning. If this structure is not provided by science content, then it could 
be provided by the model of teaching outlined in this paper. 
Second, if we are to be open about the content and method, and if we also expect 
teachers to use professional autonomy effectively, then it is very important that 
teachers have a clear rationale for teaching science - setting such a rationale has been 
the major goal ofthis paper. 
Third, if we accept that most primary teachers will not have expert scientific 
knowledge, then much more explanation [at the teachers level] of the various 
Achievement Aims is needed. For example, in my experience, there is considerable 
teacher confusion over what a 'relationship' is [see Ministry of Education, (1993), 
Aim 2, Physical World strand, p 70]. Furthermore, the curriculum should outline, for 
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each aim, what would be an appropriately sophisticated understanding [at the 
children's level] at various stages of development. If the aims were explained in this 
way, we could delete the present 'Levels' of achievement objectives, which are often 
hopelessly confused over the content and the process. For example, Achievement 
Objective 1 of the Physical World suggests that 5 and 6 year olds should' share and 
clarify their ideas' without any investigation (which is in the next level) and only at 
upper primary school (Level 4) should children 'compare their ideas with scientific 
ideas' (Ministry of Education, 1993. pp 72-79). This is clearly a nonsense; children at 
all levels will need to discuss, clarify, investigate and compare ideas with scientific 
ones, albeit at differing levels of sophistication. 
Fourth, I would remove most of the suggestions for contexts and learning activities 
[unless they were accompanied by considerable amplification as to which Aim they 
were related and how this connection was to be established]. In my observation the 
current vague suggestions lead many well-meaning teachers into ill-considered, non-
science topics which make very poor use of the 'science' time allocated in their 
programme. 
Fifth, now that other curriculum documents are established, it is time to look for 
overlap between curricula and, rather than simply removing any common aims, we 
should consider fostering integration at the curriculum document level. For example, 
Physical World, Aim 4 would clearly integrate into a 'technology' topic, and 
discussions about the ethics of technological applications could easily spill over into 
'social studies'. In this way important questions about the applications of science 
could be discussed. Furthermore, if integration was part of the curriculum documents, 
it would be clearer to teachers that there was a point where scientific thinking stopped 
and social studies/ethical thinking began. Curriculum documents should also encourage 
both reading activities in 'science' and science contexts for 'reading'. We need a 
carefully thought out policy on integration with attention given to the common and to 
the distinctive skills of each curriculum area. Such a policy would make it easier for 
teachers to distinguish, for example, between times when reading is being taught in 
science and times when science is being taught in reading. If teachers were guided more 
clearly to examine the skills taught, rather than simply naming a space in their 
timetable 'science', it could result in more science being taught without any further 
pressure to fit more into the school day. 
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In my view, the curriculum document could come down to a smaller and more useful, 
document that spoke directly to teachers about the broader issues: why we teach science, 
the special content, skills and thinking that are unique to science, the place of science 
education within general education, and ways in which science integrates into other 
planning. This slimmed down curriculum, which would continue to promote professional 
autonomy within decisions about content and method, would need to be supported with 
substantial, teacher-friendly resources. And resources do not need to be produced by 
'outsiders' or 'experts', many teachers produce great ideas, but these ideas often remain 
within their school or syndicate. This situation arises, not because teachers do not want 
to share their ideas, but because teachers often do not realise how good their ideas are. It 
would be useful to reactivate the previous inspectorial role of giving advice and guidance 
and of cross-pollenating good ideas. Here is a positive role for ERO! 
We also need to consider the areas for research. In a keynote address to the 1999 ESERA 
conference in Kiel, Peter Fensham claimed that one of the achievements of the past two 
decades has been the shift in research emphasis to the learner. However, while some shift 
was necessary, it is possible that the pendulum has swung too far and that there is now a 
need to refocus both on the teacher and on science. The dilemma that a focus on teaching 
poses for researchers has been outlined in section 10.2. Such a focus does emphasise the 
need for researchers to make sense of the complex and messy world of the classroom 
rather than looking at fragmentary aspects of learning in a controlled environment. 
Perhaps, for a teacher, the most professionally valuable work a classroom researcher can 
do is to help the teacher to reflect on their classroom decisions, to articulate a rationale for 
these decisions, and to analyse the outcome in terms of students achieving a measured 
commitment to a theory. The second renewed research focus (that on science) could start 
with a reassessment of prerequisite knowledge for learning various science topics at 
different levels. With this, I am not advocating a complete return to the type of 
conceptual analysis behind many of the curricula of the 1960' s because these tended to 
ignore the learner. With hindsight, we may be able to take into account the needs of the 
learner as well as the content demands. For me, one interesting question that may be 
answered by such research is whether we can retain a totally open approach to the 
content or whether there is a need to move to some core of topics. Either way, it seems to 
me essential that any resource which is designed to help teachers come to grips with 
science content must itself be carefully structured in terms of the concepts involved. 
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So, where does this leave primary school science? Where do we go from here? The vast 
majority of teachers and student teachers that I have met in ten years of teacher training 
have been highly skilled professionals who would be perfectly capable of teaching good 
science providing certain conditions were met. These conditions include a curriculum 
which provides more guidance, the provision of 'user friendly' resources, and the 
articulation of a clear rationale for teaching science. 
This thesis does give a framework consisting of a justification for science education and a 
model that describes science teaching . With such a framework, advantage could be taken 
of the 'myriad of possibilities' offered by the curriculum and for this reason I welcome 
the curriculum's avoidance of prescription. In criticising the current science curriculum let 
us remember that the previous curricula also failed to provide a coherent framework, and 
that changes were at least partly in response to teacher dissatisfaction. The new 
curriculum could work, and science education could move to a higher level of 
sophistication. It is not that primary teachers have tried to teach science and been found 
wanting, it is that, within the meaning of this thesis, most primary teachers are yet to try 
science teaching. 
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
The thesis started with the questions of why we teach science, what we should teach in 
science, and how we should teach it. The key to answering what to teach and how to 
teach it lies in finding good reasons for why we teach science. Science education, at the 
level of compulsory science, should be seen in the context of general education, and 
science education should share general education's broad social goals of building a better 
society. The form of democracy in most countries exists more in form than in spirit. 
While general education may teach democratic ideals, capitalist hegemony acts as a brake 
on the extent to which such ideals can be implemented. In more general terms, action for 
change is limited by the very nature of humans as social beings - since society preexists 
any particular individual, intentional human action is moulded by society. However, this 
does not lead to the inevitable conclusion of social determinism. The set of social relations 
(which is society) must itself be continually reproduced by the daily actions of people, 
and this allows for intentional or unintentional effects to occasionally transform parts of 
society. The rational transformation of society would thus be possible with a population 
that held democratic ideals, and that had the skills and disposition required to implement 
those ideals by analysing, challenging and changing social institutions. General education 
can produce a popular belief in democratic ideals, and science education can playa major 
role in fostering the skills and dispositions required to implement the ideals. 
The general question of 'What is science?' and the more specific question of 'What 
enables humans to generate reliable knowledge about the world', arose as part of the 
enquiry into why, how and what to teach. The question 'What is science?' is better 
replaced by the question, 'How science is becoming?', This replacement is required 
because science is a relatively new human activity, and it is is not characterised by a 
simple, fixed method, but rather one that is still evolving. For the purposes of science 
education, science is best thought of as a way of thinking, a particular way of utilising a 
human, meaning-making trait, and a conscious search for truth. This view roughly 
corresponds to a moderate realist view of science and is in contrast to two other 
alternatives views, positivism and postmodernism. If science education reinforces a 
positivist view of science then we will limit citizens' critical and analytical attitudes and 
suppress their justified skepticism. Under these circumstances, citizens will tend to 
accept information on the basis of authority rather than evidence, and such citizens would 
be unlikely to challenge and improve society. Post-modernist teaching is even worse as it 
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pushes skepticism to a level where it will destroy people's very belief in 'meta narratives' 
such as the democratic project. 
The nature of scientific knowledge raises questions for teachers of science: 'If science is 
authoritative, how can we teach it in a non-authoritarian manner?' or 'How can we teach 
scientific knowledge that is beyond reasonable doubt, but at the same time maintain a 
healthy skepticism in our students?' The answer lies in aiming to produce in learners a 
'measured commitment' to theories. Holding a theory in a measured way means that 
learners have accepted it, having weighed evidence and other theories against it. Having a 
commitment to the theory means that, with it, learners will expect to be able to explain 
new phenomena, to absorb new evidence and will expect it to be more than a match 
against competing theories. Learning science involves students in changing commitment to 
a theory and in judging when this is appropriate. This illustrates the difference between 
learning science and doing science - in the learning situation, teachers can make sensitive 
use of the authority of science to help children make a rational reassessment of theory 
commitment. In working this way teachers must distinguish carefully between induction 
into science and indoctrination into science. 
The quality of educational outcomes largely depends on the quality of decisions made by 
teachers. A curriculum that prescribes either content or method actually puts barriers in 
the way of teachers as they attempt to respond to the 'dilemmas'. A dilemma occurs 
when teachers face legitimate but conflicting educational demands caused by the complex 
internal and external interactions of people, school and society. For such dilemmas, 
neither educational theory nor curriculum requirements are able to provide solutions. A 
model is developed in which teaching episodes are represented by points in a space 
defined by the three dimensions; content selected to be taught, method chosen to teach it 
and the reason why it is being taught. As long as teaching has the goal of getting children 
to make a measured theoretical commitment, there is considerable scope for teachers to 
use their 'local knowledge' and 'teacher wisdom' in deciding what to teach and how to 
teach it. 
Research also has a place in helping determine teacher action but, because teacher 
decisions and actions rely heavily on local knowledge, a prescriptive model for research 
(with a hierachy placing researchers above teachers) must be avoided. One appropriate 
research model is developmental research, a form of cooperative research where theory 
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evolves through a series of 'scenarios'. Such a research programme could promote the 
desired teaching outcomes by adding to the teaching model a non-prescriptive mechanism 
for advancing teacher wisdom. In return, my model adds to developmental research a 
coherent framework that prevents the scenarios from remaining fragmentary answers to 
isolated questions. 
An analogy used in Chapter 9 casts teachers as drivers on a journey which is only partly 
mapped out. The notion of a partial picture applies to all aspects of social development. 
In particular, compulsory schooling is a relatively new phenomenon. Set up partly in 
response to liberal concerns for the fate of children in the new industrial setting, and 
partly in response to the new industrial demands for a more literate work force, schools 
have always been torn in two directions. Even where schools reproduce the existing social 
relations, there is always the potential for education to promote change. The calendar may 
show tomorrow as just one more square on a preordained chart, the teacher's plan book 
and timetable may make the year seem like a well-worn track, but events are not entirely 
predictable. Each time we teach a class we move, minute by minute, into uncharted 
territory where we cannot forecast exactly the consequences our actions. My hope is for 
a science education that has change as an integral part of its goals, and for science teachers 
to take part in the type of change process described by Gramsci: 
For a mass of people to be led to think coherently ... about the real, present 
world, is a 'philosophical' event far more important and 'original' than the 
discovery by some philosophical 'genius' of a truth which remains the 
property of small groups of intellectuals ... it is not a question of introducing 
from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone's individual life, but 
of renovating and making 'critical' an already existing activity. 
Antonio Gramsci 
quoted in Willis (1978) 
p 185 
We need to start a journey somewhere. We can start by sorting out where we are going 
and where we should be going, we can start by reflecting on how we could do things 
better but, if we want change, the key thing is that we should start. In Willis' own words, 
it may be Monday morning but 'Monday morning need not imply an endless succession 
ofthe same Monday morning' . [Italics in the original] 
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